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
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THE RANGE OF THE LOGOS-NAME IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL

The four points in dispute in connection with the Logos-title are: 1) its ontological reference to the immanent life of the Godhead; 2) its functional reference to the creation of the world; 3) its functional reference to the continued supply of life and light to the world in the sphere of providence; 4) its functional reference to the revealing and redemptive work of the Old Testament dispensation. When we compare these four questions as to their exegetical status, it appears that in regard to the first and the second it is not the presence of the idea in the text that is called in question, but only the association of the Logos-name with this idea, whereas in regard to the third and fourth points the presence of the idea itself is denied by certain exegetes. That the words: "In the beginning was the Logos and towards God was the Logos, and God was the Logos" are intended to convey information touching the internal life of the preëxistent Christ as related to God is recognized by all, and the difference of opinion concerns merely the question whether the truths expressed are analytically contained in the Logos-name or not. Similarly, there is no dispute about the fact that ver. 3 (of Jno. i.) makes the preëxistent Christ the mediator of creation. The words: "All things were made through Him" admit of no other understanding.¹ What remains subject to doubt is again merely the question whether the preëxistent Christ bears the Logos-name on account of this function. In regard to the third and fourth points the situation is quite different. That the writer in vs. 4, 5, 9, 10 means to refer to a continued operation of the Logos in supplying life and light to the natural world is by no means admitted on all hands. Many exegetes here refer what used to be thus understood to the

¹ The old Socinian interpretation of even ver. 3 as describing the new spiritual creation may be discounted. *Cpr.* Lücke, *Comm. üb. d. Ev. des Joh.*³ I, p. 302.

activity of the incarnate Christ in the sphere of redemption. Consequently, there here lies back of the problem whether the Logos-name connotes such a function, the more fundamental exegetical problem whether such a function existed in the mind of the writer or at least has found expression in his words. And even more common is the opinion that the alleged Old Testament activity of the preëxistent Christ found by some in vs. 11-13 has no real place in these verses, the reference here also being to the incarnate appearance and activity of the Saviour, so that with the whole idea of a function of Christ under the Old Covenant the inclusion of such a function in the Logos-title also disappears.

It follows from the foregoing, that in the second step of our inquiry, as in the first, the exegetical basis of fact may be taken for granted, and our attention concentrated upon the question whether the function affirmed of Christ is to the writer's mind a specific Logos-function. It is necessary to remember here the strong vantage-ground offered by ver. 14, in defense of the position that before the incarnation Christ not merely preëxisted, but preëxisted as Logos. The statement "the Logos became flesh" to our view absolutely requires the assumption that He of whom it is made was the Logos previously to His becoming flesh. Either in His previous mode of existence or in His previous mode of activity there must have been something that entitled Him to this designation. Zahn escapes from this conclusion only through a most artificial rendering of the clause in question. He translates: "The Logos became in this fashion, that as flesh He entered into existence."² This rendering judges

² "Der Logos ist so geworden dass er als Fleisch in 's Dasein trat." *Einkl. i. d. N. T.*¹ II, p. 546. In the *Kommentar* this specific paraphrase is not found. By implication, however, the *Kommentar* gives the same view. To justify the above curious rendering Zahn compares Lk. xxii. 44; 1 Cor. i. 30; xv. 45; 2 Cor. i. 19; 1 Thess. i. 5; 1 Thess. ii. 1. None of these passages, however, can be placed on a line with Jno. i. 14. In Lk. xxii. 44 *καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἰδρῶς αὐτοῦ ὥσπερ θρόμβοι αἵματος* surely does not mean that the sweat came as blood into existence, but that it was turned into blood. The thought of 1 Cor. i. 30, *ὃς ἐγενήθη σοφία ἡμῖν ἀπὸ θεοῦ* is not that Christ Jesus came into existence as "wisdom"

itself. From Zahn's own point of view a more simple escape from the difficulty would have lain through finding here in ver. 14, after the manner assumed by many exegetes in ver. 1, a proleptic introduction of the Logos-name. But this, while relatively preferable to the other translation, has its own difficulties. A proleptic use of the Logos-name in the very sentence which describes the origin of the Logos is after all something quite different from what is found in ver. 1, and cannot in point of plausibility be even remotely placed on a line with it. The fact, therefore, remains that on the only natural and practically universal understanding of ver. 14, a previous existence or functioning of the Saviour in a Logos-capacity is implied. This previous reality of the Logos-character must have lain either in the intra-divine life or in the cosmical activity of the preëxistent Christ. The writer of the Prologue may have been unacquainted with either the one or the other of these two ideas; he cannot have been unfamiliar with both. Those, therefore, who refuse to follow the church-theology in its trinitarian understanding of the clauses of ver. 1, are by reason of this very refusal all the more bound to find in the sequel some reference to that pre-incarnate display of the Logos-character which the opening words of ver. 14 imply. On the other hand, recognition of the ontological significance as implied in ver. 1 does not preclude further recog-

for us; the construction with ἀπὸ does not require such a reference to the origin of the Saviour, and would permit it only if ἀπὸ θεοῦ stood before ἐγενήθη: the meaning is simply that Jesus was made unto us all this through His mediatorial work. In 1 Cor. xv. 45 the construction, ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν, ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν. the construction (with εἰς) differs from that of Jno. i. 14, but, apart from this, the former half of the statement is a quotation from Genesis and owes its peculiar form to this; the second half is modelled after the first. 2 Cor. i. 19, ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ υἱὸς . . . οὐκ ἐγένετο Ναὶ καὶ Οὐ does not mean "came not into existence as", but "did not prove to be". Similarly 1 Thess. i. 5, τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐγενήθη εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐν λόγῳ μόνον does not refer to the origination of the gospel, but to what it came to be for the Thessalonians. The same applies to 1 Thess. ii. 1, οἴδατε τὴν εἰσοδὸν ἡμῶν τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὅτι οὐ κενὴ γέγονεν; here γέγονεν is simply "proved to be".

inition of the functional significance as expressed in the sequel. The wording of ver. 14 involves the idea that the subject of the incarnation bore the Logos-name significantly before, but this may be true in two or three capacities as well as in a single one.

What reasons, then, have we to assume that the Evangelist not merely ascribes a mediatorial agency in creation to the Logos-subject, but finds in this agency a manifestation of the Logos-character? We cannot *à priori* refuse to consider the proleptic interpretation: All things were made through Him who afterwards was to appear as the Logos. The possibility of this must be reckoned with, because we have already granted the same possibility in regard to ver. 1. The very respectable body of exegetical opinion which stands back of the proleptic interpretation there, shows that it lies well within the range of the debatable. If we recognize as a possible paraphrase of ver. 1: In the beginning was He who was afterwards to appear as the Logos, etc., we are bound to bring the same open mind to the paraphrasing of ver. 3 on the same principle. From a purely exegetical point of view the two cases are precisely alike. On the other hand, a certain degree of implausibility attaches to the view which in ver. 1 takes the name proleptically, and then in ver. 3 finds it necessary to insist upon inherent appropriateness with reference to the function affirmed. One cannot help feeling that some allowance must be made for the likelihood of the author's introducing the title in both cases for the same reason. The exegesis which finds prolepsis in the former verse and excludes it from the latter, is weaker than that which treats both verses alike, either on the principle of prolepsis or otherwise. As a matter of fact, the case for prolepsis is slightly more favorable in ver. 3 than in ver. 1, because the word Logos occurs explicitly in the great opening sentences of the Prologue, whereas in ver. 3 it appears only by implication as the antecedent of the pronoun in *δι' αὐτοῦ*. To say, through Him (= the Logos) all things were made, calls less attention to

the Logos-character of the subject than to say, in the beginning was the Logos. If therefore it should appear that even in the statement which less accentuates the name Logos, the author nevertheless has clearly the inherent significance of the title before his mind, then this cannot fail to have some retroactive effect upon our understanding of the great opening sentences of the Gospel. The two questions, as to whether the Logos-character enters into the ontological mode of existence of Christ, and whether it enters into His creative activity, are to this extent interlinked.

There are weighty reasons for believing that in ver. 3 the author introduces the creative works of Christ as a Logos-function in the strictest sense of the word. The preponderance of exegetical opinion to this effect among the very class of writers who hold back in ver. 1 and refuse to entertain the ontological exegesis there, sufficiently proves how cogent these reasons are. If it were not for them, the same shrinking from the speculative, which seeks to keep the Logos-name and the trinitarian ontology apart, would also operate to keep the Logos-name and the doctrine of creation apart. But the facts speak too plainly in the latter case to allow of this.

In the first place one must reckon with the obvious allusions in vs. 1-5 to the Genesis-account of the creation. These allusions render it necessary to assume that the author finds the Logos-name reminiscent of the part played in that account by the creative speech of God.³ It is one thing to believe that the whole Logos-doctrine as presupposed and further developed in the Prologue can be without residue explained from Genesis i, and quite another thing to say that, once the creation-story stood clearly before the writer's mind, he could not possibly have represented the

³ Hölemann, *De Evangelii Johannis Introitu*, Lipsiae, 1855, has ingeniously traced the parallelism between Genesis and the Prologue, but with too much refinement of detail. Godet not merely finds correspondences in the ἐν ἀρχῇ of verse 1, but also associates the ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν with the plural of Gen. i. 26 ("let us make man"), the life and light of ver. 4 with the trees of life and of knowledge of good and evil, the σκοτία of ver. 5 with the story of the fall.

Logos as mediating in the creation of the world, without observing that this fitted in admirably with the Scripture-account according to which God called all things into being through His word. The same suggestive force of the combination that has obtruded itself upon so many exegetes can hardly have escaped the notice of the Evangelist. That the Evangelist not merely intends to ascribe to Christ a part in the creation of all things in general, but specifically means to represent Him as performing that part in the capacity of Logos, follows also from the preposition employed. The statement is not *πάντα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο* but *πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο*. For the general thought that Christ participated in the creation of all things the former would have been the natural expression; for conveying the specific idea that His rôle was the rôle played by the divine word in Genesis, the construction with *διὰ* was the one peculiarly fitted.⁴

Weight must further be attached to the standing association everywhere else between the Logos-name and the creative function of the subject so designated. No matter where the Logos meets us, whether it be in Philo or in the Hermetic writings or in the Jewish theology, the mediation in the making of things is a specific and prominent part of His office. The constant recurrence of this feature indicates of itself that no mere accident can account for this; the name and the function belong naturally together. Whatever be the ultimate sources of the doctrine, sufficient acquaintance with and reference to the contemporaneous Logos-belief and speculations may safely be credited to the Evangelist, to render it certain that in speaking of the Logos in connection with the creation he would expect to be understood in the current sense.

Still further, the obvious progress of thought between ver. 3 and ver. 4 speaks likewise in favor of this conclusion. It is not necessary here to prejudge the question, whether ver. 4 ("In Him was life, and the life was the light of

⁴ *Cpr.* 1 Cor. viii. 6 *δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα*; Col. i. 16 *ἐν αὐτῷ* and *δι' αὐτοῦ*; Heb. i. 2 *δι' οὗ ἐποίησεν*.

men") relates to the preincarnate or to the incarnate Christ. In either case a connection will have to be assumed between the task of the Logos in creation and the presence in the same Logos of the subsequent supply of life and light for the world. Because of the fact that all things were made through Him, and in harmony with this fact, it is affirmed that in Him was life, and that this life was the light of men. By universal consent the furnishing of life and light to the world belongs to the very essence of the Logos-task. Consequently, that which forms either the basis for or the prelude to the quickening and enlightening of the world cannot have been something wholly detached from the Logos-character. If Christ gives life and light qua Logos, and if His mediatorial agency in the creation was but the beginning of this line of activity, then He must appear to the Evangelist at the former stage the same as He does in the latter, *i.e.*, as the Logos.

Finally, the obvious parallelism between the work of Christ in nature and in redemption, traced by the Prologue, renders it more than probable that it is precisely the Logos-name in which the writer finds the two members of this parallelism reduced to their higher unity. It is through the Logos that all things were made; it is also through the Logos, become flesh, that all things in redemption were accomplished. In the former case the connection between name and work can hardly be different from that in the latter. That in the latter case it is of the most intimate and organic character is recognized on every hand, most of all by the advocates of the restriction of the Logos-title to the incarnate stage of the Saviour's work. The coördinate-ness of the two activities, both of them alike coupled with the Logos-name, carries with it a high degree of probability that the inherent meaning of the name extends not simply to one but to both. Of course this agreement would be still stronger, if it were to be urged in connection with the chronologically progressive interpretation of the Prologue. If the Evangelist meant to affirm of the Logos-Person

that in succession He operated in creation, in providence, under the Old Covenant and since the incarnation, then the presumption in favor of a significance of the Logos-title equally distributed with reference to each of these four stages would grow in proportion to the care and deliberateness with which we should have to credit the Evangelist in building up this harmonious scheme of a progressive Christological function. Since, however, the chronological structure of the Prologue is subject to serious doubt, we prefer not to present the argument in this particular form.

In view of the above considerations we continue to believe that ver. 3 not merely records an important fact about Him who subsequently was to act as the Logos, but also represents this fact as an integral part of the specific Logos-task. In the creation of the world the Logos-character of the Preëxistent One finds expression. Even if we were to ascribe to the writer no conscious etymological reflection upon the way in which the Logos-name and the Logos-function hang together, this would still have to be maintained. The link between the two might be one of mere conventional association, the Logos-name calling up the thought of creating and *vice versa*, but it would work none the less with necessity. And this, even in its unconscious associational form, would be something far different from the view according to which in the mind of the writer the name Logos as applied to Jesus and His creative function were originally quite foreign to each other, the name having been given Him in the first place for a totally different, purely redemptive reason, and then afterwards, without reflection upon His name, mediation in the making of all things having been affirmed of this redemptive Logos. If this were the correct view, then the Logos-name would have inherently no more to do with the creation of the world than the name Christ or Kyrios. As Paul could say that through Christ or through the Lord all things were made, so John would have said that through the Logos all things were called into being. In both cases the two things

would be linked together after a purely external fashion. It is precisely in regard to this that we believe the use of the name Logos differs in such a connection from the name Christ or Kyrios. It is the name appropriate to the occasion.

A mere conventional association, as stated above, would be sufficient to uphold this view. But there is reason to assume that to the Evangelist the connection was a thoroughly intelligent one. The first element entering into it is undoubtedly that of the instrumentality of divine omnipotence. That God acts in general, and in particular creates by His word, is a common Old Testament expression for describing the omnipotent mode of His activity. This was the case in the first creation of all things, when God spake and by His mere speaking the effect was accomplished. Now if the Evangelist identifies the preëxistent Christ with this omnipotent creative word, his first thought will have been that through Christ the divine omnipotence asserted itself, that Christ entered into the creation as the Logos of God because God made Him the Mediator of His almighty power.

That this thought was actually present to the writer's mind follows not merely from the obvious dependence of the representation on the account in Genesis, but also from the mention of "life" in ver. 4 as the first thing present in the Logos in consequence of his Logos-relation to the world. He is the Logos because in Him is life; the connecting link that holds these two ideas together is none other than that of His being the organ of omnipotence. As in the divine word there is in general the unique potency of producing life wherever it is uttered, so in Him as the personal Word the same potency inheres.⁵

⁵ The idea is not directly expressed that the preëxistent Christ was the possessor of omnipotence, but that He acted as the instrument of omnipotence. Nevertheless the deity and the omnipotence of Christ are implied. It will be observed that the general representation: God creates through His (mere) word, and the specific turn here given it: God created through the personal Logos, seem at first sight mutually

This interpretation of the use made of the Logos-concept in ver. 3 in the light of ver. 4 holds good, no matter whether the statements of the latter verse relate to the preëxistent or to the incarnate Christ. It makes no difference whether the life spoken of was the life of nature or the life of redemption; in either case the possession of it by Christ is in accordance with and the result of His Logos-character; in either case the underlying thought of the connection is: to be the Logos of God means to be the organ for the production of life.

It is of the highest importance to mark sharply at this point that the first thing associated with the Logos-name by the writer does not lie in the sphere of knowledge but in the sphere of power; the first characteristic Logos-product is life, not light. This is all the more significant, since the sequence of the creative acts of God in the Genesis-account places the production of light before that of life, so that the reversed sequence of the Prologue: "In Him was life, and the life (that was in Him) was the light of men", obtains a pointed significance. Here it plainly appears already that the equation, Logos = Revealer, fails to do justice to the pregnancy of the title as employed by the Evangelist. Before this is thought of, the other more fundamental equation, Logos = Omnipotent Source of Life, should be called to mind. The clear recognition of this at the very root-point where the Logos-idea bifurcates is of the utmost importance for a correct understanding of the subsequent teaching of the Gospel as a whole. It places at the outset the life-giving and the illuminating aspects of Christ's activity, or, to speak soteriologically, the redemptive and revelatory functions of His work as Saviour, in their proper relation to each other. It saves the Gospel from the contradictory, the point of the former being the immediateness, that of the latter the mediateness of the transaction. The contradiction, which on Philo's premises is unresolvable, resolves itself on the premises of the Evangelist, by remembering the preceding statement *θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*. The instrumental character of the Logos here does not interfere with the immediateness of the act, because in the instrument the divine creating omnipotence is personally present.

charge of intellectualism, which has so often been brought against it, and which its characterization as the Logos-Gospel seemed to justify. If Christ as Logos has a wider task than that of imparting light and knowledge, if He fulfills His Logos-nature in the production of life, then the Gospel can be truly a Logos-Gospel, without lying open to the charge of a one-sided intellectualism. The new-creation of all things in the sphere of redemption becomes, on this wider and more correct view, as truly a part of the Logos-function as the communication of supernatural knowledge.

On the other hand, starting with this wider and more adequate appreciation of what the Logos-name covers, it will be far easier to show that the Logos-concept actually underlies and shapes the teaching in the body of the Gospel, and is not due to a mere idiosyncrasy of the mental state out of which the Prologue was written. All that the Gospel teaches concerning salvation, the whole circle of ideas connected with life and regeneration and resurrection, will on this view naturally range itself with the interpretation of Christ's Person and work from the Logos-point of view. How easy it was for the Evangelist to subsume these ideas under the rubric of creative omnipotence, operating as such by means of the word, may be seen from Jno. v. 25, 28, where the resurrection is represented as taking place through the utterance of the voice of the Son of God, and where there is the same close association between the ideas of the omnipotent word and the idea of life as in the Prologue: "The hour cometh, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and they that hear shall live. For as the Father hath life in Himself, even so gave He to the Son also to have life in Himself."⁶

⁶ It is true that in Jno. v. 25, 28 the representation differs in so far as the Son here has and utters the word instead of being the Word. But this is not fatal to the assumption that the writer connected both representations. As in the sphere of revealing God, Christ is the Logos, and yet all He speaks, forming part of what He is, is subsumed under this Logos-character, so in the sphere of omnipotent creation, Christ may be conceived both as being the Word, and as uttering it, the latter relation being subsumable under the former.

The last words of this quotation suggest that the point just made may also have a bearing on the trinitarian aspect of the Logos-idea. Where Logos is taken as descriptive of the manner of provenience of the Son from the Father, and at the same time the significance of the Logos-concept is confined to the sphere of revelation, the inference may seem justified that the eternal generation takes place *per modum intellectus*. But when it is realized that the writer of the Gospel makes the first application of the idea not in the sphere of revelation but in that of omnipotent power, that in fact the Logos-name calls up first to his mind not the idea of light but that of creation and life, then it will be perceived that the intellectualistic construction of the doctrine and the formula coined for it are by no means inseparable from the doctrine itself. The Logos-name in its ontogenetic aspect need signify no more than that the filiation within the Deity is an act of omnipotent power. On the specific *modus* of this act it need throw no further light.⁷

The question next presenting itself is, whether subsequent to the creation, and with reference to the existing world of nature, a Logos-activity is taught in the Prologue. This also the older interpretation affirmed (Chrysostom: *ἐπάγει περὶ τῆς προνοίας λόγον*), whereas more recent exegesis in varying forms inclines to denying it. This is done by transferring everything usually understood in vs. 4, 5, 9 and 10 of the work of the Logos in providence to His activity in the incarnate state and for redemption. In Him as the incarnate Christ was life, and this life on earth was

⁷ The line of argument pursued above would lose its force if it could be shown that the idea of "life" itself belongs for the writer to the intellectual sphere, for in that case the production of life would be equivalent to the production of light, of intelligence, and the equation Logos = Revealer would suffice for deducing life from the Logos-idea. But the dependence of ver. 4 on ver. 3 proves that "life" must have a wider significance than this, since it is the result of the creation of *all things* by the Logos, and only in man, not in all things, could life have this intellectual content. As a matter of fact it is only in ver. 4 that the writer comes to speak of man specifically and of the specific light-form that the life of the Logos assumes for man.

the light of men. It now (*i.e.*, at the time of writing) shines in the darkness, and the darkness comprehended (or, overcame) it not. The Saviour come in the flesh is the true light which lighteth every man. Through His incarnation He was in the world, and as such the world knew Him not. By this exegesis the whole idea of a Logos-function in providence is forced out of the Prologue. What remains is, on the one hand, the work of the Logos in creation (ver. 3), and on the other hand His work in the incarnate state (vs. 4 ff.); the middle term hitherto interpreted as linking these two together disappears.

It will be seen at a glance how radically this interpretation differs from the most wide-spread view as to the structure of the Prologue. According to the latter the principle of construction is a chronological one: the Evangelist takes his point of departure in eternity, then speaks of the task of the Logos in creation, joins to this a statement about His work in providence, next records His activity under the Old Covenant, and finally enunciates the great truth of His advent for the purpose of redemption. But if vs. 4 and 5 already speak of the Logos in the flesh and vs. 9 and 10 relate to the same thing, then it is plain that nothing remains of this whole chronological progression. According to Zahn, the Evangelist three times takes a new departure: "he starts first from the premundane existence of the Logos and closes with the joyful assurance, that, notwithstanding all its assaults, the dark world has not succeeded in extinguishing the light of men which has appeared in the living Logos (vs. 1-5). The second time he sets out from a point in the midst of history, *viz.*, the witness of John the Baptist to the Jesus who was already present in the world and had come to His people, and sketches in broad outlines His history with reference to the world and to Israel. The world as a whole has not known Him; the Jewish nation has not received Him, but in the congregation, neither Jewish nor Gentile, of those who confess Him the result of His being and activity in the world may be seen (vs. 6-12). A

third group of sentences (vs. 13-18) describes the appearance in the world of Him who up till now had been called the word, the life, the light, as of a human personality, in His relation both to God and to those of mankind for whom He did not come in vain."⁸ And Harnack tells us, that the movement of thought in vs. 1-14 is not from the past to the present, but from the abstract idea of the Logos to the concrete conception of the *μονογενὴς θεός*, which the Evangelist had in mind from the beginning and which he desired to substitute for the former as the only adequate expression of the true character of Christ.⁹ Like Zahn, Harnack finds in ver. 5 the first point in which the thought of the Prologue comes to rest, and his understanding of vs. 1-5 he sums up in the words: "The writer has not given us a history—for instance of how the Logos proceeded out of God, what He did before and after, etc.—but he has sought to determine a well-known yet undefined conception of a being, and has done this in such a way as to make this being appear in ever greater concreteness."¹⁰ And in regard to vs. 1-14 as a whole we read a little further: "Those who assume that the Prologue up to ver. 14 deals with the *λόγος ἄσαρκος* involve themselves in special difficulties in view of vs. 12 and 13. In point of fact these verses prove that the author did not intend to give a continuous history of the Logos, but to state who He is, and what relation the Logos who has appeared sustains to the World."¹¹ And once more: "Ver. 9 looks back to ver. 5; . . . the general proposition *τὸ φῶς ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φαίνει καὶ ἡ σκοτία οὐτὸ οὐ κατέλαβεν*, has therefore received its more precise definition in the statements that He of whom John bore witness as the light, has come into the world created through Him, but with the tragic result that 'the world'

⁸ *Das Ev. des Joh.* p. 72. The summary of the content of the third group presupposes in ver. 13 *ὃς ἐγεννήθη* instead of *οἱ ἐγεννήθησαν* as the original reading.

⁹ *Zeitschrift f. Theol. u. Kirche*, II, p. 218, note 2.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

has not known Him, and that He has even been rejected by the people peculiarly His own."¹² "The ἐγένετο (of ver. 14) is not to be so understood, as if the author only now passed on from the λόγος ἄσαρκος to the λόγος ἑνσαρκος, but the historic fact which even from ver. 5 onward had as to its effects stood before the writer's mind, receives now special prominence."¹³

It must be granted that the old exegetical position has been made untenable by the admission, now almost universally made, that not only ver. 14 but vs. 11-13 also relate to the historical Christ. The words ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο are not introduced to mark the great incision which separates the preincarnate life of the Logos from His incarnate existence. Only on the view of Baldensperger, who believes that the coming of the Logos with its twofold result described in vs. 11-13 is the coming of Christ under the Old Covenant in the theophanies to the patriarchs and other divine manifestations, does it still remain possible to arrange everything that precedes ver. 14 according to strict chronological sequence.¹⁴ But this exegesis of the verses in question has met with little or no acceptance, and we shall have to admit that ver. 14 is at least not the final mile-post in the progressive journey of the writer's thought that it has been traditionally assumed to be. For its introduction some other motive will have to be assigned, than the desire of the Evangelist to add the grand climax to the chronological presentation of the history and work of the Logos.

Into this we need not here further inquire. It would be quite possible to move the great incision, which used to be found in ver. 14, back to ver. 11, and continue to interpret all that precedes this latter verse on the principle of chronological progression. Or, in view of the historical character of ver. 6, one might go even farther back, and make the division between the preincarnate and the incar-

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 220.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

¹⁴ Baldensperger, *Der Prolog des vierten Evangeliums*, pp. 13 ff.

nate state at that point, still maintaining that the relation between vs. 1-5 on the one hand and the sequel of the Prologue on the other hand is that of chronological progression. But the main thing to insist upon is that the exegesis which finds in the Prologue a continuous Logos-activity previous to and apart from the incarnation, does not stand or fall with the belief in any particular structure of the Prologue, chronological or otherwise.

Opinions as to the structure of a discourse are bound to be more or less subjective, to a far larger degree than the interpretation of its component parts individually considered. The starting-point, therefore, in discussing a problem like the one before us should always lie in the detailed exegesis of the separate statements. What the writer positively affirms in them, not the coloring they may receive from any estimate of the drift of the discourse as a whole, should be given the decisive weight in a matter of this kind.

An instructive illustration of the importance of this rule is afforded by Harnack's treatment of the Prologue in the article already repeatedly cited. Harnack does not in this article deal directly with the range of the Logos-title. His main purpose is to ascertain the relation between the Prologue and the body of the Gospel. Nevertheless the way in which he determines the latter, plainly exerts its influence when he comes to touch upon the other point. In his view the Logos-idea is not merely immaterial to the remainder of the Gospel but even inharmonious and incommensurable therewith. The Evangelist uses it by way of accommodation to his readers, not because he feels any personal sympathy with its point of view. His use of it is inspired by the desire rather to correct than to commend it. Hence from the outset, *i.e.*, even in writing ver. 1, he is intent upon replacing it by the designation far more acceptable to him, "Only-begotten God" (ver. 18). Once the substitution has been made, he feels relieved at being able to dismiss the Logos-title and never even once alludes to it afterward in the body of the Gospel.

It goes without saying that a view like this is not exactly favorable to a generous conception of the range of the Logos-function. If the Evangelist only grudgingly employs the term at all, he will not enlarge but narrow its scope as much as possible, because any magnifying of its specific significance would run directly contrary to his desire to dismiss it. And if the title that he prefers, upon which his mind is fixed from the beginning, the "Only-begotten God", be, as Harnack assumes, a designation of the incarnate Christ pure and simple, with no metaphysical retrospect into the premundane life of God attaching to it, then it becomes all the more inevitable that its provisional and unsatisfactory substitute shall receive no wider range of application. Thus it comes about that Harnack, who in 1892 did not doubt the Alexandrian, Philonic source of the whole conception, including the association of the Logos with the creation of the world, nevertheless in regard to vs. 4 and 5 expressed himself to the effect that, in speaking of the enlightening activity of the Logos, the Evangelist has throughout in mind His human activity (to be sure, His human activity considered *sub specie aeternitatis*), and that, if John had ascribed actual and independent importance to the idea that the Logos first had functioned before His historic appearance and secondly had functioned *ἐν σαρκί*, he would probably have expressed himself differently.¹⁵

It appears then that in Harnack's case this opinion about the main reference of the Logos-name to the incarnate, historic activity of Christ is largely based on a subjective estimate of the drift of the Prologue, which, brilliant though it may be as a piece of conjectural analysis, is nothing more than that, and certainly falls far short of the cogency that belongs to exact exegetical demonstration. The analysis proposed is not the only possible one, nor by any means the most plausible one. We venture to assert that in the whole manner and tone of the Evangelist up to ver. 14 there is a suggestion of the very opposite of what

¹⁵ *Zeitschrift f. Theol. u. Kirche*, II, p. 218, note 2.

Harnack imputes to him: instead of a desire to displace the Logos-idea, many readers have felt through the sentences and phrases a positive delight of the writer in the conception, and a perceptible inclination to linger on it and magnify its intrinsic value and importance. That the Evangelist did not let this positive sympathy with the idea betray him into the anachronism of putting it back into the mind and upon the lips of Jesus, affords surely no argument against its actual presence in his own mind, at least not for those who believe that he meant to record the actual words of Jesus.

As to ver. 14, where according to Harnack lies the actual turning-point of the movement in the writer's mind away from the Logos-idea and towards the idea of the Only-begotten God, here also the same observation may be made, *viz.*, that the very words exhale the writer's sense of the entire harmony between the two conceptions, instead of revealing a subtle intent to offer to his readers the one for the other. In the last analysis it is only Harnack's peculiar reading of the Christology in the body of the Gospel itself, that makes him thus skeptical about the Evangelist's sincere and positive interest in the Logos-conception, and leads him to put this odd interpretation upon the Prologue. If in the subsequent teaching of the Gospel every thought of an ontological background to the sonship and preëxistence of Jesus is so pointedly absent, as Harnack would have us believe, then it becomes natural not to find in this a purely negative phenomenon, but to explain it from the conscious aversion of the writer to that whole mode of thinking. And in that case one will be *à priori* inclined to surmise that the Prologue can introduce the Logos-idea only after a half-hearted fashion, for the purpose of disowning rather than of endorsing or commending it. But the whole estimate of the Christological teaching of the Gospel as ethico-religiously and not metaphysically oriented, on which this rests, is, to say the least, exceedingly one-sided and inadequate. To show this here is, of course, impossible, but

it has been abundantly shown by Grill, to whom we may refer the reader.¹⁶

We now turn to the concrete statements of the Evangelist in vs. 4, 5, 9, and 10, for it is in the careful scanning of these, and not through any preconceived general view as to the structure and purport of the Prologue as a whole, that the decision in the matter at issue as to the providential function of the Logos will have to be reached.

As to ver. 4 the question would be settled immediately, if δ γέγονεν, usually read as the close of ver. 3, were to be drawn into ver. 4 as the beginning of the next sentence and

¹⁶ *Unters. üib. d. Entst. d. vierten Ev.* I, pp. 31-88. From the above it should not, of course, be inferred that we fail to recognize the excellent points of Harnack's discussion in other respects. Before all things his article shows convincingly that the Christological material in the teaching of Jesus in the body of the Gospel is not obtained through deduction from the Logos-idea, as the Tübingen exegesis assumes. We feel bound to take issue with him when he proceeds beyond this to the assertion that it could not have been so deduced, for the reason that it is not only of a totally different type, but incommensurable and inharmonious with the Logos-doctrine. Our position would be a third one: the peculiar teaching in the body of the Gospel has not been deduced from the Logos-idea, and yet can as a matter of fact be deduced from it, because the Logos-idea is to the mind of the Evangelist simply the most appropriate conception, into which he has gathered up the teaching of Jesus concerning Himself in the discourses. We believe, what Harnack denies, that *so far as substance is concerned* the Logos-doctrine is present in and pervades the body of the Gospel. This applies to its ontological content, including the purely spiritual preëxistence, and to its soteriological content, taking the latter both in its Old Testament proleptic aspect and in its New Testament form. The only element in the Prologue not represented in the Johannine teaching of Jesus is His work in creation and providence, but for this a solid basis existed in earlier New Testament teaching, so that the writer of the Gospel could simply incorporate it together with the other elements in the Logos-concept.

We also agree with what Harnack says about its not being the purpose of the Prologue to lay a theological foundation for the high conception of Christ as God. But here again we do not feel shut up to a choice between this and Harnack's own view. The Prologue seeks a basis in eternity, not, to be sure, for the absolute, transcendent significance of Christ in the abstract, but specifically and concretely for the absoluteness and transcendence of His work as Redeemer and Revealer of God.

the rendering adopted: "that which was made was life in Him"; for this would imply that the created world continuously had its source of life in the Logos.¹⁷ This interpretation, however, involves the rendering of ver. 4 in such extreme unnaturalness and has been opposed on such convincing grounds, textual-critical and otherwise, by eminent modern exegetes, that we must discard the help to be obtained from it in favor of our position.¹⁸

Leaving δ $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\nu\epsilon\nu$ to the third verse, we inquire what is the meaning of the statements, "In Him was life, and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness apprehended (or, overcame) it not." The problem here centers in the peculiar use of the tenses, the imperfect $\eta\nu$ twice in ver. 14, and the present $\phi\alpha\lambda\iota\nu\epsilon\iota$ in ver. 5. As to the imperfects, the most obvious interpretation would at first sight seem to be that which refers them to the same past state as that to which the threefold imperfect of ver. 1 refers, the state of eternity.¹⁹ The connection of thought then would be that ver. 4 explains the possibility of what was affirmed of the Logos in ver. 3: He could be the mediator of creation, because in Him was life, *i.e.* antecedently to the creation, in His eternal state. This would also explain the transition to the present tense in ver. 5 as a transition from the potential in eternity ($\eta\nu$) to the actual in time ($\phi\alpha\lambda\iota\nu\epsilon\iota$).

¹⁷ The above rendering makes δ $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ the antecedent of $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}$. According to others, who adopt the same interpretation, the antecedent is δ $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\nu\epsilon\nu$ which yields: "What was made, in it was life." On this rendering the implication remains that the Logos supplies the life of all created things, but it does not become clear, whether this is due to the original act of creation or to a subsequent continued Logos-influence. Still another construction is that proposed by Hilgenfeld, who would render: "What was made in Him, was life", on the basis of a distinction between three kinds of genesis: $\delta\iota'$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}$, $\omicron\upsilon$ $\chi\omega\rho\iota\varsigma$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}$ and $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}$. *Zeitschr. f. wiss. Theol.*, 1889, p. 137.

¹⁸ *Cpr.* Grill, *Untersuchungen*, I, p. 91; Harnack, *Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche*, II, p. 217, note 4; Bauer-Holtzmann in *Handcommentar*,³ IV, p. 34; Zahn, *Das Ev. des Joh.*, pp. 50, 51. Bauer, in Lietzmann's *Handbuch z. N. T.*, II, 2, p. 10, assumes a corruption of the text.

¹⁹ So Pfeiderer, *Urchristenthum*,² II, pp. 338, 465, and Bauer-Holtzmann, p. 35.

If we had only the former half of ver. 4 to reckon with, this exegesis would unquestionably deserve the preference above all others. But there is also the second clause, and the form assumed by this forbids our adopting it. When it is said: "the life was the light of men", the existence of mankind is clearly presupposed; the past therefore must be a past within time, not in eternity.²⁰

Next Godet's proposal claims consideration. According to him the imperfects are meant to cover the period between the creation and the fall. In that ideal state, before sin entered the cosmos, there was life in the Logos, and this life was the light of men. From what applied to this past period the fifth verse would then proceed to the present state of sin, exchanging the imperfect for the present (*φαίνει*) and introducing the idea of "darkness", and of the conflict between this and the light. This view implies a distinction between the effectual operation of the life and the light spoken of in ver. 4 and the mere objective presence of the light, not subjectively appropriated, referred to in ver. 5. But this exegesis assumes an antithesis, which would require pointed expression in the text in order to be perceptible to the reader, and of the presence of which in the writer's mind there is no stylistic indication. It would have been easy by a simple adverb to mark the contrast between the past before and the present after the fall,²¹ or to make the alleged important difference between the effectual *ἦν τὸ φῶς* and the ineffectual *τὸ φῶς φαίνει* unmistakable. Apart from this, the form of ver. 4 hardly seems suited to bring out the efficacy of the Logos-operation in the state of rectitude. "In Him was life, and the life was the light of men" does not affirm anything more than that the

²⁰ This would not count against Harnack's solution, according to which ver. 4 relates to the incarnate Logos but shows Him and His activity *sub specie aeternitatis*. Why the imperfect as such should be characteristic of the latter is not explained. Harnack himself observes that "es in jenen Sphären, wie kein Oben und kein Unten, so auch kein Vorher und Nachher giebt". In ver. 1, to be sure, the imperfect is the tense of eternity, but only in comparison with the moment of creation.

²¹ A simple *νῦν* before *φαίνει* would have served the purpose.

Logos was adapted for quickening and enlightening the world. This adaptation He had at all times, and not only during man's state of rectitude.

Essentially distinct from the two preceding views is that of Zahn and others, according to whom the imperfect tenses of ver. 4 already transport us into the earthly life of Jesus. The Evangelist, after having spoken of the eternal existence of the subject called *θεός* in ver. 1, and of His share in creation, now proceeds to speak of His Logos-appearance in the flesh, and affirms that, during His historical activity on earth, He had life in Himself and as such was the light of men. The fifth verse then adds that this light, which had appeared in the historical Jesus, still continues to shine, after His earthly life has come to a close, in the darkness of this world, and that so far, that is, up to the Evangelist's time of writing, the darkness has not overpowered it.²²

The serious objection to this exegesis is that it involves too abrupt a transition from ver. 3 (creation of the world through the Logos) to ver. 4 (presence of the incarnate Logos in the world, as the source of life and light, viewed as a past fact), and again from ver. 4 to ver. 5 (operation of the exalted Logos in the world-darkness as a source of light). Some word or phrase to indicate the temporal movement would be expected. Zahn appeals to the prevailing representation in the body of the Gospel, according to which Jesus' abode in the flesh upon earth is the definite, circumscribed presence of the light in the world to be followed by its withdrawal.²³ Similarly Spitta, who observes that the discourses of the Gospel speak frequently of the illuminating function of Jesus during the days of His flesh, but never of a like influence during the state of preëxistence; whence he concludes that the words "the life was the light of men" must have reference to the incarnate life exclusively.²⁴ The answer to this is obvious: the Jesus-discourses in the body of the Gospel cannot be thus quoted as a check

²² *Das Ev. des Joh.*, pp. 55-62.

²³ *Cpr.* Jno. iii. 19.; ix. 5; xii. 35 ff., 46.

²⁴ *Das Johannes-Evangelium*, p. 38.

upon the range of application which the Evangelist may have given to such ideas as life and light in the Prologue, for the simple reason that the Prologue, while it professes to subsume the teaching of Jesus under its highest rubric, yet in accordance with early Apostolic teaching, gives this rubric a wider sweep, with reference to the cosmical activity of the preëxistent Christ, than Jesus Himself does in the discourses recorded. The Evangelist was not bound to speak of Christ as "life" and "light" with the same redemptive restriction as, according to his own report, Jesus did. The fact that he never makes Jesus employ the word *Logos* as a name for Himself proves the writer to have been perfectly conscious of a distinction between what Jesus said about Himself, and what he, John, says about Jesus. The latter was meant to incorporate and epitomize the former: it was not meant to remain shut up within it.

Besides this, Zahn's appeal to the representation of the light as present in and withdrawing with the incarnate Christ proves too much, since it would exclude the light from the period after the death of Christ also, whereas according to Zahn's own interpretation the *φαίνει* of ver. 5 affirms that the light still shines at the time of the Evangelist's writing. If the withdrawal of the light in one form through Jesus' death does not prevent its reappearance in another form since His resurrection, then the epiphany of the light through the incarnation should not exclude its presence and influence in the cosmos previously in still a different form. The emphasis on the incarnate and redemptive phase of its manifestation can afford no instance against understanding the statements of ver. 4, in regard to both life and light, of the relation of the preëxistent *Logos* to the world as such.

Underlying the view criticized is the unwarranted assumption that the imperfect tense must in this case describe a state of things no longer true in the present, and that therefore the activity of the *Logos* in nature through providence cannot be meant, because this is never a thing of the

past, but goes on as long as the world exists. On the other hand, the historic activity of Jesus on earth is supposed to meet this condition, it being a thing past and definitely concluded. But, as already urged above, the Evangelist does not, as a matter of fact, look upon the life-giving and light-giving function of the Logos spoken of in ver. 4 as having come to an end. The light according to ver. 5 shines now, and the same continuance may be confidently affirmed of the influx of life. The preterite therefore is not a true chronological preterite on any view. Hence it may well be asked, if the chronological limits of the tense cannot be strictly drawn in case our verse be understood of the historic work of Christ, why should such strictness of limitation be imposed upon the view which finds here the cosmical function of the Logos? On the latter view, no less than on the former, it must be possible to reconcile the two representations that in the Logos *were* life and light and that these things *are* in Him.

By far the simplest exegesis, and that which best avoids all difficulties, is to make the imperfect tense refer to the point of time fixed by ver. 3 and let it describe something that was true at and since that point of time. Since, and in virtue of, the creation of all things through Him, and in direct continuity therewith, the Logos carried life in Himself and this life was henceforth the light of men. This surely is a most natural use of the imperfect, which frequently describes a state of affairs as existing in the past and introduced at some definitely marked point of time. On this view the connection between ver. 3 and ver. 4 is so close and self-explanatory, that no particle or adverb of more precise definition is required. The normal relation to the world of Him who had acted as the Mediator of creation, was such that thereafter the world and mankind were dependent for their life and light on Him. He was the Logos in providence, just as He had been the Logos in creation.

If it still be objected that the Evangelist might far better

have expressed this fact, as a fact of still continuing validity, by means of the present tense, the answer is twofold. In the first place, the writer takes his position at the point of the completed creation, and affirms what then was true without thereby denying that it still is true. And, secondly, he probably had already in mind the contrast between this providential Logos-activity and a fuller, richer activity performed by the same Logos since the incarnation, in comparison with which the former, while not *de facto* come to an end, may yet, inasmuch as it no longer stands alone but is now accompanied and modified by the latter, be considered in its original form a matter of the past.

The connection between the two clauses in ver. 4 likewise favors the view that not the incarnate, redemptive activity, but the cosmical activity of the Logos in His preëxistent state is referred to. When the light of men is derived from the Logos not directly, but mediately through the life that He supplies, this is a representation which suits the natural relation of mankind to the Logos far better than the redemptive relation. The Gospel of John everywhere makes a point of it that in the soteriological process the light of revelation comes first in order, as supplied by Christ after an objective, supernatural fashion, and not as something that emerges out of the new life of man, and passes through his subjectivity. It is the word, the truth, that quickens and cleanses and sanctifies. In this sphere it could be more truthfully said that the light is the life of men, than conversely that the life is their light. But in natural religion the case is quite different. Here the Logos-revelation is actually mediated through the subjective life which man in dependence on the Logos possesses. The life here naturally produces the light. The meaning is not that in man life assumes the form of light, which would savor of idealism, but that the life which man receives carries in itself, and of itself kindles in him, the light of the knowledge of God. The wording of the statement so exactly fits this peculiar relationship between the two factors in the natural religion

of man, that it is difficult to believe the author did not have the latter in mind when he wrote it.²⁵

If the above view be adopted—and we do not see what serious objection can be raised to it—the question next emerging is, how the transition to the present tense in ver. 5 can be explained on this basis. Two possibilities exist here. The present *φαίνει* might be understood in sharp contrast to the imperfect *ἦν*, as describing the illuminating function of the incarnate Logos in distinction from His light-giving activity in the natural world of the past. On this view, in ver. 5 the Evangelist, who took his point of departure in eternity and advanced from there to creation and providence, has now arrived at the stage of Jesus' earthly life. Where, however, the idea of straight temporal progression is thus maintained, the objection urged above against Godet's and Zahn's views retains its force, *viz.*, that some temporal adverb or particle would be required to render the writer's meaning understandable.²⁶ The second interpretation of the present *φαίνει*—the one that in our view deserves the preference—makes the Evangelist advance from the general proposition that the world when created was as such dependent on the Logos as its source of life and light, to the specific reflection, or after-reflection, that this holds true even now under the reign of darkness in the

²⁵ Wellhausen, *Das Ev. Joh.*, 1910, p. 7, thinks that the transition from the Logos as a cosmical principle (ver. 3) to the Logos as a source of revelation (ver. 4^e) is a harsh one, and that the idea of "life" is a purely mechanical contrivance introduced to effect it. The lack of coherence is so great, in his view, as to lead him to suspect that the text is composite and the hand of a redactor traceable in the looseness of its texture. The above remarks show that it is not impossible to find an organic, intelligible connection between the life that flows from the Logos and the light into which it blossoms for mankind. Moreover, in ver. 10 the same two aspects of the Logos, the cosmical and the revelatory, are also conjoined: "The world was made through Him, and the world knew Him not."

²⁶ The transition from ver. 3 to ver. 4 is so natural and close, that no explicit marking is required. That from ver. 4 to ver. 5, on the other hand, involves on the above view the overleaping of a considerable interval and the transporting of the mind into a totally new and different situation.

world. The light that functioned at the beginning functions also in a world which is positively darkened through sin. The only difference is that under these circumstances there is a conflict between it and the world.

It will be perceived that this view differs from Godet's interpretation, as above stated, not so much in the outcome, as in the manner in which the thought is approached and presented by the Evangelist. According to Godet, the discourse progresses chronologically from the creation (ver. 3) to the period of rectitude (ver. 4), and from this to the period of sin (ver. 5). According to our view, the progression of thought is not historical but logical, from the general to the special. The Evangelist first describes what was the normal relation of the Logos to the world after it had been created through Him, and then passes on to the concrete, specific statement, that this holds true even in the present peculiar state of the world as a world of darkness. The simple *καί* is quite sufficient to link these two propositions, the general and the special, together.²⁷

²⁷ Two other views found among expositors may be briefly mentioned. According to one, the present *φαίνει*, in distinction from *ἦν*, marks the progress from potency to actuality: The light was there—the light shines. According to the other, the present is a present of characteristic description: it is the nature of the light to shine in the darkness. Both views are open to the objection that they take the *σκοτία* as the necessary correlate of the light, and not as an abnormal fact, whereas the presence of darkness is in ver. 4 as little supposed to condition the function of the light, as the presence of death is there thought necessary to the quickening function of the Logos.

Of the two interpretations of *κατέλαβεν* that which takes it as "apprehended" in the noëtic sense deserves the preference. Most of the Greek commentators take it in the other sense of "laying hold upon" for the purpose of getting in one's power. But this latter signification, which the verb undoubtedly has, falls quite short of the proposed rendering "overcame it not". The "laying hold upon" is but the first step towards overpowering. Hence Origen: "did not overtake it", *cpr.* Rom. ix. 30, 31; Jno. xii. 35 *ἵνα μὴ σκοτία ὑμᾶς καταλάβῃ* does not go beyond "overtaking". It is plain that the rendering "the darkness has not overtaken it", or even "the darkness has not laid hold upon it", introduces a weakening element into the context. The prelude to the tragic note of vs. 10 and 11, which has been justly recognized in ver. 5^c, also speaks against this interpretation, while it is

That a reference to the incarnate Logos in vs. 4 and 5 brings a disrupting element into the context, is recognized, where on the basis of it the composite character of the Prologue is diagnosed. Thus Schwartz argues from the imperfect tenses that the clauses in which they occur must refer to the Christ on earth; so interpreted, however, these clauses reflect a totally different point of view from that of the preceding statements, and the lack of coherence is charged to the account of a redactor.²⁸

While not disputing the unity of this part of the Prologue, Spitta allows himself to be led into a most artificial rearrangement of the clauses of vs. 1-5, in order to explain the immediate juxtaposition of the cosmical and the redemptive aspects of the Logos-activity.²⁹ By drawing δ γέγονεν to the sequel, "was geworden ist, ist³⁰ in ihm lebendig", the way is opened up, he thinks, towards restoring the original structure of the text. It consisted of a triad of three sentences as follows:

In the beginning was the Logos—and the Logos was towards God—and the Logos was God.

All things were made through Him—and without Him was not anything made—what was made is life in Him.

And the life was the light of men—and the light shines in the darkness—and the darkness overcame it not.

This, it will be observed, recognizes the cosmical function admirably expressed by the other. Of modern expositors Zahn adopts the rendering "has not overpowered".

Whether the choice of the verb φαίνειν is in pointed antithesis to the $\eta\nu$ ζωή and $\eta\nu$ φῶς of ver. 4, as designating the purely objective, inflectual emission of light, depends on the rendering of κατέλαβεν. If this can mean "apprehended it not", then the absence of subjective effect will be expressed by φαίνει. If on the other hand it means "overcame it not", then the energy and persistence of the light will rather be emphasized and the antithesis to ver. 4 disappears.

²⁸ *Aporien im vierten Ev. in Nachr. der Ges. der Wiss. zu Gött.*, 1907, 1908. Schwartz declares the whole section, vs. 4-13, secondary, on the ground above stated, viz., that in it throughout the epiphany of the Logos on earth, which does not take place until ver. 14, is already presupposed.

²⁹ *Das Johannes-Evangelium*, 1910, pp. 37 ff.

³⁰ Spitta reads $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ instead of $\eta\nu$ with Codex D, a reading already known to Origen. This variant, however, is found only in 4.^a not in 4.^b

of the Logos in providence.³¹ At the same time, by violently separating the two clauses of ver. 4, apportioning each to a different triad, it enables Spitta to maintain that the words "the life was the light of men" are meant of the incarnate Christ. They mark the beginning of a new train of thought; the revelatory function is no longer the reverse side of the cosmical, creative function, but something altogether detached from it. And that in the face of the fact that the ζωή of 4^a is significantly repeated in 4^b, with the addition of the article to preclude all doubt in regard to the identity of the life which all creatures possess in the Logos and the life which is light for mankind.³²

How artificial all this is needs no pointing out. The artificiality, however, proves that there is no place for the incarnate Christ in vs. 4 and 5.

Owing to its introduction of the historical figure of John the Baptist, ver. 6 is regarded by many expositors as marking the dividing-line between what relates to the preincarnate and to the incarnate Logos.³³ This argument, however, although it ought to work in both directions, is usually urged only to prove that what follows cannot possibly refer to anybody but the historical Christ, to whose appearance John bore witness. If the Evangelist consciously and pointedly uses the Baptist to pass over from the realm of

³¹ Spitta compares Rom. viii. 10; Col. i. 16; Heb. i. 2 ff.

³² On Spitta's interpretation it would seem to follow that the life supplied by the Logos in nature becomes the light of redemption to men. At least this could be avoided only by taking ἡ ζωή in ver. 4^b as a proper name of Christ; but against this the gender is decisive. Besides, Spitta has to disregard the clear indications which the repeated use of καί affords, as to the actual structure of the text as it lay in the author's mind. On his arrangement the καί is lacking before the third clause of the second triad ("What was made is life in Him"), although the next preceding clause of this triad has it, and although the corresponding third clauses in the first and third triads likewise have it. On the other hand, the καί, which on this arrangement introduces the first clause of the third triad ("and the life was the light of men") is out of place.

³³ Thus Theodore of Mopsuestia, quoted by Lücke, I, p. 314, note 2; Lücke himself, p. 314; Grill, *Unters.* I, p. 95; Heitmüller, in Weiss, *Schriften des N. T.* II, p. 722; Bauer in Lietzmann's *Handc. z. N. T.* II, *Johannes*, p. 11.

the metaphysical into that of the historical, then it may be argued with equal warrant, that nothing of the historical can enter into the representation of what precedes. Yet this is not always done.³⁴

On the other hand, there are those who make of ver. 6 a *point d'appui* for eliminating even from the preceding verses all reference to the preëxistent Logos as a source of life and light.³⁵ Appeal is made for this purpose to the fact that John's mission is described as having been *εἰς μαρτυρίαν* and that his witness was *περὶ τοῦ φωτός* to the end that all through him (= John) might believe (in the light). It is claimed that this statement makes *τὸ φῶς* equivalent to the historical Christ, since it was to the latter as present on earth that the Baptist pointed in his preaching. And "the light" of vs. 7-9 again determines the meaning of "the light" in vs. 4 and 5.

It must be acknowledged that there is a certain incongruousness between the two aspects of "the light", if previously to ver. 6 the exclusively metaphysical, cosmical sense is insisted upon, and after ver. 6 with equal rigor the exclusively redemptive reference is maintained.³⁶ But in our opinion relief should not be sought by carrying back the redemptive light into vs. 4 and 5; it should and can be obtained by finding the cosmical light, at least in part, repre-

³⁴ Bauer, *op. cit.*, who says: in ver. 6 the discourse proceeds to the period of the human existence of the Logos, says also: in vs. 4 and 5 the Prologue already has in view the human activity of the Logos. Similarly in Holtzmann-Bauer's Handcommentar, *Ev. des Joh.* pp. 36, 37.

³⁵ So Belser, in *Theol. Quartalschr.*, 1903, pp. 483-519, who thinks that vs. 4 and 5 are to be understood redemptively, and that the Logos-name in ver. 1 is used proleptically.

³⁶ Wellhausen, *Das Ev. des Joh.*, p. 8, emphasizes the inconcinnity of the metaphysical and the historical. The Baptist, he observes, cannot be properly contrasted with the super-terrestrial Logos, but only with the incarnate Logos. But the latter does not enter until ver. 14. Consequently ver. 6 presents the strange phenomenon which he characterizes in the words, that the Baptist "unversehens in die Ewigkeit hineinschneit". Wellhausen seeks relief here as elsewhere, through denying the original unity of the composition. In our view, in vs. 6-9 the Baptist carries with himself the atmosphere of the higher world in that he witnesses to the eternity of the Logos-light.

sented in vs. 7-9. It is quite true, of course, that the one to whom John bore witness was the incarnate, historical Christ, but this settles nothing as to the question what he referred to when he called this historical person $\tau\omicron\ \phi\hat{\omega}\varsigma$. It is just as possible that the Evangelist means to make John the Baptist bear witness, among other things, to the cosmical illuminating function of the historical Christ, as that he means to make him confine his witness to the redemptive light supplied by Jesus.

That the former is the case gains in probability, if we notice how in vs. 15 and 30 the subject of the preëxistence of the Christ is introduced as constituting, to the mind of the Evangelist, the first important element in the witness that John bore concerning Him. If the reference to the $\alpha\nu\eta\rho$ in ver. 30 cannot tie down the witness to the incarnate state, then certainly the reference to the $\phi\hat{\omega}\varsigma$ need not in vs. 6-9 be held to restrict this term to its redemptive associations.³⁷ In ver. 9 there is a positive indication that the Evangelist consciously distinguished between the existence of the Logos-light in a previous state and its existence in historical form within the cosmos.³⁸ The retroactive force of the argument drawn from the historical setting in which $\tau\omicron\ \phi\hat{\omega}\varsigma$ appears in ver. 7 cannot be allowed.

But the same considerations detract also from the prospective force of the argument. If the cosmical associations of the term $\phi\hat{\omega}\varsigma$ are still clearly perceptible in vs. 7-9, there is no *à priori* warrant for excluding them from what is said about the same subject in the sequel. Undoubtedly the words $\epsilon\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\tau\omicron\ \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\sigma\tau\alpha\lambda\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma\ \pi\alpha\rho\grave{\alpha}\ \theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\,,\ \delta\omicron\nu\omicron\mu\alpha\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\hat{\omega}\ \text{'}\text{Ιωάννης}$ are a historical "Ansatz", on a line with ver. 19. They could, however, mark the time of the sequel only if the writer continued with statements of a similar historical character. This is not the case. In ver. 6 he speaks as a historian; in ver. 8 he has already resumed the tone

³⁷ *Cpr.* Clemen, *Die Entstehung des Johannes-Ev.*, 1912, p. 59.

³⁸ On the view that $\delta\ \kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$ here means the world of men, and that the entrance of the light into it means not the incarnation, but Jesus' public appearance, see below.

of the theologian. Only a careful exegesis of the words can here decide whether the Logos-subject is introduced exclusively in its incarnate aspect, or as incarnate, yet on the background of its cosmical aspect, or whether perhaps things are freshly affirmed of it that pertain to its cosmical function as such.

For deciding this question nothing is yielded by ver. 8. To be sure, the Baptist is here contrasted with $\tauὸ \phiῶς$ and it might seem as if the cosmical light and a historical person were too incommensurable to be even compared with each other. But i, 15, 30 and iii, 31 ff. prove that the Evangelist felt differently on this point, for there the Baptist is represented as formally comparing himself with Christ from the point of view of the latter's deity and preëxistence. There is nothing, therefore, to show that it would have seemed incongruous to the Evangelist to say: John was not the cosmical light manifested on earth, but was sent to bear witness concerning that light.

In regard to ver. 9 the question is interlinked with the mooted problem of the construction of the sentence. Two main views are here opposed to each other. The one makes $\tauὸ \phiῶς$ the subject and $\etaν ἐρχόμενον$ the predicate: "the true light which enlightens every man, was coming into the world." The other supplies the subject from the foregoing, makes $\tauὸ \phiῶς$ the predicate, and construes $ἐρχόμενον$ with $ἄνθρωπον$ of the relative clause: "the Logos was the true light, which enlightens every man who comes into the world".³⁹

³⁹ Other attempted renderings, covered by the above two in their bearing upon our problem, are: "there was the true light, which enlightens every man who comes into the world", or: "the true light enlightening every man coming into the world, was present"; this overweights $\etaν$ at the opening of the sentence; "there was (or He was) the true light, which, coming into the world, enlightens every man"; this draws $ἐρχόμενον$ to the δ of the relative clause, but yields no suitable sense, since the illuminating effect of the incarnate Christ does not coincide with His birth or public appearance; "the true light is that which enlightens every man who comes into the world"; this yields excellent sense, but would seem to require $\tauὸ φωτίζον$ instead of $\delta \phiωτίζει$, as Blass actually proposes to read, but without authority.

The latter of these two constructions would directly bear out the contention that the Logos is a source of light in the world of nature, because it represents Him as exerting this influence at the time of every man's entrance into the world, *i.e.*, at his birth.⁴⁰ But this construction, while perfectly allowable in itself, would leave the ἦν at the beginning of the verse isolated without a proper subject, and for this reason alone will have to be abandoned in favor of the other: "the true light . . . was coming into the world", *viz.*, at the time of the Baptist's witnessing. And this has the twofold result of apparently rendering the relative clause ὁ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον, now detached from ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον, unavailable as an argument on our side, and of apparently furnishing a direct argument against the cosmical interpretation of the light in the sequel, inasmuch as that which is here represented as coming, must from this point onward figure in the account as having come, *i.e.*, as the light of the Christ incarnate. It should be noticed, however, in regard to the first point, that the relative clause, when separated from ἐρχόμενον, while not necessitating the reference to natural revelation as it does when combined with ἐρχόμενον, nevertheless fully permits of it. In affirming that the true light was coming into the world, it was perfectly natural for the writer to observe that this is the light which enlightens every man. In other words, the purpose of the relative clause may well be to identify the redemptive light with the cosmical light.

If it be objected that such a specific reference of the φωτίζειν to natural revelation would have to be indicated in some way in order to be understood, we answer, that it is sufficiently indicated by the object πάντα ἄνθρωπον. A light of which it is said that it enlightens every man, is

⁴⁰ We do not agree with Zahn, who thinks that ἐρχόμενον joined to ἄνθρωπον is pleonastic and useless; it has excellent sense as a temporal definition. The writer might have used it for the very purpose of making it plain that he speaks of the Logos as a cosmical light. Nor can much weight be attributed to the absence of the article before ἐρχόμενον. The Greek exegetes, who follow this construction, do not seem to have missed the article, *cfr.* Lücke, p. 317.

thereby clearly enough characterized as the general light which is common to the world as such. On the other hand, this absolute universality of the *φωτίζειν* tells against the opposite interpretation, which would have us think here of the illuminating influence of the incarnate Christ, and understand the present tense as a historical present with reference to the time of writing. As a matter of fact no such universal illumination took place at that time. We have abstained from urging this objection to Zahn's exegesis of verse 4^b. The clause "was the light of men" in its pure objectivity might properly apply to the incarnate Logos on earth.⁴¹ But it becomes a totally different matter when a verb like *φωτίζειν* is used, which clearly passes beyond the sphere of objective potentiality into that of subjective effectuation. Moreover, after we have already concluded on other grounds, that in ver. 4 both the life and the light are cosmically conceived, we may allow weight to the obvious backward reference to ver. 4 in the clause of ver. 9 now under discussion, for determining the meaning of the latter verse. The present *φωτίζει* no less clearly points back to the *φαίνει* of ver. 4, than the *πάντα ἄνθρωπον* does to *τῶν ἀνθρώπων* in the same verse.⁴²

As to the other point, that the construction of *ἐρχόμενον* with *ἦν* predetermines the reference of all that is said in the sequel to the incarnate Logos, because the subject here said to have been coming, must thereafter be present,—we are inclined to think that here, as in connection with ver. 7, the argument rests on an undue pressing of the historically progressive character of the discourse, and on an insufficient recognition of the free play which the author allows his mind in approaching the subject alternately from a his-

⁴¹ *Cpr.* viii. 12, "I am the light of the world"; ix. 5, "While I am in the world, I am the light of the world".

⁴² As a rule, where the cosmical reference in the preceding and following context is recognized, the relative clause in ver. 9 is interpreted of the same thing. Keil is an exception, who takes the *φωτίζει* of redemptive illumination, and yet in his exegesis of ver. 10 upholds the presence of the Logos in the world as a cosmical principle, *Comm. üb. d. Ev. des Joh.*, p. 97.

torical and from a theological point of view. The whole issue resolves itself into this, whether in ver. 10 it is the historian or the theologian who speaks. If the historian, then the question is immediately decided in favor of the view which finds here the presence of the incarnate Logos in the world, for after the historical statement: the Logos was coming into the world, an immediately succeeding statement of similar historical import: He was in the world, can only mean that the coming into the world resulted in a presence within the world. If on the other hand it is not the historian but the theologian who speaks, then it is equally plain that the clause "He was in the world", being a free reflexion of the author, receives its chronological setting, not from the progress of events, but from the movement of the author's thought, and, provided a movement in that direction can be made psychologically intelligible, we may feel at liberty to refer the words to the presence of the Logos in the world as a principle of providence.

For this reason the mooted question as to the exact force of the periphrastic form *ἦν ἐρχόμενον* has far less to do with the exegesis of the sequel than is generally assumed. Opinion among present-day exegetes inclines to the view that the form cannot have, grammatically considered, future significance, in other words that it cannot mean, the true light was to come in the future, or, with a somewhat weaker futurizing force, was about to come. On both renderings, it is urged, *ἔρχεσθαι* receives a meaning which it cannot bear in either classical or New Testament Greek.⁴³ Only the former of these two renderings would materially affect the sense of what follows, since from the statement: the light was to come into the world in the future, no easy historical transition could be made to the statement: He was in the world; and consequently this stronger form of the futurizing interpretation would compel in ver. 10^a the rendering: He was already in the world previously to this future coming. But in its weaker form: the light was

⁴³ *Cpr.* Lücke, pp. 319-324; Zahn, pp. 67, 68.

about to come, the future understanding of the verb leaves room for imposing either sense on ver. 10^a. Perhaps even so the connection slightly favors the reference of the clause *ἦν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ* to the providential presence of the Logos in the world, since between: He was about to come and: He was present, if both statements form part of one historical movement, there would be left a gap, the act itself of coming being unmentioned.

But there is no need of further considering this here, since, on the ground already stated, we follow the more recent exegesis, which takes *ἦν ἐρχόμενον* as a periphrastic preterite: the light was in the act of coming into the world at the time of the witnessing by John. And this certainly, even more clearly than the weaker futurizing interpretation, leaves us free to understand the next statement, "He was in the world", of the incarnate life on earth.⁴⁴ The question now is, whether we shall avail ourselves of this possibility, or choose the alternative, equally possible in itself, of rendering: He was (already) in the world.

This latter view yields a perfectly natural train of thought, and suggested itself quite early to exegetes.⁴⁵ Bengel in his usual pointed way has formulated it as follows: "Ne quis illud veniens in mundum ita accipiat, acsi lux antea in mundo plane non fuisset."⁴⁶ It is not a necessary concomitant of this view that the incidental qualification of ver. 9 should be considered the only purpose of ver. 10^a. Ver. 10, and within it the words we are considering, conveys an independent thought—that of the failure of the

⁴⁴ While, of course, grammatically different, yet as a matter of practical outcome the weaker futurizing and the preterite version of *ἦν ἐρχόμενον* amount to much the same thing. To say that one is in the act of coming implies, if it does not express, that he is about to come. Thus Lücke, who opposes the futurizing view, yet himself paraphrases: "*War im Begriff hervorzutreten*"; the future expelled from *ἦν ἐρχόμενον* reënters in "Begriff" and in "*hervorzutreten*".

⁴⁵ Theodore Mops., quoted by Lücke, p. 319, observes: *εἰπὼν τὸ, 'Ἐρχόμενον εἰς τ. κόσμον περὶ τοῦ δεσπότου Χριστοῦ καλῶς ἐπήγαγεν τὸ, 'Ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν, ὥστε δεῖξαι, ὅτι τὸ, 'Ἐρχόμενον πρὸς τὴν διὰ σαρκὸς εἶπεν φανέρωσιν.*

⁴⁶ *Cfr.* Keil, *Comment. ü. d. Ev. d. Joh.*, p. 98.

world to apprehend the Logos. Whether this thought is new or a refrain-like repetition of ver. 5^b "the darkness apprehended it not", will depend on the exegesis of οὐκ ἔγνω, into which we shall look presently. In any case, the interpretation before us involves the view that the writer makes use of the incidental qualification of ver. 9, "He *was* in the world", to prepare the way for the subjoined statement: although being in the world, the world knew Him not.

The choice between the two views now before us is exceedingly difficult. The attempt has been made to decide the question by appealing to the sense of ὁ κόσμος in ver. 9^c. This must have the meaning, it is thought, of the world of humanity and of public life, and cannot here bear the sense of the created universe, for at the time of John's witnessing Jesus was entering, not into the created universe through birth, but into the world of men through His public appearance. And this sense of κόσμος is then carried over into ver. 10, from which results the rendering: He was in the world (= present among men) . . . and the world (= men) knew Him not,—a mode of representation which could be naturally applied only to the presence of the incarnate Logos in the world.

One might be inclined to reply to this, that it is not inapplicable to the alternative view, for the providential activity of the Logos with reference to mankind could be fitly described as a presence of the Logos in the world. The statement, "He was in the world", would then simply extend to the Logos the specifically divine attribute of immanence of being with reference to the life of mankind.

It is very doubtful, however, whether the argument on which this restriction of the term κόσμος is based is a sound one. To tie down the Evangelist in ver. 7 to this degree of chronological preciseness seems to us to overlook the bold, broad sweep of the whole representation. Where eternity and time are put into relation to each other, as is the case here, it would be pedantic to quibble about a matter of some thirty odd years. Even though the incarnation

had taken place that many years before the preaching of the Baptist, the writer could none the less with perfect propriety say that the light was then in the act of coming into the world and include in this act of entrance into the world everything connected with the epiphany of Christ from His incarnation down to His public appearance, and could put into the word *κόσμος* a sufficiently broad meaning to cover all this. A certain indefiniteness in its meaning would be the natural thing under the circumstances. The choice of the periphrastic conjugation may have been due in part to a desire to adjust the verb to this latitude of conception. Elsewhere also in the Gospel the phrase *ἐρχεσθαι εἰς τὸν κόσμον* in Christological connections has this broad sense of transition from the higher, divine sphere into the lower, created sphere,⁴⁷ although in a single instance it may have been used with restricted reference to the public appearance of Christ.⁴⁸ And in the present case ver. 10^b ("the world was made through Him") proves how any sharp distinction between the world as the universe and the world as humanity was at this point absent from the writer's mind. It is the cosmos as including mankind and as summed up in man in which the Logos is said to have been present, and accordingly the words can be equally well understood of His presence in nature and of His historical presence among men in incarnate form.⁴⁹

By this reasoning, however, no more than the possibility of relating ver. 10 to the preëxistent Logos can be established. An actual presumption in favor of this exegesis is only obtainable from ver. 10 taken in connection with the following statement, *εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἦλθεν καὶ οἱ ἴδιοι αὐτὸν οὐ*

⁴⁷ *Cpr.* vi. 38, 51; viii. 23, 27; ix. 39; xii. 46; xiii. 1; xvi. 28.

⁴⁸ *Cpr.* xvi. 18, 38.

⁴⁹ Spitta takes occasion from this double meaning of the word *cosmos* to cut out from ver. 10 the first two clauses: "He was in the world and the world was made through Him." In ver. 9 he throws out everything from *τὸ ἀληθινόν* to *ἄνθρωπον*. This leaves as the original statement: *ἦν τὸ φῶς ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔγνω*, translated as follows: "Es war das Licht beim Kommen zu den Menschen, aber die Menschen erkannten ihn nicht." *Das Joh-Ev.*, pp. x, 41, 42.

παρέλαβον. As is well known, expositors are sharply divided in regard to the question, whether the terms ἴδια and ἴδιοι designate the world, and specifically mankind, as the Logos' "own" in virtue of creation, or the people of Israel, as belonging to Him in virtue of a particular redemptive relationship.⁵⁰

It should be noticed that the former of these two interpretations of ver. 11 has for its natural correlate the reference of ver. 10 to the preëxistent Logos as present and active in the natural world. If the words ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν already affirmed the presence of the incarnate Logos in the world, the subsequent affirmation of His coming into the world (εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἦλθεν) would make of them a singular *hysteron proteron*. The writer cannot have first said, He was present, and then added, He came, and have meant both in the same relation. On the other hand, the view which takes ἴδια and ἴδιοι of Israel, not only permits the finding of the incarnate Logos in ver. 10 but positively creates a presumption in favor of this exegesis, because after the ἦν ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον, one naturally expects some mention of the result of this process, the actual presence of the Logos in the world, and this the words ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν supply. A progress in the movement of thought from the Logos-presence in nature to the Logos-advent among Israel, would leave unexpressed this indispensable intermediate conception, the advent of the Logos into the world.

With this relation existing between ver. 10 and ver. 11,

⁵⁰ Besides these two main interpretations, the views of Spitta, who thinks of Jesus' relations in the narrowest genealogical sense (*Das Ev. des Joh.*, p. 42) and of Belser, who would understand the term of the Judeans, as according to the Gospel Jesus' fellow-countrymen *par excellence*, (*Theol. Quartalschr.*, 1903, p. 491) may be mentioned. Belser interprets ver. 10 of Jesus' private life before His public appearance. It was at that time that He was in the world unknown to the world; thereupon He came to His own, the Judeans, and was rejected by them. Apart from the obscure statement, Jno. iv. 1-3, which has received the most divergent interpretations, there is no evidence that the Fourth Gospel makes Judea the home-country of Jesus.

it is obviously the proper procedure to make one's exegesis of the former depend on that of the latter. The question arises, whether there is anything in the wording of ver. 11 that renders the sense less equivocal than that of the preceding statement, and consequently enables us to remove the uncertainty in which the consideration of ver. 10 by itself has left us.

Zahn believes that the terms *ἴδια*, *ἰδιοι* furnish such a positive indication. He urges that *ἰδιος* does not express appurtenance in general, but appurtenance in distinction from the absence of it in a wider sphere, that cannot be called in the same sense a person's own. For this reason, he thinks, the cosmos could not be called the *ἴδια* of the Logos, because there is no other foreign sphere to be distinguished from it in respect to this relation. It must be granted that reflections on the existence of other worlds, not equally related to the Logos with our earth, or reflections on the sub-human cosmos, as excluded from the peculiar affinity of mankind to the Logos, can scarcely be credited to the Evangelist in the present connection. But we are inclined to call in question the premise itself of Zahn's argument. It is obvious from the usage of the word *ἰδιος* as ascertainable from any dictionary, that the side-reference to what is not *ἰδιος*, while usually present, is nevertheless, etymologically considered, a purely secondary and incidental element in the signification. *Ἰδιος* simply designates that which appertains to a person and in virtue of this sustains a particularly close relation to him. From the nature of the case in human proprietary relationships, this always involves the existence of other objects not so owned, but it is not permissible to infer from this, that, where the application lies outside of the sphere of human proprietorship, this element must necessarily be retained. To say that the universe and mankind are in virtue of their creation through the Logos His *ἴδια* or *ἰδιοι* does not detract from or in the least do violence to the normal meaning of the word. The usage of *ἰδιος* therefore settles nothing as to the import of ver. 11.

But there are some considerations, which, to our view, incline the balance in the opposite direction. In the first place, we cannot help believing that there is a close connection between ἴδια and ἴδιοι in ver. 11 and the clause ὁ κόσμος δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο in ver. 10. It is certainly most natural to assume that this latter clause prepares the way for and explains the characterization of those to whom the Logos came as His ἴδιοι. They were His own, because as part of the cosmos they had been made through Him. The production of a thing is the most primitive and prevalent source of the proprietary relation. Especially if τὰ ἴδια and οἱ ἴδιοι be given the sense of "his own home" and "his own home-relations", the force of this consideration will become apparent.⁵¹ On the other view the term ἴδια emerges unprepared for and unexplained.⁵²

In the second place the pointed parallelism between ἦν and ἦλθεν on the one hand, and οὐκ ἔγνω and οὐ παρέλαβον on the other hand, can be best accounted for when it is understood as a parallelism between the Logos-relation to the natural world and the Logos-relation to the world of redemption. Of the natural, cosmical relationship in its lasting, unchanging character the clause ἦν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ is eminently appropriate, just as of the redemptive approach as a unique historical event the verb ἦλθεν is strikingly

⁵¹ *Cpr.* Bauer in Lietzmann's *Handbuch, Johannes*, p. 13. Bauer, however, although rightly explaining τὰ ἴδια of the cosmos, finds the incarnate Logos already in ver. 10.

⁵² It will have been noticed that in discussing ver. 10 we did not argue from the clause ὁ κόσμος δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο that the preceding clause ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν must likewise relate the Logos to the world of nature. Such an argument would not be valid, because the middle clause might be retrospective from the point of view of redemption: "He was, incarnate, in the world, and the world was made through Him, and the world knew Him not." As the preceding note shows, the close connection between ver. 10^b and τὰ ἴδια can be recognized, τὰ ἴδια understood of the world, and yet ver. 10^a understood of redemption. But in that case the peculiar sequence of ἦν and ἦλθεν is unaccounted for. This is the weak point in Bauer's exegesis. Our argument is: τὰ ἴδια = the world in ver. 11 because of ver. 10^b and since the ἦν must come before ἦλθεν ver. 10^a describe preincarnate relations.

descriptive. This is not saying that $\eta\gamma\omega$ and $\eta\lambda\theta\epsilon\nu$, each considered by itself, do not yield good sense on the other view. Our point is that the delicately shaded contrast perceptible in the use of these two words by the Evangelist is obliterated by the other exegesis. And the same applies to the difference between $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}\kappa \epsilon\gamma\omega$ and $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \text{παρέλαβον}$. The issue between knowing and not-knowing naturally reminds us of the religion of nature and man's universal failure to apprehend the light supplied by the Logos.⁵³ On the other hand, the issue between receiving and not-receiving points to a definite, historical act on the part of the Logos whereby He aggressively made His appearance among those who were His own. Here again it is not denied that the $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}\kappa \epsilon\gamma\omega$ can be amply justified on the basis of what the Gospel teaches about the failure of the world to recognize the incarnate Jesus, but nevertheless the fine point of distinction between the two situations is lost, if both are made to refer to the same thing.⁵⁴

Thirdly, it will have to be remembered that the broad, universalistic outlook of the Prologue as a whole does not particularly favor the introduction of Israel at this point, co-ordinately with the natural cosmos and the Christian Church, as constituting by itself a separate sphere of Logos-activity. While such a conception is quite in keeping with the general attitude of the Gospel towards the Old Testament, and perhaps finds expression in viii. 56, yet in the presence of the highly-generalized contrast between nature and redemption which furnishes the key-note to the Prologue, its appearance here would be more or less anomalous. In the sequel, even where the author speaks in the plural, as representing the first believers who were witnesses

⁵³ *Cpr.* the words of Heraclitus (Sext. Emp. vii. 19, 1: $\gamma\iota\nu\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\nu \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu \kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha} \tau\omicron\nu \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu \tau\omicron\nu\delta\epsilon \acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\tau\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu \epsilon\omicron\iota\kappa\alpha\sigma\iota\nu$, with their striking resemblance to the contrast in ver. 10.^{b c}

⁵⁴ The only possibility of retaining the contrast, other than the exegesis advocated above, is that suggested by Belser (*cpr.* note 47). Apart from its general implausible character, it labors under the disadvantage that the non-recognition of the Logos during His private life lacks the tragic, culpable aspect, here connoted by the $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}\kappa \epsilon\gamma\omega$.

of the incarnate Logos-life, he speaks not out of the specifically Jewish, but out of the general Christian consciousness of himself and his fellows.

One other consideration must be taken into account. The view which understands ver. 10 of the presence of the incarnate Logos in the world and ver. 11 of His coming to Israel encounters a difficulty when the last clauses of both verses are to be explained as marking two successive and distinctive steps in the ill-reception of the Logos. The question may be pertinently asked, to what historical events or development the words *ὁ κόσμος αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔγνω* refer if they are to be kept separate from the statement *οἱ ἴδιοι αὐτὸν οὐ παρέλαβον*? How or where did the world reject the incarnate Christ, apart from His not being received by Israel? The clearly perceptible climax in the tragic note as between ver. 10^c and ver. 11^c requires that the two clauses shall not be related to the same thing. It will not do, therefore, to say, that in Israel's rejection of the Logos, it was the cosmos, which, acting through Israel, rejected Him. Whatever may be thought of the theory that in the Gospel the Jews thus represent the cosmos, it is plain that, as the two statements stand here, two distinct failures to appreciate the Logos, by two distinct subjects and in two distinct relations are spoken of.⁵⁵

The singular view of Baldensperger, who understands the *ἴδια* and *ἴδιοι* of the Israel of the Old Covenant, and carries the act of the coming of the Logos back to the same period, specifically to the time of the patriarchs, needs only passing mention.⁵⁶ It lies open to three fatal objections. In the first place, the aorist tense *ἦλθεν* cannot describe a repeated coming such as is assumed on the view in question, but only a single definite advent. Secondly, what Balden-

⁵⁵ The same difficulty is encountered on the exceptional view which combines reference to the incarnate Logos in ver. 10 with the exegesis of *τὰ ἴδια* of the world in ver. 11. Thus Bauer in Lietzmann's *Handbuch* ii. 2, 13 seeks to make out a "Gedankenfortschritt von Schöpfung und Geschöpf zu Heimat und Angehörigen". In reality, however, the one is but the reverse side of the other.

⁵⁶ *Der Prolog des vierten Evangeliums*, pp. 13 ff.

sperger seems to have overlooked, the description of those to whom the Logos came as His *ἱδίοι* implies a previous activity on His part in regard to them. If, when the Logos came to them, the patriarchs were already His own, then it becomes necessary to think of a still earlier Logos-work that made them such, and this it would be difficult to point out. And, in the third place, the present participle *τοῖς πιστεύουσιν* at the close of ver. 12 excludes a reference to past believers and points plainly to the writer's own time.⁵⁷

The result of our inquiry into the purport of vs. 10 and 11 yields a twofold addition to the evidence for a cosmical Logos-function already discovered. Besides giving us the direct affirmation that the Logos was in the world made through Him by nature, it presents us with the same truth, indirectly expressed, in the description of the cosmos as the Logos' own. It is evident, moreover, that the writer does not look upon the production of the world through the Logos as a past fact, of which the significance and influence ceased with the moment of creation. It is a fact resulting in a continuous relationship, for only as such could it offer a reason why the world could and should, under normal conditions, have so known and received the Logos as is implied in both ver. 10^c and ver. 11.⁵⁸ The bare fact that the Logos had a hand in the creation of the world would not of itself have made it easier for the world to know Him; this would result only if the origin of the world

⁵⁷ Zahn, who understands *τὰ ἴδια* of Israel, thinks that the destination of the people to belong to the Messiah, affords a sufficient ground for calling them the Logos' own. Against this is the parallel case of the cosmos, which has its relation to the Logos not in virtue of destiny alone, but as a result of its creation through Him. Therefore, in the case of Israel also, a more substantial basis would have to be found, and the only thing to be thought of in this connection would be the activity of the Logos under the Old Covenant.

Franke, *Das Alte Testament bei Johannes*, assumes that the term *ἴδια* is meant by the Evangelist as an equivalent of the Old Testament *קְנָלָהּ* as a designation of Israel. But the Sept. rendering of this is *περιούσιος*, not *ἴδιος*.

⁵⁸ Notice the adversative *καί* before both clauses in ver. 10^c and ver 11.^o

through the Logos established a perpetual relation of immanence in the world and proprietorship of the world.⁵⁹

The result of our exegesis of ver. 10, however, proves important in still another respect. It once more shows the close connection in the author's mind between the Logos as a source of omnipotent power and the Logos as a source of revelation. As in ver. 4 the Logos in virtue of His having life in Himself becomes the light of men, so here in virtue of His being in the world, and His having made the world, He appears as the One whom the world should have known and consciously appropriated. And it is chiefly in this that the doctrinal value of the teaching of this part of the Prologue consists. The question has perhaps been raised by the reader, whether a laborious inquiry of the kind here instituted is sufficiently repaid by the establishment of a principle, which elsewhere in the New Testament finds direct and undisputed expression. Why argue at length on the riddles of the Prologue, if 1 Corinthians and Colossians, and perhaps Hebrews, teach the cosmical significance and function of the preëxistent Christ in the most unequivocal language? Our answer to this is that the Prologue, if correctly interpreted by us, presents the truth involved from a peculiar angle, from which it is not considered in these other passages. The unique feature of the Prologue consists in this, that it views the cosmical function of the preëxistent Christ as a revealing function and places it in direct continuity with His revealing work in the sphere of redemption. Not that the Messiah has a share in the creation of the world or in providence, but that in mediating both He acts as the revealing Logos of God,—this is the valuable information which the Prologue supplies. It not only vindicates for nature the character of a revealing

⁵⁹ The above answers the question, left unanswered at a previous stage, to what the οὐκ ἔγνω of ver. 10^c must be referred. It is correlated with ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν and, in accordance with our understanding of these words, describes the culpable non-recognition of the Logos by men in the state of nature, not the failure of the world to recognize the incarnate Christ.

medium through which God speaks, but also links together creation and redemption as both mediated by the same Logos. Vs. 4, 5 and 10 taken together are preëminently the *sedes* for the church-doctrine of natural revelation in its relation to God's redemptive disclosure in Christ. While it is plainly taught that mankind subjectively fails to appropriate this revelation of nature, it is likewise implied that it nevertheless remains objectively valid. Moreover we receive the guarantee of the inner harmony and mutual interdependence of the two realms of truth in which the one Logos rules. Especially in our days, when a potent current of thought seeks to banish all natural theology from religion and to void the Christian mind of all antecedent rational knowledge of God, the principle just formulated assumes more than ordinary importance, and the old exegesis of the Prologue, in which it finds classical expression, becomes invested with a new apologetic interest.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

CONSCIENCE AND THE ATONEMENT

The fundamental subject of the Atonement of our Lord Jesus Christ has scarcely ever been discussed by a theologian without some reference being made to its relation to the human conscience, and by some theologians the relationship in question has been discussed with great seriousness and at very considerable length. Thus Turretine, in his *De Satisfactione*,¹ makes, as is well known, a powerful use of the argument from conscience with an ultimate intention of showing that, on the supposition of God's purposing to forgive sins, the nature of Divine Justice renders a precedent Atonement absolutely necessary. Dr. Hugh Martin, in the same spirit, devotes a section of his valuable work on the Atonement² to showing that the benefit of the remission of sins can never be made intelligible or acceptable to the human conscience, except as issuing from the expiation of the guilt of those sins. One cannot help regretting that Dr. Martin was never able to bring to accomplishment a purpose, or at least a strong wish, to which he gave expression once and again of subjecting the question of the relation of conscience to the Atonement to a discussion as near as might be to completeness.³

Dr. J. MacLeod Campbell, whose work on the Atonement⁴ has from its publication up to the present hour been profoundly influential in English theological thought, regarded conscience as an instrument by means of which we may ascertain the true significance of Christ's obedience unto death.

¹ Francisci Turretini *De satisfactione Christi Disputationes*, Thesis I., Pars I., xxix. s.

² *The Atonement*, by Hugh Martin, D.D., p. 191 f.

³ An article entitled, *Conscience and the Blood of Sprinkling*, which Dr. Martin contributed to the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review* some ten years after the volume on the Atonement was published (i.e. April 1882) is, in the present connection, worth perusing.

⁴ Cf. *The Nature of the Atonement*, by John McLeod Campbell, D.D., p. 10 f., p. 311 f.

He used the term conscience, however, with a connotation which one cannot but regard as highly questionable. He held that the testimony of conscience was in favor of what is really the basal thought of his treatise, to wit, that the whole human race, according to the original constitution of things, stood towards the Creator in the relation of children to a Father, that this filial relation has been the determining principle of all God's dealings towards the human race, and that the purely legal element was, at any time, anything but determinative in our case. Without waiting to debate the matter, here and now, from the point of view of the nature of conscience itself, it occurs to one to say in passing that if the truth of the matter were as Dr. MacLeod Campbell would have us believe, the apostle Paul's method of dealing with sinners in order to shut them in to the faith of the Gospel would have been other than it was. To the present writer at least it seems quite evident that when the apostle Paul wished to show how inexpressibly greatly all mankind stood in need of the Gospel which he preached, he, at this stage of his presentation of the truth of the Gospel, made everything of the legal element in the natural covenant, and he did so in order that sinners might realise how intolerable the natural condition had become through sin, that thus they might wish for an interest in a gracious covenant whose most distinguishing and characteristic promise is, "I will be merciful to your unrighteousness and your sins and your iniquities will I remember no more." The natural covenant knew nothing of forgiveness; but much, very much, about death as the unavoidable penalty of sin. Now the case could scarcely have been altogether thus, if Dr. McLeod Campbell's construction of the original constitution of things were correct.

It is not the aim of this paper to discuss, with any pretensions to adequacy, either conscience, or the Atonement, or yet the relation of these most potent factors in the moral and religious spheres, the one to the other. The present discussion is not to be taken as raising, save in a very meagre sense, the general question of the relation of con-

science to the Atonement, nor even of the many difficulties, which one approaching the subject of expiation from the point of view of conscience might conceivably feel. The paper, mainly at least, deals with one difficulty or question the nature of which may at this stage be indicated thus: If it be ascertained that the common doctrine of the Reformed Creeds, in the sense of "Satisfaction" as against say the "Triumphantorial", the "Moral Influence" or the "Governmental" theory, is the right construction of the meaning of Christ's obedience unto death, how may we suppose that a conscience, painfully burdened with guilt, can rationally find rest in Christ's death as thus interpreted? Of course, preliminarily to our taking up this question in precise form, it will be necessary for us to make plain what the concept, conscience, stands to us for, and what, in one main aspect, the Atonement. And if our solution of this practical question be a good one, its goodness will manifest itself in the ease with which it self-evidently lends itself to a wider application. In this limited sense, the present discussion may be held as having a reference to the subject of the relationship in question in a more general regard.

It may be in place to say a word here concerning the sources of our knowledge. Conscience belongs to the natural sphere, and its origin, nature, and functions are proper objects of scientific study. Moral philosophers have for generations exercised themselves with this enquiry, and, although one may, or rather must, examine one's experience for oneself, it would surely be great presumption for any one to think that he has not much to learn in this matter from men who have devoted their lives to this special study. On the other hand, the Atonement belongs to the supernatural revelation of God. Its nature can be learned only from the Scriptures, which are here, of course, taken as the very Word of God. But the Scriptures speak of conscience also. It is here assumed that what the Scriptures say of conscience is not contradicted by anything that can be learned in the natural sphere. The fact that herein we have something that is common to the two spheres, the natural and the

supernatural, to which conscience and the Atonement respectively, in the main part, properly belong, points to the possibility of a rational comparison being made between the claims of conscience and the content of Christ's Atonement.

I. Conscience: In a matter of such difficulty⁵ as the human conscience, it seems most advisable to proceed from simpler to more complex views of the subject. I venture to submit the following propositions thereanent.

(a) The simplest, and therefore the broadest, although not necessarily the deepest, view one can take of conscience is, that it is a power belonging to the human soul in virtue of which we make moral distinctions, and are rendered capable of appreciating such moral distinctions. Conscience is, in a word, moral reason.⁶

(b) By virtue of this moral reason or conscience we are not only capable of apprehending an essential fundamental difference between right and wrong in dispositions and in actions, but with this apprehension we cannot avoid recognising, although it comes not to all with the like clearness, that we are under law. In other words conscience, which enables us to say of certain acts that they are right and of others that they are wrong, compels us at the same time to recognise that we are under obligation to follow after the one and to avoid the other. When conscience apprehends that envy or murder is wrong, with that apprehension comes also the knowledge that we are under obligation to avoid the

⁵ Even Butler found the subject abstruse and difficult. Cf. Preface to *Sermons*.

⁶ I think it of importance to hold that it is in virtue of our being creatures endowed with a conscience that we are capable of making moral distinctions at all, and that in this capability we have the most elementary, and the broadest view that can be taken of conscience. When Kant (*Metaphysics of Ethics*, Calderwood's, 3rd Ed., p. 254), says that "the consciousness of an internal tribunal in man, before which his thoughts accuse or excuse him, is what is called Conscience", he, in my humble opinion, regards the matter from a too narrowly individualistic point of view, a point of view, of course, in keeping with his Critique. It is not questioned that those activities of conscience which Kant condescends to notice are the activities which, in the estimation of every thoughtful person, lend awe to the theme.

condemned disposition or act. Similarly when conscience apprehends that it is right that a son or daughter should cherish affectionate regard towards a parent and, in case of need, should help such a parent materially, with that apprehension comes the knowledge that a son or daughter is under an obligation to act in this spirit towards a parent. The fact that in the case of many this concomitant knowledge is practically disregarded does not nullify the truth of what is now being asserted.

An analysis of conscience that does not take note of, and indeed emphasize, the fact that with the apprehension of a fundamental difference between right and wrong there comes the concomitant knowledge of an obligation to choose the right and to avoid the wrong is fatally defective.⁷ For, on the one hand, we have given us in this sense of obligation the indispensable subjective condition of our being capable of attaching any meaning to moral law in an objective sense, of our being capable indeed of sin, or of our being convicted of guilt. On the other hand, because this inward sense of obligation cannot account for itself, cannot render its own rationale, we are compelled to look beyond ourselves for the true rationale of the condition of things to which we are referring.⁸ Our sense of obligation, which, as we said, we, in virtue of conscience, apprehend, cannot be regarded as merely equivalent to an apprehension of the reasonableness, as within the finite spirit itself, of following after the right and of avoiding the wrong. The weight of it, the unshakeableness of it, the tragicalness of it, have been too realistically experienced by countless millions of our race that it should thus simply be accounted for. But a sufficient rationale of the conscionable obligation is ren-

⁷ "The observation that man is by his very nature a law to himself pursued to its just consequences, is of the utmost importance." Butler, *Sermons*, Preface. "This notion of responsibility is at all times involved, however darkly, in every act of moral self-consciousness." Kant *op. cit.*, p. 256.

⁸ This, of course, amounts to saying that ethical science is forced to borrow a fundamental premiss from theology. Cf. Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*, last ed., p. 505.

dered if, with the best Reformed divines, we identify this obligation, so far, that is, as it is correctly construed, with the law of God.⁸ The intuitions of some of the profounder moral philosophers among the heathen made them with more or less clearness of vision and firmness of grasp to lay hold upon this solution. The tortures of some of the wickedest men both in heathendom and in nominal Christendom have forced the sufferers to an acknowledgement, more or less clearly expressed, of the truth of this solution. But it is the supernatural revelation of God's word that supplies us with the fullest and clearest proof of the truth and reality of the identification here asserted. That revelation, so far as it bears on the present question, is given us partly in unambiguous utterances, the explication of which need not now occupy us, but partly also in what may be called the Biblical presuppositions, the significance of which requires closer attention. These presuppositions are in the sense that, although in the case of fallen man, there is not always clearness of vision enabling all and sundry, without fail, to pass over from law as revealed in every man's conscience to the Personal Lawgiver, or God, yet, in innocence, the law of the conscience must have been immediately understood as being a direct revelation of the will of the Creator, and thus a revelation of the Creator Himself.

⁸ Says Turretine (*Theol. Elen.* L.I.Q.3, 5): "Natural law, which has been written on the conscience of each and which (according to Romans ii. 14, 15) excuses and accuses men for well-doing or ill-doing, is to be met with in man. Nor may it be excepted: Either (1), that not the law but the work of the law is said to have been thus written; for, to the apostle these are synonymous expressions, so that he takes the expressions, "they are a law to themselves", and, "they have the work of the law written in their hearts", in one and the same sense. And the nature of the thing itself proves the truth of this, because such a work of the law is meant as that a man by the impulse thereof not only distinguishes the honourable from the base, but is urged to pursue the former and flee the latter. Or (2), that the law is said not to be innate, but written, that is, made known, as the law of Moses was made known to the Jews by revelation; for, the writing implies a natural revelation of that law in the conscience of man in contradistinction to the external revelation which was made to the Jews through a writing which was upon tables of stone."

This construction of the relation of conscience to the law of God, which in its final form we owe to the Biblical revelation, gives the rationale of that awful sense, as one may say, of responsibility to something, or rather some One other than ourselves of which no human being can quite rid himself. It gives the rationale also of that superintendency of conscience, as among our mental and moral activities, for which the moral philosophers have, as a rule, argued.⁹ True it is that the proper ultimate object even of the purely intellectual reason also is God. The fact that human beings have shown themselves capable of giving, so far, an intelligible account of the arrangements that rule the starry heavens, of thinking, as Kepler said, their thoughts with God,¹⁰ ought to be taken as intimating to us that nothing can satisfy man's soul, considered even as an intellectual being, but the very Creator of heaven and earth.^{10a} We are not, therefore, making conscience man's sole religious organ. All we maintain is that it serves with a certain emphasis as the handle whereby God binds every human being to Himself, and especially to His righteousness or justice. And in this emphasis there is given us the rationale of the superintendency of conscience as among man's intellectual and moral powers, and the rationale also of man's unshakeable sense of responsibility. In a word our search for the rationale of conscionable obligation brings us to the conclusion that the highest function of conscience is to act as guardian of the claims of God.¹¹

⁹ Cf. Butler's oft-quoted dictum (Sermon II): "Had Conscience strength, as it has right; and had it power, as it has manifest authority; it would absolutely govern the world." Professor Calderwood (*Handbook of Moral Philosophy*, p. 80) says that, "Butler has placed the fact of the supremacy of conscience on such a basis that it has been admitted with wonderful unanimity by the upholders of most conflicting theories as to the nature of conscience."

¹⁰ I have often thought that this consideration was fitted to go a long way towards commending to man the reasonableness of the doctrine of the Incarnation, when once revealed.

^{10a} Augustine (*Confessions* i.) says: "Thou hast formed us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless till they find rest in Thee."

¹¹ "Conscience," says Delitzsch, *Psychology*, 2 Eng. Ed. p. 167, "in its primitive state was precisely knowledge knowing itself in God. But, in

(c) Conscience, which we identify with that "spirit of man which is the lamp of Jehovah searching all his innermost parts" (Proverbs xx. 27),¹² is a light capable of augmentation.¹³ This, on our construction of conscience, is a thesis that, one would think, scarcely requires proof. Notwithstanding, because of some interesting questions that arise in this connection, one may endeavour to make the phenomenon manifest. If we shall speak true to the Biblical representations we must, on the subjective side, consider two principal cases here; I mean that of the regenerate and that of the natural.¹⁴ For, with regard to the former, regeneration must be held to have affected their conscience beneficially. It increases its sensitiveness. Not only so: it renders it sensitive to some objects and truths to which it was once quite irresponsive. Regeneration thus enables conscience to fulfil in a better way than before its proper and natural functions, both in discriminating between the right hand and the left, and in identifying natural obligation with the will of Jehovah. Regeneration in this connection in fact means not only the coming of spiritual life, but an augmentation of light, in the sense of vision. But over and above this augmentation, in a purely subjective sense, it stands to reason that, in an objective sense, the conscience whose eyes, so to say, have been opened should gain additional light from the revelation which God has given of Himself in the work of creation, in the promulgation, after a supernatural manner, of the moral law at Mount Sinai, and in the revelation which God has given of Himself as a Saviour both in the Old and especially in the New Testa-

consequence of the fall, it is no longer the perfectly true mirror of God's law in us. This law itself, however, subsists in man as the ineradicable dowry of his divinely constituted nature."

¹² "Conscience is God's searchlight." Toy *in loc.*

¹³ In other words, it has a content from without.

¹⁴ "The existence of conscience," says Delitzsch, *op. cit.*, p. 168, "reaches beyond the fall, and has, in its manifestation of itself, run through a changeful history: it was one thing in its original position; it is another thing in its position under sin; it becomes another thing in its position under grace, through which it becomes renewed."

ments. Nor does it cause any difficulty if we should say that the regenerated conscience makes this, to begin with objective, light its own.

The other case is that of those who are yet in the state of nature, strangers to a gracious regeneration. Now, however difficult it be in this second case to explain all the facts, there can be no question that, even in the case of the unregenerate also, natural conscience is a light that is capable of increase. Conscience may in one sense reject a light¹⁴ which in another sense it makes its own. One may conclude from the first chapter of the Epistle of Paul to the Romans that generally in the case of heathen idolaters the moral reason rejects the light which the natural creation throws upon the Being and Perfections of God. Yet, in another sense, the moral reason makes that light its own. Otherwise it is inconceivable in regard to those who "sinned without the law and perish without law" that they should in the next world suffer remorse of conscience because of their not having put that revelation of God, which the creation yields or serves, to good use. And, on the other hand, apart from such remorse, one can scarcely attach any intelligible thought to the expression, "the heathen perishing without law".¹⁵

A similar remark falls to be made with regard to the written Word, and especially here to that Word as, in a supernatural way, it repromulgates the natural covenant. When the apostle Paul in Romans ii. 13, says that "as many as have sinned under the law shall be judged by the law", "judgment" in this latter case must mean something still more terrible than "perishing" when spoken of the heathen.¹⁶

¹⁴ Light is truth, and all truth may be said to have God for its author. The truth, however, which we have here in view is, mainly, God's self-revelation in creation, in law, and in grace.

¹⁵ "The Bible," says W. G. T. Shedd (*Sermons to the Natural Man*, p. 86), "sends the ungodly and licentious pagan to hell, upon the same principle that it sends the ungodly and licentious nominal Christian."

¹⁶ "Paul argues," says Shedd (*ut sup.* p. 85), "that the ungodly Jew will be visited with a more severe punishment than the ungodly Gentile."

Again we say that we can attach no intelligent thought to the expression if it does not imply that in the next world such as have had such a revelation of God's will as is given us in the ten commandments, and have not put this revelation to good use, will on this very account suffer remorse. Yet it is inconceivable that that should be so, if conscience did not in some sense make this supernaturally bestowed light, which it did not improve, in some sense its own.

Because, according to the Scriptures, such as have had the light of the Gospel and have not appreciated it are the guiltiest of any, and must suffer the greatest punishment of any,¹⁷ Dr. McLeod Campbell, reasoning I suppose on presuppositions that might seem, but are not really, analogous to those made use of by me in the last two paragraphs, concludes that the law of conscience must be one with the Gospel, and that, because the Gospel in a word means sonship, therefore we must conclude that the filial relation was the determining factor in the first constitution of things. But this kind of reasoning is fallacious. It is quite true that rejecters of Christ in the Gospel are the guiltiest of any, and it is also true that unless in some sense conscience made the light of the Gospel its own even whilst rejecting it, it would be inconceivable that rejecters of Christ should suffer remorse in the next world on account of this rejection. All this may well be, without the case for a natural sonship being altogether as Dr. McLeod Campbell imagined. For, to begin with, adoption, although it may be regarded as the crown of our salvation, is by no means the whole of our salvation. And further, the Biblical view of adoption in the evangelical sense is (howsoever the question concerning a natural sonship in some sense be decided on Biblical grounds), that those, who believe in the Son of God, Jesus Christ, are received into the family of God in the sense of a sonship which is ever so much higher than the natural cov-

¹⁷ "This is the condemnation that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil." John iii. 19.

enant so much as once contemplated.¹⁸ These simple and, I should say, easily demonstrable truths, of themselves, take the ground from under Dr. McLeod Campbell's argument.

But I shall not here and now pursue this line of reasoning farther. I return to the proposition with which under this section I started: The light of conscience may be augmented. Both in the case of the regenerate and of the unregenerate the augmented light is still, in some sense, the light of conscience, although as will be readily perceived that is true in a much more profound sense of the former than of the latter.^{18a}

(d) The light of conscience, from its dimmest to its brightest manifestations on earth, may be traversed. The warnings of conscience may, so far, be unheeded. But this cannot be done with impunity. The result is a blot, a burden, it may be a burning. In proportion as the conscience is sensitive, the issue will be a discomfort, a restlessness, an upheaval in man's moral nature, in which one seems to interpenetrate oneself in the form now of criminal, now of accuser, now of extenuator, now of judge. "The procedure," as one has said, "takes the form of the conduct of a cause before a court." But throughout it all there is some consciousness, more or less distinct, that the case cannot end there, that it must be appealed to an Ultimate Court. This circumstance may, from one point of view, be construed as lending fearfulness to the situation, when one can expect only a fearful looking for of judgment, and of fiery indignation that shall devour such as have trampled upon conscience in its several degrees of enlightenment. Yet from another point of view the fact that the case goes up as by necessity from the court of conscience to an Ultimate Tribunal, contains in it the only hopeful circumstance attending

¹⁸ God has properly speaking only One Son—the Only Begotten. Those who believe upon this Son are, in the evangelical sense, *exclusively* the children of God. Cf. John i. 12, Galatians iii. 26.

^{18a} The matter may be put thus: The former receive the truth in the love of it, the latter not in the love of it.

this woeful business. If the case must go to the Ultimate Tribunal, it must be that it is with that Tribunal we have mainly to do. That, as we shall see later on, is a hopeful matter.

(e) We bring our remarks upon conscience *per se* to a close by observing that we have, in (a), (b), (c), (d), been dealing with what are universal experiences. This lends grandeur as well as awesomeness to our discussion. All have a conscience,¹⁹ all have some sense of obligation to a Higher,²⁰ all have had some augmentation of light, all have violated conscience, even if some did so in more aggravated forms than others, so that all have naturally reason to dread a flood of wrath in which not only the fountains of the great deep of the human conscience shall be broken up, but heaven's windows shall be opened as avenues for God's immediate wrath. Seeing then that conscience is an instrument, awesome in its complexity, that every conscience has been more or less defiled, and that the consuming fire of God's holy wrath is ready to seize upon the conscience that remains defiled, and the fierceness of that fire will be in proportion to the degree of defilement, it becomes a pressing practical question, how this defilement may be cleansed, how the conscience may be purged. Now the Gospel of Jesus Christ offers cleansing, in the sense required, and consequent freedom from wrath. When the Holy Spirit (Hebrews ix. 9) discounts the efficacy of the gifts and sacrifices that were offered up under the law as being things that could not make those who exercised themselves to the utmost in those ceremonial services perfect as pertaining to the conscience, He plainly thereby claims for the sacrifice of Christ an efficacy to cleanse the conscience of the believer in Christ, be that conscience ever so much defiled.

II. We come, therefore, to discuss briefly the second

¹⁹ Cf. Kant's "Every man has, as a moral being, a conscience." *Op. cit.*, p. 217, and repeatedly.

²⁰ Consult Turretine's splendid discussion: "An dentur Athei proprie dicti." *Th. El. L.III. Q 2.*

member of the relationship in question, to wit, the Atonement—a remedy for a defiled and burdened conscience which is apt to appear to one, on first thoughts, as a professed friend showing his back to one in the time of need. For Christ in expiating guilt did not set His face towards sinful creatures. On the contrary He set His face towards God. On account of this, as Naaman with Elisha, one is apt to feel disappointed (2 Kings vii). But on a better understanding of Christ's method of relieving the guilty, one will not feel disappointed. Meantime for our present purposes, we must be at some pains to establish the fact that Christ's work in making Atonement, or in other words in expiating guilt, terminated upon God Himself. For it is this fact that raises the difficulty to which special attention is now drawn. And moreover, there is additional necessity laid upon us to establish the Godwardness of Christ's Atonement, inasmuch as not a few, in the name of theological science, have at one time or another denied it. It is a fact of common knowledge that some early Christian writers expressed themselves as if their idea was that Christ's work, in giving His life as a ransom, terminated upon Satan. That a very important result of Christ's death was the destruction of Satan—I mean in the sense of Hebrews ii. 14—is a fact to which the Scriptures bear ample evidence, and is an aspect of Christ's intention in dying which, if overwrought by some of the early Christian Fathers, is generally under-worked nowadays. When one thinks that the very first intimation of salvation through a suffering Saviour that was made to our race was enveloped in a threat addressed to our arch-enemy (Genesis iii. 15), that Christ Himself regarded the work He was engaged in as a battle deciding once for all whether the world was to be His or Satan's (John xii. 31), that in a portion of the New Testament in which more than in any other Biblical writing—I mean the Epistle to the Hebrews—the relation of the Atonement to conscience gets prominence, a main purpose of Christ's death is set forth as being the

destruction or bringing to nought of him that had the power of death, that is the devil—all this is surely ample proof that the results of Christ's death cannot be adequately dealt with, without an important section being devoted to the question of what Christ's death meant for the god of this world. But Christ did not achieve His victory over Satan, as the so-called "Triumphantorial" theory would seem to teach, through giving Himself in any sense to Satan. His victory over Satan was complete, but He achieved it through giving Himself in life and death to God.

Again, within post-Reformation times and up to the present hour there have been not a few who have taken in hand to discuss the significance of Christ's death, whose construction comes practically to this: God cannot but forgive sinners who repent of their sins, Christ's life and death have in some way, howsoever inexplicable the connection be, an influence to bring about in sinners this indispensable repentance desiderated. In this way Christ's death saves. This is the Socinian view, and the view of not a few who, although they repudiate the Socinian name, have come under Socinian influences. It is the "Moral Influence" theory of the Atonement, and, according to it, Christ's death can only in a very indirect or rather improper way be said to terminate upon God at all.

The "Governmental" theory, although it is at a less remove from the doctrine for which we contend than the "Moral Influence" theory, has this in common with it, that it makes the Atonement terminate upon God only in an indirect, or rather, I should say, in an improper sense. It would seem to be the human conscience that the Atonement, according to the "Governmental" theory, directly affects.^{20a} It is because the Atonement does this directly, that God can consistently with rectoral righteousness exercise mercy.

Abettors of the "Moral Influence" and "Governmental" theories of the Atonement claim to do more justice to con-

^{20a} That is to say, it affects the human conscience with a view to quicken it. But what of cleansing and appeasing conscience?

science than can be done on the "Satisfaction" construction, the construction which we advocate. The theories we discard appear, indeed, at first sight, to deal more immediately with conscience. But it happens in not a few cases that the seemingly longer road is really the shorter. And so it is in this case. It is only by making the first first, that we can ever have a good second. But be the interests of conscience what they may, it is, in view of the Biblical data, a demonstrably true affirmation that the Atonement of our Lord Jesus Christ, or Christ's priestly act in laying down His life, terminated not upon devil or man, but upon God the Judge of all. We can here and now give only the elements of this demonstration:

(a) Sin, which, in this case, is the great trouble—that which defiles the conscience, and that which Christ's Atonement must put away—is against God. So David in confessing in the fifty-first Psalm, "Against Thee, Thee only, have I sinned", evidently meant to teach. As Perowne puts it: "Human judges can only regard wrong actions as *crimes*, God alone takes cognizance of them as *sins*." The apostle Paul regarded this question from one and the same point of view as did David. One may prove it thus: In the opening portion of the Epistle to the Romans, Paul undertakes to show that every human being stood in need of forgiveness as preached through Jesus Christ. Why? Because all men are demonstrably under God's wrath. And how demonstrably under God's wrath? Because all are guilty. Unpurged guilt spells unappeasable wrath. It is just another way of saying that sin strikes against God. If sin does so, the Atonement, which cancels it, must terminate upon God.^{20b}

(b) Not only is sin against God, but it belongs to the perfection of God's nature that no sin should go unpunished. In Deuteronomy xxxii. 35, the fact that vengeance belongeth unto God is given as a reason making it certain that the

^{20b} Wrong actions may be hurtful to one's neighbor, or to one's self; but it is in the sense in which these same actions wrong God that Christ bore them.

finally impenitent guilty person must suffer condign punishment, howsoever long that punishment may seem to delay its coming. This perfection of God is pointed to in the Epistle to the Hebrews (x. 30) as the reason why despisers of Christ in the Gospel shall in the judgment have the most intolerable portion of any. David, in Psalm v, reasons from this perfection of God to the certain ultimate overthrow of such as obstinately oppose themselves to God, and similarly the apostle Paul in 2 Thessalonians i. 8, reasoning from this perfection of God, warns the troublers of the Church of God concerning their certain fearful end.

It is quite easy, we admit, to dwell so exclusively on this aspect of the Divine character as to give an entirely wrong impression of the God of Israel. We cannot dwell too much on that aspect of the Divine character to which the Westminster Divines—see Confession of Faith II, i—were enabled to do so much justice when in setting forth the natural and essential perfections of God they declared Him to be “most loving, gracious, merciful”. But, notwithstanding, one may justly say that, in a certain sense, it makes the unavoidable wrath of God against sin all the more terrible when it is realised to be the unavoidable wrath of a Being who is naturally infinitely loving in His nature. This view of the matter puts the blame on the right party—it makes sin appear exceedingly horrible.

(c) If then sin is against God, and if further it is a perfection of the Godhead to execute vengeance on account of every sin, it is evident that Christ, if He is to save sinners from their fearful plight on account of sin as guilt, must engage His heart to draw near to Jehovah (Jeremiah xxx. 21). His work must terminate upon God. That the achievement was equal to and in keeping with the emergency, was taught the Church of God under the Old Testament dispensation in connection with the sacrifices which they were then commanded to offer up. For proof: The sin offering^{20c} was

^{20c} For a particularly fine statement of the argument as from the broader base of all the piacalar sacrifices of the law of Moses, one

the sacrifice which in a more significant sense than any other of the Mosaic sacrifices was the type of Christ's sacrificial death, and therefore is best fitted to throw light on the significance of Christ's death. It is quite a good proof of this last assertion that, in the New Testament, Christ as a sacrifice is more frequently designated sin-offering than under any other name drawn from the Mosaic appointments. Further the sin-offering itself may be studied most significantly of all as it was offered up on the tenth day of the seventh month in Israel, that is on the great day of Atonement. The signal significance of the service of the great day of Atonement is evident from the nature of the case, and also because the fact of this pre-eminent significance is a presupposition of the argument of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Now on that great day the High Priest under the law took the blood of those animals which were for sin offerings, and, bringing it into the holiest of all, sprinkled it upon the mercy seat and before the mercy seat. He sprinkled it neither upon the people nor upon the tabernacle^{20a} but upon the throne and before the throne of God Himself. Could it be shown more clearly that it is the essence of sacrifice, at least of the sin-offering, to propitiate God, to turn away His wrath, and to procure His favour?²¹

(d) The truth that the sacrifice of Calvary had God, the Judge of all, for its objective, is brought out in the New Testament in a simple way, but in a way which is in perfect keeping with what the law of Moses might have taught us. In every case in which the immediate *terminus ad quem* of Christ's priestly activities in laying down His life is indicated in the New Testament, that terminus is said to be God Himself. "He gave Himself a sacrifice to God" (Ephesians v.

may refer to Outram's, *Two Dissertations on Sacrifices*, especially Dis. i. chs. 15 and 19.

^{20a} Even if with the Jewish commentators we understand Lev. xvi. 16 in the sense that a part of the blood of the sin-offerings of the great day of Atonement was ordered to be sprinkled in the outer sanctuary the argument is not substantially affected.

²¹ That is, in the sense of Judge.

2). "He offered Himself without spot to God" (Hebrews ix. 14). In a word, the cause of Christ's death was, according to the Scripture, our sins (Romans iv. 25). But the death which He died on account of our sins amounted to a sacrifice of a sweet smelling savour, which, of course, was unto God.

Christ's death may, in a secondary sense, be said to terminate upon the believing sinner's conscience. But, in the primary sense, it terminated upon God. *And the primary sense is the whole of the Atonement.* The death of Christ, which took place nearly nineteen hundred years before we, who now live, were born, was in its own nature there and then perfect in the sense of an Atonement, and perfection does not admit of addition. "By the one offering Christ hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified" (Hebrews x. 14). In proof of its perfection God, to whom Christ offered Himself as a sacrifice of a sweet smelling savour, raised Him from the dead, and exalted Him "far above all heavens that Christ might fill all things" (Ephesians iv. 10). It is because of this perfection of Christ's work in the sense of an Atonement, that believers in the Son of God always have the forgiveness, not of some of their sins, nor even of most of their sins, but of *all* their sins. (Colossians ii. 3; 1 John i. 7).

One of the latest somewhat noteworthy contributions to the interpretation of the significance of the Atonement is, one regrets to say, in the regard now alluded to, one of the least satisfactory. I refer to Principal P. T. Forsyth's, *The Work of Christ*. Principal Forsyth professes to have sympathy with the three great ideas which have commended themselves to so many as interpretive of the significance of Christ's Cross,—destruction of Satan's power, moral influence, satisfaction; and instead of making any of them in a supreme sense the interpretive idea, he tries to combine the three in one. The result, as might be expected, is little better than a medley. It is as if, in regard to the constitution of man's moral nature, instead of, like Butler, asserting the

supremacy of conscience, and assigning to self-love and to benevolence their proper subordinate places, one were to conjoin self-love and benevolence with conscience in the superintendency.

The evil effect, however, of seeking to co-ordinate these interpretive ideas is seen at its worst when towards the end of the volume under notice, the author faces the question what it is that God has regard to in forgiving sins. "Christ", he says, (p. 224) "satisfied the heart of God by presenting in the compendious compass of His own person a Humanity presanctified by the irresistible power of His own creative and timeless work." In other words a holy penitent people is, in the last resort, substituted for Christ's satisfaction to divine justice as the immediate ground of forgiveness. Cover it up with fine phrases as Principal Forsyth may, the outcome of his discussion does not differ essentially from the old Romish view: "He merited that we might merit."²²

III. But, to return to our direct purpose. Let what has been advanced suffice as the elements of a demonstration of the thesis that Christ's work in making Atonement terminated upon God, the Judge of all. Christ seems thus by the very fact of His turning His face towards Another, even although that Other is God, to turn away from ourselves and our distressful case. Now no one is so self-centred as the one whose spirit is wounded. Naturally, therefore, none are so ready as the wounded in spirit to think that, if Christ is to expiate their guilt, He must deal primarily and directly with their own conscience. Yet such was not His method. In what is really the whole of expiation, of propitiation, of Atonement, Christ was occupied in offering Himself unto God, and thus made an end of sin, finished transgression, made reconciliation for iniquity, and brought in an everlast-

²² Principal Forsyth opens his discussions in the volume referred to promisingly, beginning, as he does, with man as God's enemy. But he very soon loses the right path, and that because he takes this enmity only in an active sense. In Romans v. enmity is primarily passive enmity. That is: such is the nature of God's righteousness that, if we remain guilty, we must be dealt with as enemies. Had Dr. Forsyth but admitted that one truth, it would, we think, have compelled him to make "satisfaction" the interpretive idea in Christ's death.

ing righteousness. And He points the burdened conscience for relief to a work that thus is seen to have terminated entirely upon Another, a work that was finished ere any now living had a being. And, after all, Christ's directions to us—and here we are offering the solution for the sake of which mainly this paper was written—are most reasonable. It is not that we think that any sinner was ever simply reasoned into a cordial acceptance of the Atonement. What we mean is that regeneration does not leave a man less reasonable than before, but on the contrary that God's efficiency is in perfect harmony with the original laws of our rational nature, whether intellectual or moral. And, therefore, in pursuance of our proof of the reasonableness of our being directed to find peace of conscience in a work that terminated upon God, consider:

(1) The main function of conscience, as was already pointed out, is to be a guardian of the interests of God. Not only so, but the functionings of conscience, whether in the sense of discerning right from wrong, or in discerning the obligation under which a creature is to choose the right and to avoid the wrong, is a revelation of God, because it is a revelation of His Will. If that is admitted, it will surely appear no unreasonable thing that conscience should identify satisfaction rendered to its Lord with satisfaction rendered to itself, in fact should reckon that satisfaction to its Lord as that whereby alone conscience, according to its proper office, could be honoured, or in which it could find rest.²³

(2) The Biblical view appears to be that it is just because Christ's work terminated upon God that that work can result in the cleansing of the conscience of a guilty, if believing, creature. The *locus classicus* is Hebrews ix. 13,

²³ "The human conscience," says Professor B. B. Warfield, "is the shadow of God's judgment; its deliverances repeat the demands of God's righteousness; its satisfaction argues the satisfaction of God's justice." The sermon from which this quotation is made—see Warfield's *The Power of God unto Salvation* (p. 79)—is altogether a most valuable contribution to a better understanding of the relationship discussed, so far, in this paper.

14. The meaning seems to be: (a) This relation or dependence of conscience for cleansing on the Atonement was adumbrated by means of types under the old dispensation: "If the blood of bulls and goats and the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh: how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through His Eternal Spirit²⁴ offered Himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?" The thought of these verses, so far as, for our present purpose, they throw light on the meaning of the Old Testament sacrificial arrangements, may be brought out in this way: In ver. 13, "the blood of bulls and goats" means the blood of the sin-offerings, especially of the sin-offering of the great day of Atonement. In other words "the blood of bulls and goats" gives us the sixteenth chapter of the Book of Leviticus. In the same verse, "the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean", gives us the nineteenth chapter of the Book of Numbers, with its laws concerning the water of separation. Now the Apostle by thus bringing these two chapters into close proximity suggests that the rites of Numbers xix were dependent upon the rites of Leviticus xvi. Now the rites of Leviticus xvi were typical of Christ's sacrificial death, when He offered Himself unto God. And the rites of

²⁴ "His Eternal Spirit": The right rendering is of course a matter in debate, and the argument of this paper is not really affected by the decision. But I may briefly indicate why I take "Eternal Spirit" in the sense of, "Christ's essential or divine nature", and not in the sense of, "the Third Person of the Godhead". (1) It is not denied that "Eternal Spirit" is attributable to the Holy Ghost, but He is not spoken of exactly as in Hebrews ix. 14, elsewhere in the Scriptures. (2) The expression is anarthrous, and thus suits a nature still better than a Person. (3) The terms "Eternal Spirit" are certainly attributable to Christ's essential nature, and, according to many good exegetes, have, if taken in this sense, a close analogue in Romans i. 4. (4) Especially, the passage (Hebrews ix. 14) in which the terms occur is a terse summary of the glorious views of Christ's Person and office that make up the previous part of the Epistle to the Hebrews. None of these reasons is absolutely decisive, but, taken in combination, they, in my judgment, turn the balance in favour of the above translation.

Numbers xix were typical of the cleansing of the conscience, which is a result of the offering of Christ unto God. In other words, according to the Old Testament adumbration, cleansing of conscience was dependent upon Atonement. To put it otherwise "the blood of bulls and goats" in ver. 13 has for its parallel "Christ offering Himself through His Eternal Spirit without spot unto God" in ver. 14. And "the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean" in ver. 13, has for its parallel "the blood of Christ cleansing the conscience from dead works in order to serve the living God" in ver. 14. And the Apostle appears to me to say that this dependence of a cleansed conscience upon the satisfaction of divine justice ought not to be regarded as a truth quite novel, because that, properly understood, the same truth was in a shadowy way taught under the law, as one may see if one considers the dependence of the minor ceremonials on the central ceremonial of Leviticus xvi. (b) What was taught, although with less distinctness, under the Old dispensation, is set before us in a plainer and more direct way under the New: "The blood of Jesus Christ who through His Eternal Spirit offered Himself without spot to God, will purge the conscience from dead works." It is not as if he had said that the blood of Christ will effect this, although it was offered to God, but that it has this effect just because it was offered to God, for the offering of Himself is the offering of His blood. The thought of this 14th verse seems most concentrated. It is as if the Apostle would gather up the essence of all that he had said in the previous portion of his Epistle into one pregnant sentence. "His Eternal Spirit" is a phrase that appears to the present writer to give in a word what had been given *in extenso* in Chapter i concerning that Son of God, who is all that God Himself is, who is called God and unto whom the works of God are ascribed, who is even called Jehovah, the God of Israel, and unto whom the works that are proper to the God of Israel are ascribed. Similarly the phrase, "without spot", is tantamount to a declaration of the per-

fection of His humanity and refers us back to Chapter ii, where the Apostle has expatiated on this interesting theme, showing that as the Redeemer is God's Son, so is He His people's Brother, and all that His brethren ought to be. Again, when it is said that "He offered . . . to God", that is but to say that He acted the part of a Priest, a priest after the likeness of Melchizedec, a royal priest, and suggests Chapters iii, iv, v, vi, vii. Finally, in that he says "that He offered Himself", it is in order to show that Christ, His Father's Son, His people's Brother, the Priest after the similitude of Melchizedec, was Himself the sacrifice, and that, although He behaved to be a sacrifice emphatically in our nature, there is not a consideration implied in all the rich references which are here made but was an element contributory to the worth of this sacrifice. In a word, it was a sacrifice worthy of God. And because it was worthy of God, it must needs be worthy of acceptance on man's part, and man's conscience's part, the Biblical view being that God alone is independent, that man is dependent upon God and that man's conscience has a peculiar dependence upon God's justice.

(3) By emphasizing the fact that it was with God alone, as the Judge of all, Christ had to do in offering Himself a sacrifice, we remove one principal difficulty which is apt to occur in connection with the Biblical doctrine of a definite Atonement. For one can scarcely avoid putting the question: Was I, according to God's purpose, one of the people? Now that question cannot be answered at the outset, but neither need it. For the essential thing is that God, the very God against whom one has sinned, was in Him. And He was in Him not in a fractional sense,—if to meet the unreasonableness of unbelief one be permitted to use an almost unreasonable term. He was in Him in His entirety. "The fulness of the Godhead dwelt in Him bodily." It is sufficient proof that the only God, and all of God with whom we can have to do, was in Christ, that Christ was Himself God, that He drew upon all the resources of His entire Godhead in this matter, that it was through a

really eternal Spirit that He offered Himself without spot unto God. It was this God against whom we sinned, whether sinning against the light of nature, or the light of the moral law given in a supernatural manner upon Mount Sinai, or the light of the Gospel as promised in the Old Testament, yea even if we sinned against light and love, it was this God, we say, who sent Jesus Christ into the world, who was with Jesus Christ, unto whom also Jesus Christ offered Himself. This God it was that raised Him from dead, exalting Him far above all heavens that Christ might fill all things, so that in Christ God gives the all perfect revelation of Himself. The Atonement terminated upon God. It is God with whom we have to do. This God was in Christ, and in as much as that was the case, we may rest upon this God, and in resting upon Him we shall have the assurance soon that He had everlasting thoughts of love towards us, thoughts with which our eternal destruction is incompatible.^{24a}

(4) We are confirmed in the correctness of our proposition because of the circumstance that, according to the Biblical teaching, God as propitiated is the object of saving faith. The Publican, according to Luke viii. 14, sought after the face of a propitiated God; and according to Paul's teaching in Romans iv. 23-25, it is such a God that is revealed to us in the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. To trust in God as thus revealed is indefectible salvation.

(5) *Omnia exeunt in mysterium*. No one has been able to explain so simple a matter as that through images of external objects formed on the retina of the eye, we gain a knowledge of the external world. If that is so, need we wonder if the relation of a purged conscience to the satisfaction of divine justice should involve mysteries? But just as in connection with questions bearing on the connection between soul and body, between mind and matter, without our being able to answer the metaphysician's every

^{24a} Cf. also John v. 22.

question we may have not only such a knowledge as serves all practical interests, but also such a knowledge as enables us to rest in an assured conviction of the ultimate rationality of it all, so also, as regards the more mysterious question of the relation of a purged conscience to the satisfaction of divine justice, we may, without our professing to give an exhaustive account of the whole matter, appeal to experience in proof of the truth of our account, so far, of the relation of conscience and the Atonement. For, has not the whole Evangelical Church of God been witnesses to the fact that when, through the power of the Holy Spirit, men were enabled to lean upon God as revealed in the death of Christ on account of sin, and as revealed in the resurrection of Christ on account of the satisfaction which the death of Christ rendered to the justice of God, this act of leaning was answered with comforts of the Holy Ghost in their soul? This Spirit created thoughts holier and also more humbling than, previous to their falling in with God's way of salvation, they ever experienced, and this experience may well be taken as an intimation of a justifying act on the part of the Judge of all, and as corroborating evidence of the truth of our construction of related doctrines.²⁵

Our task is practically over. This paper was, in the main, written with a practical purpose, that is to say, with a view to direct every wounded conscience to the Atonement of our Lord Jesus Christ. With a view to strengthen and stimulate such consciences in this direction we have been insisting on the reasonableness of looking for peace of conscience from faith in a propitiated God. For if one may use such an expression, the controlling strand in the doctrine of Atonement is its Godwardness, and the controlling strand in conscience also is its Godwardness. This common factor gives the rationale of the dependence of a purged conscience upon the death of our Lord Jesus Christ. A wounded conscience, on this account, finds rest in the Atonement, and in it alone.

²⁵ Cf. 1 Peter iii. 21.

But the argument may, in a more general regard, be so pointed as to contribute towards a proof of the proposition that no other idea save that of satisfaction to divine justice can be regarded as properly interpretative of the Cross of Christ. For (a), one would not venture to undertake to ascertain from the outset the nature of the Atonement from the nature of the human conscience. The Atonement had not its springs or origin in the will of man, neither was man's moral nature the mould it had to conform to. Its springs or origin is the will of God, and it must be conformed to the righteousness of God. For, to use an expression of Dr. Smeaton's, the divine character has a conservative as well as a liberal aspect, God cannot give, without at the same time keeping. He cannot grant forgiveness without at the same time retaining the glory of His hatred to sin. Yet, although conscience ought not to be made the measuring rod of the Atonement, when it is discovered that that which fully answers the demands of the divine righteousness answers also the needs of a wounded conscience, the healed conscience may reasonably be emboldened to say that since in the fact of the Godwardness of the Atonement it found rest and cleansing, an Atonement in which the controlling strand is not its Godwardness would to it be no Atonement at all. Or (b), again, one may put the matter thus: In the sphere of mechanics, if two related members, both of which are very complex in structure, correspond exactly the one to the other, there is moral certainty that this answerableness of the one to the other was designed, that, in fact, given one side of this complex relation, the other side is, in a sense, already and thereby determined. In the case of a lock of extraordinary complexity, its wards will determine the cavities of the complex key which will fit it. If then Atonement, in the sense of satisfaction, meets the needs of conscience, of a wounded conscience, even as we have seen that reason, revelation and the experience of the Church of God combine in assuring us that it does, is not the problem so profound, is not the matter involved in such

complexities, that one feels morally certain that a second solution cannot be forthcoming? In other words, the only idea that will interpret, the only real, that is, actually existing, Atonement, is satisfaction to Divine Justice.

Inverness, Scotland.

JOHN R. MACKAY.

THE SOURCE OF ISRAEL'S ESCHATOLOGY*

The topic selected for this lecture has been chosen largely because the history of recent criticism on this subject can perhaps best illustrate for us, within the limits of a single hour, the principles and methods of the dominant school of critics—the Wellhausen school—and the new forces that are now at work to discredit them. Though the limitations imposed by the time at our disposal prevent attention to details, the choice of a narrower theme would stand in the way of our obtaining that general impression which can only be gotten from a rather broad outlook.

It was undoubtedly a one-sided view of the Old Testament writers, especially of the prophets, that saw in them merely or mainly predictors of future events, and in their writings little of worth save what could be interpreted as at least a foreshadowing of greater things to come. But the over-emphasis on this phase of their function has been at least counterbalanced by the insistence of scholars, since Gesenius a century ago, upon the mission of prophet and poet, historian and sage, to their own contemporaries—particularly upon the prophet's function as a preacher of righteousness to his age. At first critics tended simply to slight the predictive side of the prophets' message. Largely as it bulks in their books, it was regarded as the product of an enthusiasm of little value while they lived—in fact, an obstacle to their usefulness—and of no value to us to-day in our effort to envisage the man in his historical environment. But the Wellhausen school, with characteristic thoroughness, included this eschatology of the prophets in its programme of reconstruction, just as it included their ethics, their theology or their politics. Still, even to this school the eschatological message is not the central and organizing fact in determining the significance of the prophets: it lies on the periphery and must rather be judged in its nature

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and extent through a process of deduction from what is conceived to be more central.

That central fact of Hebrew prophecy, in the view of Wellhausen and his followers, is of course this: that the prophets of the 8th century B.C.—notably Amos, the earliest of them—were innovators in preaching an “ethical monotheism”. Taking Jehovah, this little tribal god of the Israelitish people, they made of Him such a deity as that in principle no other god could exist alongside of Him, and a deity who not only was ethically perfect Himself, but also demanded moral conduct of His worshipers. The deduction from this central feature of prophecy with respect to eschatology was made as follows: Jehovah alone is Israel’s God; Jehovah is holy and Israel must put away sin or be punished for it; Israel’s sin is great and demands an unheard-of punishment; Jehovah will come in wrath and sweep away utterly the sinful nation.

Beyond the limits of Israel this coming of Jehovah will indeed smite this nation and that and the other with disaster, yet obviously the view of a prophet like Amos is limited to his little Syrian world, the immediate environment of Israel—Damascus, Philistia, Phœnicia, Edom, Ammon, Moab. Even in Isaiah (the genuine 8th century Isaiah) it is only Assyria, Jehovah’s particular foe, that He will devour with His fire and brimstone. The prophet singled out by critics of this school as the first to preach a world-wide conflagration at Jehovah’s coming is Zephaniah, at the end of the 7th century.

With Ezekiel, a few years later, we already enter, according to this scheme, upon the new, apocalyptic stage of eschatology, which is to mark its course thereafter. That stage is characterized, not by the immediate and necessary deduction of the prophet’s eschatology from his own historical environment, but by a theoretical and bookish system, derived from growing notions of canonical authority, plus a detached and fantastic imagination that delights to paint the future in colors as lurid as the writer’s present is gray

and dull. As the earlier stage may be described as the psychological stage, so this latter may be called the literary stage of eschatology. It culminates in the literary phantasies of the apocalypses, from Daniel to Enoch, Esdras and Revelation.

But what now of the reverse side of the shield? we ask. There is, pervasively, an eschatology of weal as well as an eschatology of woe. Are not all the prophets, early as well as late, continually breaking forth into rhapsodies upon the contemplation of "the latter days", when Israel shall be saved, and all the prosperity, peace, joy and glory of paradise shall be enjoyed once more by Jehovah's people? Is it not Amos himself who tells us of the days "when the plowman shall overtake the reaper, and the treader of grapes him that soweth seed; and the mountains shall drop sweet wine, and all the hills shall melt"?

No, comes the reply; no, for it is psychologically inconceivable that a prophet with a message to his contemporaries such as Amos bore, should have so stultified himself and so nullified his own preaching, as to paint for hardened, mocking sinners whose judgment was impending, this rosy picture of peace and plenty through the favor of the very deity whom their conduct outraged and summoned to judgment. No! Every such element must go—away with it! Not only that ninth chapter of Amos, but every passage where Amos or Hosea or Micah is made to depict a future of bliss for Israel, must be an interpolation.

When, however, we reach Isaiah, we reach the genius who first devised a theory by which judgment could be tempered with mercy. In his new doctrine of "the remnant", Isaiah succeeded in conserving, as vigorously as his predecessors, the penal phase of Jehovah's appearing, yet added to it His gracious preservation of a limited portion of Israel, the "remnant" that "returns" unto Jehovah and forms the nucleus of the new Israel of a better day.

But again we discover, on closer examination, that "the bed is shorter than that a man can stretch himself on it".

This concession to Isaiah's genius proves insufficient for him to rescue by it all those glorious Messianic passages, which in the present constitution of his book look like the culmination of his eschatology. There is indeed no perfect unanimity among critics of this school in accepting or rejecting those verses in chapters vii, ix, and xi, where Messiah's salvation is celebrated in words that can never lose their power. Yet any divergence as to their genuineness is due simply to varying judgment upon the question, Can this passage, can that passage be deduced, on psychological principles, from Isaiah's premises, or can it not be? For those who answer the question in the negative there remains, of course, only the alternative of relegating the passage to a later writer, who lived after the exile had given to prophecy a new starting-point, viz., the comfort required by a nation already stricken to the uttermost by Jehovah's judgments. With this total reversal of the historical situation by the exile there could and did emerge that final efflorescence of Messianic prophecy, which constitutes one important side of Judaism, and which transmitted its theories to the apocalyptic literature and through this to the Christian Church.

This whole scheme has now, just as the last details of its application have been worked out by Nowack, Stade, Smend, Volz and others, received a blow that threatens to be a death-stroke. It comes from an unexpected quarter. Though there had not been wanting, since the first elaboration of the Wellhausen hypothesis, writers on the history of Israel's religion who opposed it strenuously, such as König, Robertson and Sellin, their arguments were discounted in advance because their angle of approach was held to be "apologetic" and therefore unworthy of serious consideration. In deference to their unanswerable logic it had indeed to be admitted, for example, that Amos was not an absolute innovator, that he had some predecessors who foreshadowed his doctrines, much as "the Reformers before the Reformation" foreshadowed the views of Luther, Zwingli and Calvin. But no serious impression was made on the lines

defended by the adherents of the hypothesis in general, and in particular upon the explanation of Israel's eschatology before the exile through psychological deduction from "ethical monotheism".

Whence then has the blow come to which I refer? I may answer in these well-chosen words of Professor Sellin: "It turned out that the help in this time of need came from a quarter from which we could scarcely have expected it: from Egypt, from Babylon, from the entire ancient orient. The old literatures there discovered and unlocked opened up entirely new perspectives, completely did away with the old points of view, gave us glimpses of an intellectual life, in which that of Palestine also shared even as early as the second millennium [B.C.], by which, too, that of Israel must be estimated, without which it can never be rightly understood. And this new surge has made a breach in the walls of that edifice apparently so firmly constructed, so that it is only a question of time now when in its place a new structure will arise."¹

Though many scholars have contributed a part in this new movement, we are now concerned particularly with those who have applied the results of archaeology to the eschatology of Israel. Here I shall mention three names, as significant of what appear to be three stages in the process of application and rectification.

First, Professor Hermann Gunkel, in a series of books commencing with his *Creation and Chaos*, 1895,² has done the pioneer work, in showing how irreconcilable are the conceptions of the end of the world, paradise, "the old serpent", and other myths that Israel shared with the surrounding nations, with that scheme of eschatology which the current literature on the religion of Israel has been elaborating and defending.

Next to Gunkel stands Professor Hugo Gressmann, whose

¹ *ATliche Proph.*, p. 110.

² *Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit*. Von Hermann Gunkel. Göttingen, 1895.

work, 1905, on *The Source of the Eschatology of Israel and the Jews*³ was an exceedingly clever working-out of Gunkel's principles, applying them to the Old Testament with a clearness of logic that left the adherents of the older school of criticism without a leg to stand on. In the eight years that have elapsed since this work appeared it has found no one to answer it: at best a few voices have been lifted in criticism of this or that feature of Gressmann's positive construction. But if I mistake not, its lasting influence will rest in its negative attitude toward the older view, over against which it establishes, once and for all, the irrefutable thesis that the earliest writing prophets of Israel did not create Israel's eschatology, but adapted and used an eschatology that was prevalent in their nation from ages agone.

But around this central thesis of Gressmann there lie, in his book, several other theses, which are indeed in his own view as essential as this one to a correct history of eschatology among the Hebrews, but which in fact are not capable of demonstration, or are even demonstrably false. It is the honor of Professor Ernst Sellin to have discerned between the wheat and the chaff, pointed out in an engaging and convincing style the permanent worth of the former, and separated most of the latter which threatened to discredit the whole. Only last year, 1912, appeared Sellin's study entitled *The Age, Nature and Source of Old Testament Eschatology*.⁴ His method is simple. He divides the material into the eschatology of woe, the eschatology of weal, and the eschatology of a Saviour. In each division he first states Gressmann's view over against that of the scholars he was opposing, passes on next to buttress Gressmann's arguments with further considerations establishing the high

³ *Der Ursprung der israelitisch-jüdischen Eschatologie*. Von Hugo Gressmann. Göttingen, 1905. (Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur d. A. u. N. T. Band I, 6.)

⁴ *Der alttestamentliche Prophetismus. Drei Studien*. Von Ernst Sellin. Leipzig, 1912. The second of these three "studies" is the one referred to in the text, entitled *Alter, Wesen und Ursprung der alttestamentlichen Eschatologie*.

antiquity of these eschatological ideas in Israel, then exhibits the inadequacy of Gressmann's interpretation of the nature of those ideas—their essential character even in the popular Hebrew mind,—and ends by tracing their origin, not like Gressmann to ancient extra-Israelitish nature-myths, but to the unique experience of revelation and redemption given to the Hebrew nation at Mt. Sinai upon its deliverance from Egypt. If in the sequel we have any fault to find with Professor Sellin's book, it must be understood that in general it deserves only the warmest praise, and that wherein it errs it errs in not going far enough in the direction in which it does go.

In the remainder of the time allotted to me I shall endeavor to give succinctly a notion of the contents and origin of that body of expectations in Israel, which we group commonly under the title "eschatology", the doctrine of the last things. We shall adopt Sellin's convenient division of material.

I. The Eschatology of Woe.

When we collect and compare the various utterances of Old Testament writers upon a time of disaster that impends, we discover, first of all, that they may be roughly grouped according to the nature of the phenomena used to describe that time. These phenomena belong either (1) to the sphere of nature, or (2) to the sphere of history. I need not quote the familiar passages in psalm and prophecy that paint for us the impending earthquakes, storms, floods, fires, evil beasts, droughts or pestilences that threaten to annihilate puny and helpless man. And again the threats of coming woe through an invading army—the sword of man—are so pervasive as to require no special illustration. In the face of this obvious division into natural and historical disasters we are compelled to seek the unifying thought that underlies them all.

The school of Wellhausen finds this unity, as we have seen, by interpreting the historical disasters literally and the

natural disasters figuratively. Roughly speaking, the view is this: the prophets, stirred by Israel's need of penal retribution, discern in the political situation of their day—the advance of the Assyrian army, later of the Babylonians—Jehovah's method of punishment. He summons these resistless human forces to accomplish His purpose of final judgment upon His sinful people. No catastrophe of nature that came within the horizon of the prophets' experience was too terrible, none indeed was sufficiently cataclysmic, to serve as a figurative drapery or setting for that scene of Israel's doom.

Gressmann, on the other hand, discovers the underlying unity by taking the natural disasters literally and the historical disasters figuratively. Again, we are speaking only roughly. For it is time now to observe that Gressmann distinguishes three phases of Israel's eschatology: the mythical phase, the popular phase, and the prophetic phase. In general these may be said to be not merely logical phases, but also chronological stages. The cornerstone of Gressmann's edifice is this dictum: nature-myths never arise in historical times. In other words they arise only in primitive, mythopœic times, and all that we find in the literary period are the more or less mutilated ruins of the ancient myth-structures. In Israel long, long before the writing prophets the mythical stage had passed, and that floating eschatological material which the prophets found abroad among their contemporaries and made use of in their messages belonged to the second or popular phase of eschatology. It is of this phase that the remark above made is approximately true: the popular idea of evil to come was essentially the idea of a natural cataclysm, of some indeterminate sort, but universal, unescapable and final. The prophets then gave to this conception abroad in their day a new turn, by discerning in the Assyrian or the Babylonian, as the case might be, the actual means of introducing "the day of wrath, that awful day", and by lending the whole idea that highly ethicized significance which it exhibits in their writings.

Finally, Sellin has shown that the true unity of conception underlying this kaleidoscopic variety in depicting the future of woe, is to be found in something higher than either of the two groups of judgments and back of them both, in the conception, namely, of the sovereignty of Jehovah.

When sympathetically read, these Old Testament writers, from the earliest poetical fragments to the last of the prophets and psalmists, are seen to have deepest down in their minds the thought of their God as Israel's King. As King, He has all the functions of a king. He it is who fights their battles, both to annihilate their foes and to save themselves; and He it is who judges them according to the laws He has enacted for His realm. This is the ancient oriental idea of the king. In Israel we find this sovereignty of Jehovah—under a variety of titles and figures of speech—in literature that by all schools of criticism is accepted as among the earliest monuments of Israel's self-expression. Thus in Jacob's blessing He is the "Shepherd" of Israel. The Red Sea song closes with "Jehovah shall reign as King forever and ever". The Balaam-oracles sing of "Jehovah his God" as "with Israel", and "the shout of a King among them". The blessing of Moses reminded the tribes who recited it that "there was a King in Jeshurun", and that they were "a people saved by Jehovah, the Shield of thy help and the Sword of thy excellency". And the song of Deborah distributes, among the tribes, blessing or cursing according to whether they came or "came not to the help of Jehovah, to the help of Jehovah against the mighty".

Now the true significance of all the lurid details in those canvases of the prophets lies in this, according to Sellin: they are attempts to depict, now by one means, now by another, in the only language available to them, the language of their day and of their hearers, *Jehovah's vindication of His sovereignty in His "day"*. To call that "day of the LORD", so conspicuous in the prophets from Amos to Malachi, simply a "judgment-day", would hardly be doing full justice to the prophets' conception of it. To be sure, there are some

remarkable pictures of that day drawn on the general pattern of a judicial scene, such for example as Isaiah i, Psalm i, Hosea iv, Micah vi. But Gressmann is right in pointing out that the only judicial scene in Old Testament eschatology where the machinery of the court-room is consistently depicted is that in Daniel vii, where thrones are placed, the books are opened, and sentence is pronounced and executed. The true explanation is doubtless this, that no single figure is adequate in itself alone to convey the writer's conception of Jehovah's majesty, power, wrath and grace. It is His absolute supremacy "in that day" that overpowers the mind, renders all speech vain, and attains fitting expression only by the heaping up, or alternate selection, of all the various traits by which the divine Sovereign manifests Himself to His human subjects. Now it is a tempest from Him who "maketh winds His messengers, flames of fire His ministers" (Ps. civ), that breaks upon the head of His enemies, with the lightnings which mythopœic fancy regarded as the arrows or spear of the deity, and that sweeps them away with the flood that reproduces the deluge of ancient story. Now it is a parching wind from the desert, that ruins vegetation, dries up the bodily frame, produces wasting fever and pestilence, consumes the precious supply of water hoarded through the dry season, fans fires in the dessicated stubble, and sends the wild beasts forth in frenzy to tear or carries the armies of locusts to devour. Again it is the subterranean fires, that burst forth in sulphur or naphtha, to annihilate as with a flaming flood city and field, the whole face of the cultivated land, as when Jehovah of old "overthrew Sodom and Gomorrha". Or else He who ruleth alike "in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth" summons the hosts of Assyria or Babylon—but too well known!—or the storied squadrons of "the northerner" (Joel ii. 20), that mysterious "scourge of God", whose imaginary terrors seemed more fearful than the cruelties of any familiar foe. In any case it is *Jehovah's* army, *His* mighty arm, *His* glit-

tering sword, that merely executes for Him the sovereign decrees of His just wrath.⁵

In all this we recognize the fundamental correctness of Sellin's position, which is essentially this: (1) Israel at the time of Amos, and long before that 8th century, possessed the conception of a "coming" of Jehovah in the terrors of His royal wrath. (2) Israel expressed that conception in all the variety of coloring that nature about them, their stories of the past, especially of Sinai, and their contemporary political perils suggested, and in language which, because powerfully suffused with the poetic feeling that always accompanies a highly kindled imagination, was saturated with images and allusions that have their roots, partly indeed in ancient myth (like the poetic imagery of every nation), but for the most part in the memorable events that accompanied the birth of the nation—Sodom and Gomorrhah, the plagues of Egypt, the destruction of Pharaoh's host, and the marvelous phenomena witnessed at Sinai. (3) Amos and the other writing prophets "gave ethical depth and point to this eschatology"; but the contrast between their view and that of those to whom they spoke is not the contrast of ethical and "mythical". "However primitive and naïve for the

⁵The reader familiar with the older writers on Messianic prophecy and eschatology will recognize in this insistence by Gunkel and Gressmann upon the universalistic, cosmical character of the "day of Jehovah" a return to that older view, over against the national, particularistic view of it maintained by critics of the psychological school. If Israel's prophets took over from the popular treasury of myth what the people in turn had obtained from a common international inheritance, it is clear that the movement was a narrowing, not a broadening movement. This is of the utmost importance in the interpretation, for example, of a prophet like Amos. If the movement of his thought is, as it appears to be, from the general to the particular, then his view of Israel's relation to the future of woe is just what we should expect it to be. It is not necessary to agree with Gressmann as to the actual source of the elements of prophetic eschatology, into which he goes in great detail (earthquake, storm, volcano, fire, thunder and lightning, war, pestilence, etc.), in order to accept with thankfulness his clear demonstration that all these elements point to the cosmical rather than the national, the universal rather than the particularistic, as the prius implied thereby.

most part the ethical qualities of the popular eschatology may have been,"—I quote Sellin—"it is impossible to deny it all ethical tone, for it was already acquainted with the thought of judgment. . . . And besides, the opposite of mythological is not ethical, but—historico-religious. And the popular eschatology of Israel ceased to be mythological the moment that all those mythical terrors were taken up out of their isolation, and combined into a complex of phenomena, ordained and directed by God, which were to accompany that great day of history when He Himself should come to set up His kingdom in all the earth; but this is as much as to say, from the moment that there existed an eschatology embodied in Israel's religion. . . . The origin of the entire eschatology of the Old Testament rests in the act of revelation at Sinai, whereby was implanted deep in the heart of the nation the seed of hope for a future similar appearance of Jehovah, for the purpose of assuming His unlimited sovereignty of the world."⁶

II. The Eschatology of Weal.

We have seen that according to the prevailing view of the present day the idea that mediates between the woe and the weal of the "day of Jehovah" is the idea of "the remnant", first conceived by Isaiah, and emphasized by the national experience of exile and partial restoration.

Gressmann is quite dissatisfied with this hypothesis. He attacks it from several different angles. For one thing, the notion of a remnant is misinterpreted by criticism, if it is supposed that it can mediate between a world-catastrophe and a restored paradise beyond. For, "the thought of a remnant", says Gressmann, "belongs essentially to the eschatology of woe. For one speaks naturally of a remnant or of the escaped only after some fearful catastrophe, that has annihilated everything *except a remnant*. . . . Those two or three berries left when the olives are gathered (Is. xxiv), the ten men left in the besieged city (Amos v), the 'two legs and part of an ear' of the lamb recovered by the shep-

⁶ Sellin, *op. cit.*, pp. 147 f.

herd from the lion's mouth (Amos iii) contain the idea of the remnant and use it to illustrate the greatness of the disaster. This is comprehensible. But in the eschatology of weal the remnant is only comprehensible as a 'technical term'. Are all the delightful and splendid things that are said of that time of weal to belong originally to a *remnant*? This would be like pouring two or three drops of oil upon the raging waves of ocean. The two facts do not harmonize. A remnant and an eschatology of weal are mutually exclusive."⁷

Gressmann proceeds to show how the prophets developed the idea of the remnant, so as to make of it a new people of Jehovah, who should enjoy the benefits of His reign. His remarks suffice at least to sustain his thesis that this idea of the remnant was evidently not the invention of the prophets, but one adopted by them from the prevalent conceptions of the people. He further proves the impossibility of Isaiah's having originated the idea, from Isaiah's having named his son *Shear-jashub*, "A-remnant-shall-return", without any explanation: "whoever heard it must have known at once what it meant." And this is confirmed by the very plain fact that Isaiah's predecessors had already used "remnant" as a "technical term"; so Amos, for example, in his fifth chapter, "the remnant of Joseph".

After this negative critique of the Wellhausen construction, Gressmann voices his own conviction that in the popular eschatology upon which the prophets thus drew, there was, properly speaking, no mediation between the two sides of the eschatological outlook. Weal and woe were both essential and primitive parts of the ancient myths that Israel inherited from prehistoric times, and, whatever mediation may have existed in that primitive conception—such a mediation, for example, as a universal resurrection after the world-catastrophe was overpast,—that link was forgotten by Israel, at any rate it was missing, and the two phases, the

⁷ Gressmann, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

dread and the hope of "that day" lived on side by side, undisturbed by any demands of logic or system.

When now we turn to Sellin, we find, as before, complete recognition, in the first place, of Gressmann's great service in exhibiting the weakness of the "psychological view" that he combats; in the second place, valuable contributions to Gressmann's arguments establishing the high antiquity of the notion in Israel of an eschatological salvation and bliss; but also, in the third place, a much needed criticism of the whole argument about the "remnant" and the mediation between destruction and salvation in the "day of the Lord". Let us examine this critique, and gather up its results.

For one thing, there existed in the language of ancient Israel a series of expressions, analogous to "remnant", that present the same phenomena of "technical terms", the edge of which has been dulled by long familiarity and use. Such is the phrase "to turn the captivity" (שוב שבות), which we find used, for instance, even of Job's restoration to health and prosperity, where there is no thought of a captivity, but only of a sudden, complete and lasting change of fortune.⁸ Such, too, are "hiding-place", "covert", and the like, as in Is. xxvi, where we read, "Come, my people, enter into thy chambers, and shut thy doors about thee (a touch reminiscent of the deluge-narrative, 'and Jehovah shut him in'⁹); hide thyself for a little moment, until the indignation be overpast."

Again that idea of a resurrection of Jehovah's people is by no means uncommon or only late. In Hosea vi. 1-3 we apparently possess a passage that represents what was, not the prophetic, but the popular idea in the 8th century as to the manner in which Israel could participate in the joys that lay beyond Jehovah's judgments: "Jehovah hath torn, and He will heal us; He hath smitten, and He will bind us up. After two days He will revive us: on the third day He will raise us up, and we shall live before Him."

⁸ Job xlii. 10.

⁹ Cf. also Gilgamesh Epic, 11th tablet, col. ii, line 34.

But after all, the prevailing notion among the contemporaries of the prophets was clearly this, that while the future woe was for the other nations, the future bliss was for Israel. It is against this view that Amos thunders out his famous paradox (iii. 2): "You only have I known among all the families of the earth: therefore I will visit upon you all your iniquities." Unethical as the idea was in its practical effect, it was nevertheless based upon a very ancient and respectable theory of the moral superiority of Israel to the nations (*cf.*, *e.g.*, Tamar's "no such thing ought to be done in Israel" in 2 Sam. xiii. 12), though mixed with a perverted, heathenish conception of the covenant-relationship between Jehovah and Israel. But as the counterpart to the doctrine of Jehovah's use of the nations as a scourge for Israel's sins, there lived on in Israel from the pre-prophetic into the prophetic period the doctrine of Jehovah's use of Israel as a scourge for the nations. For example, in Mic. iv. 13 we read: "Arise and thresh, O daughter of Zion; for I will make thy horn iron, and I will make thy hoofs brass, and thou shalt beat in pieces many peoples."

Whoever, then, were to become the participants in this ultimate salvation and bliss, ancient Israel had no difficulty in discovering some such objects, coinciding now with a limited fragment of the nation, howsoever selected, now with all the nation, and now with an indefinite multitude who should, by attaching themselves to Israel through conquest or voluntary submission, become incorporated into the people whom Jehovah saves in His great "day".

Moreover, it is impossible to deny all ethical quality to this discrimination that Jehovah exercises on "that day", even in the popular estimation. It is true that the colors of paradise are used to paint the picture of this eschatology of weal, but it is the paradise of Israel's type, not the mere mythological paradise of the nations. That is to say, just as the paradise of the protoplasts was an ethical paradise, even in the oldest tradition into which divisive criticism distributes Genesis, so also the eschatological "paradise re-

gained" is to be characterized by ethical perfectness as well as by natural charm. After the sketch of that "age of gold" when "the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid", and all the rest of that familiar idyllic picture in Isaiah xi, the prophet concludes thus: that "all the earth shall be full of the knowledge of Jehovah as the waters cover the sea"; and he gives this as his reason for predicting that "there shall be none to do evil or be corrupt in all my holy mountain".

The fundamental fault of Gressmann, here as before, lies in his failure to grasp the sovereign presence of Jehovah Himself as the central feature of that time of weal to which Israel looked forward. All of that transformation of nature, that covenanting with the beasts of the field, that slaying of leviathan, that limitless bounty of field and herd, of tree and stream, which combine to give at best but an inadequate expression to Israel's expectations of a "paradise regained",—all this has as the vital, pulsating heart of the system, the restored communion of man with God. He shall dwell among them, and Israel shall dwell safely. He shall teach them His *torah*, and judge righteously among them. He shall offer Himself in a new covenant of love to His people,—such is the burden of Hosea's love-song of Jehovah: "I will betroth thee unto Me forever; yea, I will betroth thee unto Me in righteousness, and in justice, and in lovingkindness, and in mercies. I will even betroth thee unto Me in faithfulness; and thou shalt know Jehovah" (Hos. ii). Such, too, is the climax of Zephaniah's song of salvation: "Jehovah thy God is in the midst of thee, a mighty one who will save; He will rejoice over thee with joy; He will be silent [so the margin] in His love; He will joy over thee with singing" (Zeph. iii).

It is the especial desert of Sellin to have shown in this connection, not only that this thought is the central, organizing thought in the eschatology of weal, but also that it is as old as Israel's literature, where the conception of Jehovah as the Saviour and Deliverer is associated, on the one hand,

with His universal kingship, and, on the other hand, with all the separate details of the eschatological hope.

III. The Eschatology of a Saviour.

This brings us very suitably to our final subject, the origin of the Messianic idea in Israel.

The idea of a Messiah, if limited strictly to the expectation of a future king, and explained solely on the "psychological" principles of the Wellhausenian evolution-scheme, cannot have arisen before there was a king in Israel, that is, before David; nor even, apparently, before prophetism and kingship had reached their final breach with each other, that is to say, before Isaiah fell out with King Ahaz; nor even, to be quite accurate and logical, as Volz at last has shown, before the exile, with its complete overthrow of the Davidic dynasty. This progressive banishment of the Messianic expectation from the præxilic literature of Israel is an excellent illustration of what our German cousins call *Systemzwang*,—the compulsory force of a theory, that drives on and on to a thorough-going readaptation of facts and materials to its remorseless logic.

For there are facts. And what are the facts? Not simply this, that the Davidic house is already typical, for psalmist and prophet, of the Coming King promised of that line, centuries before the exile; but also this, that such a personage, without the title "King" indeed, yet with all the attributes of sovereignty, is presupposed long before there was any king in Israel save the divine King. To say nothing, therefore, of the Messianic psalms (ii, xxi, xlv, lxxii, cx), which are simply inconceivable in the time of the Maccabees and can only belong to the old monarchical period, we have the "Shiloh" passage in Jacob's blessing, and the "scepter out of Israel" celebrated by Balaam's oracle, the context of both of which lends them not only a very early date of origin, but also a clearly eschatological setting. And among the various explanations of the "Immanuel"-child of Isaiah vii and Micah v, the most natural—to say the least—is that which sees in the allusive manner of both prophets,

especially in referring to "the virgin" or "her who travaileth", evidence that these prophets did not invent the features of this wonderful child, but took them over, as they took over the other features of their eschatology, from the accepted ideas of their day. It was in the use they made of these ideas that their individual contribution and advance lay.

What then shall we make of a figure such as this, alongside of that figure of the expected Jehovah, whose sovereignty was found by us to be the central fact in all Israel's expectations? What room is there for a Messianic King alongside of that divine King?

The marvel only grows when we discover divine attributes, divine titles, divine activities, associated with the Messiah-figure Himself? For illustration of what I mean I may cite Micah's words, "His goings forth are from of old, even from everlasting", Isaiah's ascriptions, "Mighty God, Everlasting Father", Zechariah's prediction, "His dominion shall be from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth". Preëxistence, essential deity, universal rule. Yet, on the other hand, we cannot take refuge in the view that this is only Jehovah Himself under another guise. For Jehovah's relation to this person is clearly depicted as that of the One who will "raise Him up", or "set Him on His throne", or "bring Him forth", or supply the "strength" and majesty" in which He shall rule, or the "spirit" by which He shall judge.

Israel's divine King, and yet not Jehovah! *This*, in a nation of monotheists, and most uncompromisingly from the lips of Israel's most uncompromising monotheists! What does it mean? And why do the two expectations persist from age to age side by side: "He comes," that is, Jehovah cometh; "He comes," that is, Messiah cometh?

The only explanation of this riddle lies in a *wholly unpsychological origin* for this figure of Messiah. In this we can agree with Gunkel and Gressmann over against the prevalent criticism of the day. Where we cannot agree with them is in their positive statement of its origin,

namely, that this figure was derived from mythical material that wandered into Israel in early days without having any organic connection with Israel's religion.

The entire field of ancient oriental literature has been searched most diligently to discover traces of a coming Saviour-King among the nations. More has been read into the lavish praises and self-gratulations of Babylonian, Assyrian, Persian and Egyptian rulers than even the wildest flights of egotism or flattery could conceive. But we may safely assert, in the words of Professor Sellin (who uses spaced type to emphasize them), that "the ancient orient does not know the eschatological king". At most we may perhaps discern in the "court style" of these foreign scribes a certain analogy with what may have been the "court style" at the court of David and Solomon, of Jeroboam and Hezekiah, and may therefore have contributed elements of form to the language in which this eschatological king is celebrated. This is hypothesis, but it is not in itself improbable. Yet this deals only with form, not with substance. The substance of this Messianic doctrine, we must hold with Sellin, runs its roots back into "a tradition older than the revelation at Sinai, which was then, it is true, united most intimately with the fundamental eschatological thought (*i.e.*, that Jehovah shall be king 'in that day') that sprang up therefrom, and in the main became subordinate thereto, yet which also maintained persistently a certain independence".¹⁰

From this point, however, we must part company, in a measure, even with Professor Sellin. We do not feel, with him, that "in the moment that we begin to pursue this pre-Mosaic tradition, we are treading on the soil of hypothesis". We believe that the patriarchal period, as depicted for us in the book of Genesis, is firm historical ground. In passing from the principles of Wellhausen to those of Gressmann, Baentsch and others, criticism is just discovering that the elephant that bears up the world must have a tor-

¹⁰ Sellin, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

toise on which to stand. How long must it be before criticism awakes to the stupendous discovery that the tortoise, too, has probably something on which to stand? Just as back of Amos stands Moses, so also back of Moses stand Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, with whose God Jehovah at Sinai took pains to identify Himself; and to this family of Semites, immigrants to Canaan from the Mesopotamian lands, God had given a promise, world-wide in its outlook, gracious in its terms, unconditional in its pledge, that in their seed all the nations of the earth should be blessed. And back of Abraham, again, we believe that the same tradition of a purpose of salvation was associated with the line of Shem, in whose tents Jehovah should dwell, and that it finds its beginnings at the gate of "paradise lost", where "the seed of the woman" is to "bruise" the serpent's "head". In this chain of tradition we see, starting with the weal once possessed but forfeited, and renewed at each of those crises when Jehovah made fresh covenant with men of His choice, how the covenanted blessing of the future, the essence of the eschatological hope—or "comfort", as Lamech, the father of Noah, first calls it—how this covenanted blessing of the future attaches itself to a human "seed", until at length it is designated as of the "seed of David according to the flesh", and from that woman of "Bethlehem Ephratha", who "travaileth" in birth of Him "whose goings forth are from of old, from everlasting."

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

The New Philosophy of Henri Bergson. By EDOUARD LE ROY. Translated from the French by Vincent Benson, M.A., Late Scholar of New College, Oxford. New York: Henry Holt and Company. London: Williams & Norgate. 1913. 8vo; pp. x, 235.

This work, though complete so far as it goes, "does not in any way claim to be a profound critical study". It aims simply to give an "introduction which will make it easier to read and understand Mr. Bergson's works, and serve as a preliminary guide to those who desire initiation in the new philosophy". That the original sets forth correctly the leading principles of Mr. Bergson and that Mr. Benson's translation represents the original as adequately as a translation can, we do not question. Indeed, the interpreter would seem to have caught Mr. Bergson's spirit and the translator to have reproduced the interpreter's brilliant style. And yet we cannot but doubt the utility of the book. Scholars will not need it and tyros will not understand it. Its defect is that its illustrations are often more difficult than what they would illustrate.

Princeton, N. J.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature. By JAMES Y. SIMPSON, D.Sc., F. R. S. E., Professor of Natural Science, New College, Edinburgh. New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1912. 8vo; pp. xv, 383.

Dr. Simpson is the worthy successor of Henry Drummond, and the book under review might almost be described as the sequel to the latter's "Natural Law in the Spiritual World". It is this because it presents the opposite truth. Drummond would bring out the analogy of the spiritual world to the natural. Simpson would evince the conformity of the natural world to the spiritual. Both writers are pronounced evolutionists. If Drummond sought in the theory of evolution illustrations of Scripture doctrine, Simpson aims to show that evolution affords the true interpretation of Christianity. Both writers are far from being mere amateurs in science; but with Drummond science is the handmaid of religion, while it sometimes seems as if Simpson would have science give law to religion.

We congratulate the New College on her Chair of Natural Science and on her distinguished incumbents of it. The revelation of God in "the things that are made" ought to be studied much more than it is. Danger arises only when it is given the first or the chief place. Facts are facts, wherever we find them; but the Bible ought always to have the last word in our interpretation of them. This is because it is both the supernatural and the final revelation.

There is much in Dr. Simpson's book which makes it a marked publication. One of these features is its clear and often charming style. Another is its high scientific character. Its presentation of "the principles of biology", for example, is so thorough and so up-to-date as to be valuable even for the specialist in science and philosophy. The positions maintained, moreover, as well as the way in which they are maintained, are usually such as to call for the heartiest commendation. Chief among these are the following:

1. The insistence on the spirituality of life. "We know life," Dr. Simpson says, "only in association with matter, yet it is not matter" (p. 63).

2. The emphasis on individuality. "With regard to the realm of life even although all forms are of the same chemical constitution, yet it is not possible to imagine a summed mass even of invertebrate life. Still less can we think the term humanity in the same corporate way as we can think the term rock, for the former is composed of distinct individuals whose very life is a protest against fusion in any single mass" (p. 98).

3. Its searching and just estimate of Darwinism. "In fact, Darwinism is as Ptolemaism and needs the introduction of subsidiary cycles and epicycles to make the explanation cover all the facts. Which simply means that it is incomplete, if not positively faulty: the Copernicus of biology has not yet arisen" (p. 152).

4. Its recognition of the self-regarding and of the altruistic virtues as both essential to the ethical ideal. "The altruistic motto is, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor'. The individualistic motto is, 'Thou shalt love thyself'. The incomparable Christian motto is a choice blend of these two words, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself'. Here we have law not merely rational but divine" (p. 165).

5. Its doctrine of the uniqueness and the originality of the soul. "Its constituents are largely, perhaps all, hereditary, but the particular collection—that cream that rises to the top out of them all, that extract or essence in itself—is not a hereditary thing. It is a unique creation; it is not a duplicate; it is a living soul" (p. 245).

6. The insistence on a "directive factor in evolution". "To what is due," he asks, "that particular heterogeneity, that definite arrangement of matter and energy, that at any stage contains implicit within it all that follows?" "This question," he adds, "Spencer never answers" (p. 259).

7. The emphatic denial that "evolution supplies its standard of morality in what actually survives as the result of natural selection". "This is to ignore much in the physical zone of the environment that

is unaffected by that factor. It is wholly to forget that the demands of the psychical zone have often led to the immediate physical extermination of those who yielded to them, but by that very circumstance the ideals in question gained a wider recognition and led to the survival of the race" (p. 329).

8. The affirmation of the possibility of miracles from the scientific standpoint and of their necessity from the moral one. "If the aversion to miracles is simply an expression of belief in a purely mechanical self-contained world, then the human spirit must hail them in defense of its own liberty. For if God be so bound by his laws that initiative is no longer his, much more are we. And if he cannot intervene in the physical realm, still less can he do so in the spiritual, for the two stand in close relationship. The miracle is the sign of the divine freedom" (p. 362).

While, however, because of all these and many other admirable features, it would not be easy to speak too highly of this uncommon book, there is also that, and some of it not unimportant, to which we must decidedly dissent.

1. We cannot agree with the position taken on mental evolution, that "in the light of the historical argument, within the records of the human race alone, the probability of such an evolution almost amounts to certainty" (p. 310). No less an authority in science than Alfred Russell Wallace, we remember, holds just the contrary. Nor is Dr. Simpson's claim to the unlimited time "mayhap 600,000 years of human development", that his theory demands undisputed. Lord Kelvin, Prof. Virchow, Prof. G. F. Wright, not to mention others eminent in physics and biology and geology are against him.

2. While endorsing his conception of evolution as continuous, we deprecate his unwillingness to admit divine intervention here and there in its continuous process. That there is "divine direction" throughout it, as he rightly insists; that there are even "increments" at critical points such as the origin of life, the dawning of consciousness, the birth of Christ (p. 131)—this is not enough to assert. The point is, Whence the increment? Does it bring to a head the elements implicit in the preceding process, or does it express an influx from outside and above the process? Was Christ only the greatest of the prophets, or was he not the "Son of man who came down from heaven"?

3. While, as has been said, we can scarcely commend too highly his insistence on God's power and right to intervene in and even to interfere with the order of nature, and while we heartily agree also that such interference on God's part will never be in any lawless way, we regret that Dr. Simpson has seen fit to qualify this by teaching that this interference will rather be "through the medium or superposition of laws other than those that are already open to our comprehension" (p. 135). This is to miss the point of the whole matter. Incomprehensibility is not the essence of the miracle. It is wonderful precisely because it is the result of the outputting in nature of God's own hand. It sometimes seems as if our author had lost sight of the distinction between providence and miracle.

4. There is the same oversight or confusion with regard to the Christian doctrine of sin. "So far as the doctrine of Original Sin," we are told, "is construed as a doctrine of Original Guilt—imputational in the Augustinian sense—it has been rejected by the developed Christian moral sense of to-day: indeed, it is a contradiction in terms. It belongs to a period in which the value of the individual was yet undeveloped" (p. 336). However, this doctrine forms a part of the Confession of faith of the great and glorious church in one of the divinity halls of which Dr. Simpson is an honored professor; it is the teaching of the Apostle Paul (Rom. v. 12, 15-19); and whether it does violence to the individual or not depends largely on its philosophical basis, on whether one adopts the Realistic or the Federal theory of imputation.

5. Even more erroneous appear to us to be the conclusions as to immortality. "The whole method of evolution," he thinks, "seems to point in the direction of the theological doctrine of Conditional Immortality." "It was Plato, not Jesus Christ, who taught that the soul is inherently immortal." "If we exclude the Platonic myth, there is no conception of immortality, in or out of Scripture, that is not in some vital sense conditional" (p. 373). From these and other statements, however, it appears that he mistakes the import of "the theological doctrine of Conditional Immortality". That doctrine represents eternal life as the gracious gift of God to those who meet the conditions of salvation. Dr. Simpson virtually agrees with Rev. Dr. S. D. McConnell in his theory that immortality is achieved and attained through our own efforts in the progress of moral evolution. So, too, he confuses salvation, or what the New Testament often calls "eternal life", with what Dr. McConnell speaks of as immortality. The former the Gospel always makes conditional on faith in Christ. The latter it never does. Our Lord Himself declared: "Marvel not at this: for the hour is coming, in which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation" (John v. 28, 29). How could this be if the future existence, whether of the soul or of the body, were conditioned either on moral achievement or on the gift of grace?

6. He underestimates the significance of the destructive criticism of the Bible. He regards it as a matter of indifference, if only one be sincere, whether he holds the alleged authors of the Scriptures to have been the real authors. He fails to see that these questions touch the veracity and so the person of our Lord. If Christ was mistaken in His conception of the Old Testament, how can we trust Him in His proclamation of the Gospel? He viewed both as but different stages in the one way of life.

7. The distinction between the natural and the supernatural is altogether missed. They are not "different aspects of one reality" (p. 35). Though causally related, they are mutually exclusive. The supernatural is the Absolute or Uncaused. The natural, spiritual as well as physical, is the caused and relative. The supernatural would exist unchanged,

were there no natural; but there could not be a natural, were there not the supernatural.

8. Finally, our author's conception of the relation of truth to life, of theology to religion, is utterly wrong. He tells us that "the sense of dependent relationship that is involved in religion cannot be touched by any study of the intellectual account of religious experience usually termed theology. The personal attachment to Jesus Christ that is at the heart of any genuine Christian endeavor, whether individual or social, is unaffected by theories of his life and work" (p. 10). Could there be a sentiment more at variance with our Lord's words, "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free" (St. John viii. 32)?

The question has been asked whether Dr. Simpson's volume might not be used as a text-book. The reviewer's answer can readily be inferred. Not unless its standpoint and trend be changed radically. But beyond this, it would need simplification. Often, and specially in its ablest chapters, as those on *The Principles of Biology*, it is too technical for the tyro. In a word, those who can understand it would not need a text-book, and most of those who do need a text-book would miss the meaning of much of it.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Social Idealism and The Changing Theology. A Study of the Ethical Aspects of Christian Doctrine. The Nathaniel William Taylor Lectures for 1912. Delivered before the Yale Divinity School. By GERALD BIRNEY SMITH, Associate Professor of Christian Theology in the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. 8vo; pp. xxiii, 251. \$1.25 net.

"The purpose of these lectures is to show how and why the change from aristocratic to democratic ideals has taken place, and to indicate wherein an understanding of the significance of this ethical evolution may aid in the reconstruction of theology. It is hoped that when this is clearly apprehended by theologians and ministers, the reconstruction of religious belief may be more closely related to the great problems of social ethics now looming so large, and needing the help which a positive religious faith can supply."

In carrying out this purpose the author "first attempts to show how the exigencies of the Christian church during the first millennium of its existence made the adoption and the perfection of the authority ideal in theology a source of moral power". This ideal was "the inevitable result of facing the facts of a decadent world under the sway of an apocalyptic view of history". Such a condition and such a view could not but issue in pessimism; and "so long as men know their own relative inability to achieve for themselves the best things of life, the attitude of docile learning from authority is natural and ethical". The writer then "shows how during the past four or five centuries changes in our social and intellectual life have taken place

which have gradually brought into existence a new type of moral loyalty". Such changes are "the development of a secular theory of industry", "the secularization of politics", "the changed position of the church in a secular state", "the secularization of modern scholarship", "the rise of a secular ethics", and "the historical explanation of religion". Thus our author tries to show "that the Christian church, in so far as it retains the authority ideal, has lost its hold on large sections of modern life because of a failure to appreciate the real moral problems involved". "The moral challenge due to these facts is then stated." "Finally, the ethical aspects of the work of theological reconstruction are considered in the light of the preceding survey."

The discussion thus imperfectly outlined is careful, interesting, and instructive. It is instructive:

1. In that it reveals how far theology may depart from historic Christianity and still presume to call itself Christian and even to pose as defending "the faith which was once for all delivered unto the saints". Thus, John tells us that "many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book: but these are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through his name" (John xx. 30, 31). Dr. Smith, however, refers approvingly to certain modern theologians "the actual content of whose theology and the actual structure of whose faith would not be seriously impaired if it should be found necessary to deny the historicity of the Biblical marvels—theologians who expound man's knowledge of God, his relation to God, his salvation through Christ, and his religious life, in terms which would require practically no changes in content if the possibility of miracle were denied outright" (p. 225). That is, Dr. Smith would defend and develop Christianity by setting aside its supernatural essence.

2. In calling attention to the prevalent misconception of the ethical and the supernatural as at least in contrast with one another, not to say as contradictory the one of the other. It is assumed throughout the volume, not only that true religion must be ethical, but also that it must cease to be ethical in proportion as it is supernatural. In so far as it presupposes "supernatural forces which lie out of man's reach", in so far as it depends on miracle, it must be non-ethical, if not unethical. Could there, however, be a greater or a more dangerous mistake? Does it not, in the last analysis, amount to this, that fallen man is held to be capable of making himself righteous instead of being, as Paul affirms him to be, "dead through trespasses and sins"? Scientific development is highly useful, but what if the subject to be developed be a corpse?

3. In the comparison which it draws and the contrast which it points between what it calls the assurance of content and the assurance of method, between the assurance which results from the agreement of our belief with "a guaranteed *content* of theology" and the assurance which comes from "a reliable *method* of ascertaining the

meaning of religion". The discussion at this point is glaringly faulty. It assumes, that these two methods are exclusive; that because one bases his assurance on what he takes to be an infallible since supernatural revelation, therefore, he has no use for scientific method in the interpretation or even in the validation of that revelation; and that because one grounds his confidence on the scientific method of his investigation, therefore, it is a matter of indifference whether what he investigates be conceived as the truth of God or the myth of man. The truth is that these two kinds of assurance are vitally related and mutually indispensable. The fact of a supernatural revelation demands the highest scholarship for its study, and scholarly methods are wasted when applied to the interpretation of fables.

4. In the light which it throws on the new ethics. This is "a science of relative values rather than an exposition of 'absolute truths'. Of course, there are certain abiding human traits and needs, as there are certain abiding conditions of human life; and these will continue to require certain fundamental moral principles. But the validity of such principles is referred to the needs of humanity in its present relations to the world and to society rather than to super-human sanctions" (p. 90). That is, what ought to be is determined by what man needs rather than what man needs is determined by what ought to be. In the last analysis, it is man and not God who makes law and so constitutes right. Could there be a worse case of putting the cart before the horse than this? Let us remember, then, that it is the only ethics to which pragmatism can give rise.

5. In emphasizing unintentionally and unconsciously, that on the basis of such an ethics no theology or reconstruction of theology can give the assurance and conviction to the modern view of life which the author feels that it lacks and which he recognizes as its most imperative need. It is not only in a decadent age that man needs an authority outside of himself. As Bacon said in his essay on Atheism, "man looks up to God as naturally as the dog does to his master"; and he can not look up to a God whom he has fashioned out of his own head or bow to a law which he has evolved out of his own necessities. Doubtless, we are confronted by a new moral situation; doubtless, many and novel social questions are pressing for solution; doubtless, the demand of the hour is that the new social order should be brought under the control of positive and Christian belief: but if this is to be done, it can be done only by a return to the religion and to the ethics of authority, to the Word of God, to the Scriptures which, because inspired by Him who is himself the law and who "knows the end from the beginning", are always and equally "profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good work". In a word, it is no reconstruction of theology, but a general and fearless reapplication of the theology of the ages which social idealism calls for.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Our Own Religion in Ancient Persia. Being lectures delivered in Oxford, presenting the Zend Avesta as collated with the pre-Christian exilic Pharisaism, advancing the Persian question to the foremost position in our Biblical research. By LAWRENCE MILLS, Professor of Zend (Avesta) Philology in the University of Oxford, etc., published in the United States by the Open Court Publishing Company, 1913, pp. x, 193.

The title of this collection of lectures scarcely prepares us for the variety of their contents. A series of eleven lectures on various themes related to the Avesta, interrupted by supplements, recapitulations, interludes, and the like, issues in two lectures, as an appendix, whose titles "God contemplated as Almighty and Superpersonal—Defined from Universal Nature—He is not the World-soul" and "God as Almighty, Superpersonal and Illimitable, further defined from Universal Nature" indicate their character. The appendix, in turn, issues in a summary with an application. The first lecture, "Zarathushtra and the Bible", which is re-edited from the *Nineteenth Century Review* of 1894, and from the *Open Court* of 1909, and the second lecture, which contains "a continued recapitulation with expansions and fresh pointing", review the points of doctrinal similarity between the Zend Avesta and Judaism, both exilic and post-exilic, and conclude as follows: "The long prior religion of the Mazda-worshippers was supremely useful in giving point and body to many loose conceptions among the Jewish religious teachers, and doubtless also in introducing many good ideas which were entirely new, while as to the doctrines of immortality and resurrection within a restricted sphere the most important of all, it certainly assisted and confirmed, though it did not positively originate belief. But the greatest and by far the noblest service which it rendered was the quasi-origination and propagation of the doctrine that 'virtue is chiefly its own reward', even in the great religious reckoning, and 'vice its own punishment'."

Germantown, Pa.

HAROLD MCA. ROBINSON.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

Die jüdischen Exulanten in Babylonien. Being Heft 10 of the Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten Testamente, edited by Rudolf Kittel. By ERICH KLAMROTH, Lic. Theol. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs. 1912. Pp. 107. M. 2.80.

This monograph is an attempt to supply a deficiency to which the author calls attention on his first page in these words: "The Babylonian exile has never yet been made the object of a special investigation by a German scholar." The scope of the book may be best judged by the titles of its chapters: methods of exiling; Judah's deportations; journey to Babylon; treatment of the exiles; their social situation; God, nation and land; false prophets; religious parties; and worship of Jehovah. Its presuppositions throughout are those of scholars who follow the lead of Kuenen and Wellhausen. At the same time Klam-

roth shows a tendency to appeal for support to traditions so late and historically worthless, that in comparison with them the testimony of "the Chronicler", which this school rejects, is of the first importance.

For the early exile Ezekiel is naturally the chief source. For conditions at the end of the exile it is necessary to piece together a variety of hints, gathered here and there from historical, prophetic and even poetical books, and in this task free rein may be given to the imagination. The view entertained by some scholars, that at the Persian conquest there was an influential body of Jewish exiles, men of wealth and station, is totally rejected by our author, who interprets literally a number of allusions in Isaiah and the Psalter to prove a severe and general persecution of pious Jews just at this time.

It is of interest to note that such a work as this leads its author inevitably to the conclusion that the edict of Cyrus, as given in the opening verses of Ezra, though so generally rejected by historians of Judaism (e.g. even by Meyer), is actually in accordance with what the historical situation demands. Our author, after commenting on the supreme significance of rebuilding the temple as the constitutive moment of the Jews' return to Palestine, and on the analogy between this fact and the facts recorded on the Cyrus-cylinder, remarks: "We will not here enter upon the difficulties which the Cyrus-edict [Ezra i. 2-4] offers; it suffices to assert that only by such an edict, which commanded the restoration of the cultus at Jerusalem, could a Jewish nation be recognized as existing" (p. 62). And again Klamroth suggests (p. 81) that the "strange circumstance" that Cyrus' edict permitting the Jews' return is not mentioned in the cuneiform record, may be explained by the absence from their worship of any image or other sensible symbol of the deity's presence, such as the ark might have afforded if it had been preserved. "The king [Cyrus] when he visited the Babylonian temples must have decreed the restoration of the various idols there collected, together with the corresponding settlement of colonies of their worshippers; in this he overlooked the Jewish nation, because he was not reminded of the God of Israel by anything tangible save certain vessels." More and more will criticism be driven to the acceptance of the Cyrus-edict as genuine, not only in the fragment preserved in Ezra vi. 3-5, but also in the portion embodied, in a form at least substantially faithful to the original, in Ezra i. 2-4.

Lic. Klamroth has a theory concerning the successive deportations of Judah that claims serious consideration. He believes that in Jer. xxix. 2 the words "after that" are to be taken literally and point to a large deportation of Jews subsequent to that of 597 in which King Jeconiah (Jehoiachin) was carried captive. He distrusts some of the chronological notices scattered through the book of Ezekiel, which, he thinks, have been conformed to the theory that Ezekiel himself and the other "priests, prophets and people" mentioned in Jer. xxix. 2 were deported along with their king and his court. But the facts, according to our author, point to the lapse of two years between Jeconiah's and Ezekiel's removal to Babylon. Among other advantages this theory makes it possible to explain the "thirtieth year" of Ezek. i. 1

(= 595) by the era of Nabopolassar (625), instead of by the other more or less unsatisfactory explanations proposed such as the age of Ezekiel himself.

One substantial service that Klamroth has certainly rendered is to exhibit the improbability of that conception of the great deportation, which pictures the emigrants as selling their fields to their brethren who remained, and thus carrying with them into exile good round sums of money with which to make themselves comfortable there. The evidence shows that the poor who remained received the vacated properties gratuitously, and that the exiles themselves received their new fields, not for money, but freely from the government. Indeed the whole process of deportation was so designed by the Assyrians and their Chaldaean successors, that as many individuals as possible might become completely dependent upon the government for their very existence. How far, in course of time—half a century or so—the Jews, like other deported peoples, were able to lift themselves, in individual cases, out of this slough of misery and utter dependence into an enviable state of well-being, is another question. Analogy with all the later history of Judaism, down to the twentieth century, points to the probability that no pressure such as Kings Nebuchadnezzar or Nabonidus would exert, could succeed in keeping down the thrifty, ambitious, patriotic and yet adaptable Jew. Cf. also Jer. xxix. 5.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

Das Buch Qoheleth. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Sadduzäismus. Kritisch untersucht, übersetzt und erklärt. By DR. LUDWIG LEVY, Rabbi in Brünn. Leipsic: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1912. Pp. 152.

Another to be added to the growing list of commentaries of Ecclesiastes that defend its integrity. This author has only jest for Siegfried with his array of "Q's", the successive authors and glossators of this little book. Herein, we think, lies the chief significance of Dr. Levy's contribution just at this time, when all the critics are showing signs of reaction from the extreme divisive methods in vogue until lately.

There is nothing vague in this author's idea of the origin of Ecclesiastes. For the Geiger hypothesis of the "Sadducees" he has no use. The two pupils of Antigonus of Socho, Boëthus and Zadok, living and teaching at Jerusalem in the second half of the 3d century B.C., are the source to which must be traced the origin at once of Ecclesiastes and of the "Sadducees". One of the two must have written this book. He must have been born about 270 and died about 203. At the close of chapter vii and before writing chapter viii he had to flee from Jerusalem to Egypt—himself doubtless one of "them that had done right", that "went away from the holy place and were forgotten in the city" (viii. 10). His book was finished "only shortly before his death", in his old age, the weaknesses of which (ch. xii.) he had himself experienced.

This author acknowledges, nay, helps to demonstrate, with Schechter and others, the dependence of Ecclesiasticus upon Ecclesiastes. This furnishes him with his *terminus ad quem*, which he announces as B.C. 180. But it is open to serious question whether Ben Sira, writing rather B.C. 200-190 than as late as 180, and in Palestine, would quote in the way that he does, the language of a book just published in Egypt. This is a weakness in Levy's position. His other weakness is in disregarding the evidence that Qoheleth's ideas of life, often so surprisingly similar to those of the Greek schools of philosophy, may have had their starting-point, not in that philosophy, but in the reflections and maxims common to Oriental thought from the earliest days. Professor Barton, in his recent commentary, has pointed out the true sources of inspiration, through comparison with ancient Babylonian and Egyptian literature. And Professor Bois has, in our judgment, by his brilliant criticism of Tyler, Plumptre and Pfeleiderer, justified his own claim to have shown "the impossibility of proving, in a satisfactory manner, the reality of a Greek influence felt by Qoheleth. If the author of Ecclesiastes felt the Greek influence, he certainly felt it too slightly for us to be able to recognize it positively, to put it beyond question, and to regard the assertion as a truth scientifically established."

Yet it is just this influence "by the atmosphere of the Greek popular philosophy", that Dr. Levy makes his *terminus a quo* in dating the book, which he therefore shuts up to a date later than 270. If due weight be given to the solid arguments, those from the language of the book, and its developed attitude towards the chief problems of the Chokhmah, and those from the use made of it by Ben Sira, then the view of Oehler and others will most commend itself, that it belongs not far from the latter half of the 5th century B.C.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

Die Selbstoffenbarung Jesu bei Mat. xi. 27 (Lk. x. 22). Eine kritisch-exegetische Untersuchung. VON DR. HEINRICH SCHUMACHER, (Sixth part of the Freiburger Theologische Studien, edited by Dr. G. Hoberg and Dr. G. Pfeilschifter, Freiburg im Breisgau: Herdersche Verlagshandlung. 1912. 8vo; pp. xvi, 225.

Our Lord's great declaration of His interrelation as Son with the Father in their mutual perfect knowledge of one another, recorded in Mat. xi. 27 and Lk. x. 22, has been thrown up into great prominence in recent discussion. Those who have been engaged in what has come to be known as "the quest of the historical Jesus", that is to say, in the effort to find behind the Christ of the Christian tradition a purely human Jesus, who knew and confessed Himself to be merely a man among men, are greatly scandalized by it. It is not merely found imbedded in the Synoptic rather than in the Johannean record—"a Johannean passage in the Synoptics"—but, being found in both Matthew and Luke, must be acknowledged to form part of the oldest and best attested tradition of the utterances of Jesus. Upon the principles of the current criticism of the Evangelical narrative themselves, it would

seem to be unquestionable that it was spoken by Jesus. And if it was spoken by Jesus, it certainly seems to bear very striking testimony to his possession of a more than human self-consciousness. It is not strange therefore that the "Liberal" critics employ every possible expedient to rid themselves of its pressure as part of the trustworthy historical tradition of Jesus. Some, accepting the facts, content themselves with declaring that the saying bears witness to a fanatical element in Jesus' consciousness which, though it may be deplored, need not prevent our admiration going out to Him otherwise. Others endeavor, in one way or another, to explain away the facts. Some of them attack the meaning of the declaration and endeavor to reduce it to a mere claim on Jesus' part to a certain high, perhaps unique, moral sympathy with God. Others attack rather its genuineness as a saying of Jesus, and endeavor to find some color of reason for denying it to Him, whether as a whole or at least in its fulness as recorded by the Evangelists. In the face of this general assault upon the declaration, in its genuineness, meaning and bearing, there is a place for a calm, thorough discussion of it in all its aspects, from a point of view free from antecedent unwillingness to accept it in its obvious significance; and Dr. Schumacher has undertaken and admirably carried through such a discussion in the volume now before us. Naturally it is the recent assaults on the passage by Alfred Loisy and Adolf Harnack, from closely related points of view but by means of different instruments of attack, which especially lie in the background of Dr. Schumacher's treatment; they govern in point of fact to some extent the outline of his discussion. But he has neglected no important line of argument, and, while making his treatise in essence a positive discussion of the declaration in question, has managed in its course to discuss in great detail every mode of assailing it which has been adventured.

Comprehensiveness, it will be seen, is the note of Dr. Schumacher's work; comprehensiveness and fulness of detail. Some hint of the completeness of his discussion may be given by indicating the formal disposition of his matter. He divides his material into six chapters. In the first of these he presents a history of the problem, including an indication of the position of the problem in the latest Biblical research. Then, in a comprehensive chapter of nearly a hundred pages' length, he discusses in great detail the textual question, with a view particularly to Harnack's treatment of it. The third chapter examines the historical connection of the passage and the significance of this connection for understanding it. The fourth chapter proceeds, then, to a thorough exegetical study of the passage itself, taking it up clause by clause, and discussing it in the light of the entire literature which it has called out (pp. 109-178). There remains only in the closing two chapters to compare the exegetical results obtained with other related passages in the Synoptics, and to defend them against the several attempts to interpret the Sonship here claimed by Jesus in a lower than metaphysical sense—whether as of merely theocratic, or of theocratic-ethical, or of theocratic-mystical nature, or as merely (as

Harnack contends) the expression of Jesus' priority to other men in the discovery of the Fatherhood of God.

The fulness of the discussion of the text is justified by the elaborateness and influence of its treatment in Harnack's *Sprüche und Reden Jesu* (1907). By neglecting the primary evidence and skilfully manipulating the indirect evidence derived from their (often very free and very partial) citation in the Fathers, Harnack succeeded in reducing, to his own satisfaction, the words of Jesus in Lk. x. 22 to this: "All things have been delivered to me by the Father, and no one has known the Father (*or*, who the Father is) except the Son and he to whom the Son may reveal [Him]." This being established as the Lucan report, Harnack then assumes ("this goes without saying", E. T. p. 293) that this was also the form in which the saying stood in the common source of Luke and Matthew, and therefore that this is the most original form of the saying that has come down to us. The main textual questions involved concern the substitution of the aorist "has known" (*ἔγνω*) for the present "knows" (*γινώσκει*), and the omission of the clause "the Son [*or* who the Son is] except the Father", which is mediated by the transposition of this clause and its fellow, "the Father [*or* who the Father is] except the Son". Harnack has no difficulty, of course, in adducing patristic quotations in which the aorist is found instead of the present; and equally no difficulty in adducing patristic quotations in which the order of the clauses is reversed. What is difficult is to make out a case for preferring these readings to their opposites. For not only is the entire direct evidence against them, which is in itself conclusive (even Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, 1913, p. 301, reminds us that "the philologist knows from experience that the manuscript transmission must be given a higher value than the indirect"), but the most explicit indirect evidence is equally against them. Irenaeus, while recognizing that a reading with the aorist and the inverted clauses was current and was exploited in heretical circles, expressly testifies (*Haer.* iv. 6. 1) that the Gospels themselves read as they still read in the manuscripts. Harnack's whole argument turns as on its hinge on the assumption that the heretics spoken of by Irenaeus, *Haer.* iv. 6. 1, are the Marcionites, that therefore it is the Gospel of Luke (for it was with Luke that Marcion operated) that is in question, and that it may be inferred therefore that Luke originally read the aorist and transposed the clauses. But it does not seem at all likely that Irenaeus was citing from a Marcionite account in *Haer.* iv. 6. 1,—he rather appears to have had as at *Haer.* i. 20. 3, the Marcosians in mind; the form of the text he cites is not Lucan but Matthaean; Tertullian (*Cont. Marc.* iv. 25, though the form of the citation here too is Matthaean) seems to imply that Marcion read as in the manuscript text; and in no case throughout the whole mass of patristic citations with the aorist, does the aorist appear in a citation which has the Lucan form, "who is the Father" (always the simple Matthaean "the Father"). Schumacher (p. 72) is thoroughly justified in concluding: "In the whole patristic

literature there can be pointed out no single witness which directly or indirectly gives occasion for even a conjecture in the sense of Harnack's view, that even only silently the aorist form is indicated as the original text of Luke. On the contrary a plurality of the most important authors of the earliest age make it clear (as is obvious from the evidence given above), that the original reading by Luke is *γινώσκει*. It is quite clear, indeed, that the reading *ἔγνω* which is so common in early patristic quotations is a variant of Matthew, not of Luke. And, we may add it is also clear that it finds its account merely in the freedom of quotation from memory which reigned among the Fathers and in the equivalence in sense of the gnomic aorist with the present. For that *ἔγνω* was taken by the Fathers who quoted the text with this form habitually in the gnomic sense (Schumacher, p. 78, cf. Chapman, *JThS.* x. 1909, p. 504) is indubitable. That, once having become current, it was exploited by heretics in a historic sense for their own purposes, and was occasionally understood from the same point of view of orthodox writers, is of no significance in the case. There is no reason therefore to seek an account of the currency of *ἔγνω* in citations from Matthew as Schumacher is inclined to do, by assuming that it is a variant rendering, along with *ἐπιγινώσκει* of the common "Hebrew" original in the primitive form of Matthew, which was written according to the testimony of Papias "in the Hebrew dialect". We need not follow Schumacher in his discussion of the other textual problems. Suffice it to say that under his full and careful marshalling of the facts Harnack's whole case breaks hopelessly down, and Schumacher can close the discussion justly with the declaration: "If there is any saying in the Gospels which we can esteem without hesitation a genuine, uncorrupted saying of Jesus, it is the acclamation of Mat. xi. 27, (Lk. x. 22)" (p. 100).

The exegetical discussion is as careful and minute as the textual. It is shown that Jesus employs the term "Son" in the theological sense, as designating Him in contradistinction to all creatures the Son of God by way of eminence, as, for example, we may see in Mk. xiii. 32. "As frequently as Jesus speaks of the 'Father' with reference to His hearers, He nevertheless emphasizes with striking and unmistakable care and constancy the distinction between *His* Father and *their* Father. Even Stevens finds it noteworthy that Jesus never places Himself on the same plane with other men when He speaks of God's Fatherhood or of man's sonship. It is therefore an erroneous contention when Jülicher maintains that 'over against God, He feels Himself one with all other men'. On the contrary we hear Him always speak only in the formulas, fixed once for all, of 'your Father', 'my Father'. He never recognizes Himself as of the same rank with His disciples, otherwise so lovingly received by Him, by uniting them with Him in the common address 'Our Father'. He never, as Stevens maintains with complete accuracy, brings Himself with others 'together in a single term as being in the same sense 'sons of God'' (p. 130). The nature of this uniqueness of Sonship

claimed for Himself by our Lord, Schumacher solidly argues, cannot be properly described otherwise than as metaphysical: Jesus proclaims Himself here as consubstantial with God and as therefore knowing Him as He is known by Him. The knowledge He has of God surpasses all creaturely knowledge: the depths of His being can be plumbed by none but a divine knowledge. As Cellini argues (as quoted, p. 141): "The knowledge with which the Son knows the Father must certainly be like that with which the Father knows the Son, since this twofold knowledge is expressed by the Evangelists in the same terms, with no intimation of a difference. But the knowledge which the Father has of the Son is a specifically divine knowledge. Therefore also the knowledge which the Son has of the Father is also a specifically divine knowledge." Indeed even Harnack allows that if the text be permitted to stand as it is found in our Gospels, recognition can with difficulty be escaped of the fact that we have here "a formal equality of the Father and Son, who are distinguished only by name, and a relation of the Father and Son which has never begun but remains ever the same" (p. 142). We need not go into the details of the exegesis, which would carry us further than would be proper to this brief notice. It must serve simply to say that no detail is neglected and that the conclusions reached are reached in the full light of the whole history of the exegesis of the passage.

The author himself in bringing his discussion to a close (p. 219) sums up for us the conclusions which he considers himself to have established. "The result of our investigation," he says, "is briefly as follows: The logion, Mat. xi. 27 (Lk. x. 22), is from the point of view of textual criticism incontestable in its Biblical wording; the secondary form *ἐγὼ* in Matthew is, as the gnomic aorist, indistinguishable from the present. With respect to its contents this saying of the Lord is the most profound, though mysterious, self-revelation of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels: He is the 'Son', exalted above all creatures, interpenetrating the Divine Being, the physical Son of God, absolutely independent vehicle of revelation and mediation as God Himself ('and he to whomsoever the Son wishes to make revelation'), possessor of the divine nature and might from all eternity as *filius Dei proprius naturalis*, and sharer of the same in time as *filius Dei incarnatus* ('all things have been committed to me by my Father'). This conception of the content of the saying is not strange to the Synoptic gospels, but expresses their sublime background, which only comes forward in an especially striking and illuminating way in Mat. xi. 27 (Lk. x. 22)." We think it must be admitted that this summary of the results of the discussion fairly describes what has actually been attained by it.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

Auferstehungshoffnung und Pneumagedanke bei Paulus. Von LIC. KURT DEISSNER. Leipzig. 1912. A. Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. Pp. iv, 157.

The idea has gained currency of late among expositors of Paulinism

that a development showing several distinct stages can be traced in the Apostle's eschatology and especially in his doctrine of the resurrection and the state after death. The propelling principle in this development is assumed to have been the Pneuma-conception. In the first stage of teaching, represented by 1 Thess., Paul did not yet possess his later peculiar Pneuma-conception or, if he possessed it, did not yet bring it to bear upon his idea of the resurrection. He here expects the raising of a body like unto the body that has died, not a body differently constituted or organized. During the second stage, reflected in 1 Cor., the Apostle gives the Pneuma its full influence upon the form assumed by his resurrection-belief. What is now expected is a body different from the present body, a body deriving its specific character from the Pneuma. Now, inasmuch as the Spirit is a present possession of believers, it is urged that from this point of view, according to which the resurrection is a pneumatic transaction, the result of the indwelling of the Spirit, there was no good reason for postponing the moment when the influence of the Spirit reaches the body and effects its transformation till the parousia. If nevertheless Paul in 1 Cor. makes this pneumatic resurrection coincide with the parousia, this is an inconsistency due to a failure on his part to give full effect to the changed point of view. But this inconsistency could not last. Between the writing of 1 Cor. and 2 Cor. Paul had learned to realize that from his present premises the endowment with the pneumatic body might be just as well put at death and thus an intervening period of nakedness between death and the parousia avoided. This third stage of development, we are told, appears definitely accomplished in 2 Cor. v. where the heavenly body is represented as coming immediately after the laying aside of the earthly body or even in the same moment, what is mortal being swallowed up of life, and where consequently the entrance into full fellowship with the Lord is not postponed, as in 1 Thess., till the parousia, but placed directly after the exit from this life. Some go farther than this, and find in certain passages the extreme view that the resurrection-body is under the influence of the indwelling Spirit already in process of formation underneath the physical body during the present life, so that what takes place hereafter would be strictly speaking not the receiving but only the revelation of the new body which had been up to that point hidden under its earthly envelope.

This view just sketched has with minor variations been advocated by such writers as Pfeiderer, Schmiedel, Teichmann, Sokolowski, Charles and others. Deissner's treatise is in its main intent a criticism, and we believe a successful criticism, of its central principle, viz., that the introduction of the Pneuma-conception has essentially modified the Apostle's view of the resurrection. The author shows how little basis there is for such an assumption. A careful exegesis reveals that on the one hand there is no reason to believe that the eschatological statements of 1 Thess. have any other background than the character-

istically Pauline doctrine of the Spirit, although, owing to the peculiar form which the perplexity of the Thessalonians in regard to the destiny of their dead had assumed, there was no special occasion for Paul to make this background stand out very strongly here. It also shows that on the other hand in 2 Cor. v. there is no real abandonment of the eschatological positions of 1 Thess., nay that on the contrary the phrases and statements in which the endowment with the new body at death is here found by the advocates of the development-view in reality refer to the being-clothed-upon at the moment of the parousia, the attainment of which Paul, in his strong desire to avoid "nakedness", here expresses himself as preferring to a previous death. In other words the Pneuma-conception is an integral element in the structure of Paul's doctrine of the resurrection from the outset and not introduced subsequently as a disrupting factor. All this is shown by a very painstaking and lucid exegesis of the main passages 1 Thess. iv., 1 Cor. xv., and 2 Cor. v. If this exegetical enquiry brings out virtually nothing that is new or original, it at least has the great merit of being conducted with special reference to the point at issue, and so enables the reader to weigh the evidence much more easily than would be possible through the study of the commentaries, where the question appears mixed up with a number of other problems. One distinctly gains the impression in following the author's reasoning, that the whole hypothesis of an eschatological development in the mind of Paul is chiefly due to the present vogue of finding evolution and complications and inconsistencies wherever possible. If the writers advocating this scheme were half as eager to discover and vindicate the unity and harmony of the Apostle's teaching on this fundamental subject from beginning to end, they could have made a far stronger case than they are now able to make for the opposite view. Deissner demonstrates how impregnable the old position, notwithstanding the exegetical difficulties of such passages as 1 Cor. xv and 2 Cor. v, actually is.

In regard to certain issues not directly involved in the main point under discussion, we are not sure that we are able to follow the author. Thus e.g., where he intimates a couple of times that the order of affairs which the Apostle expects to begin at the parousia is conceived by Paul as a kingdom on earth, although nothing distinctively chiliastic is predicated of it, so that we remain in doubt in regard to its precise nature, as also in 1 Cor. xv. we remain in doubt as to the precise chronological relation between the parousia and the delivery of the kingdom by Christ unto the Father. Too much, it seems to us, is staked in this matter on the one word *καταβήσεται* of 1 Thess. iv. 16. Nor can we agree with the author when, after rejecting the development assumed by the other writers in the main substance of the doctrine, he traces a development of his own in regard to a minor point between the standpoint of 1 Thess. and 1 Cor. on the one hand and 2 Cor. and Philipp. on the other hand. This development is held to consist in this that during the earlier period Paul conceived of the

intermediate state as a state of κοιμᾶσθαι "sleeping", whilst during the later period he connected the entrance upon full conscious fellowship with Christ immediately with death, so that in 2 Cor. v where at first the alternative: previous death or survival till the parousia evoked from Paul strong preference for the latter and strong aversion to the former, a few verses later under the realisation of this hope of immediate enjoyment of fellowship with Christ after death, the alternative just described lost for him its acute painful character, and he professes himself contented even in prospect of the less desirable of its two possibilities. We do not believe that the use of the word κοιμᾶσθαι in 1 Thess. and 1 Cor. is able to bear the weight of inference here put upon it. It must have been even in the time of Paul a purely metaphorical designation of the act of dying and the state of death, and the author has not in our opinion succeeded in proving that Paul necessarily associated with it the idea of unconsciousness. On the contrary, the same argument which he urges in favor of the view that the resurrection-idea stood already at the time of writing of 1 Thess. under the influence of the Pneuma-conception, seems to us to weigh equally much in favor of the view that at that time already Paul must have conceived of the state of death as a state of fellowship with Christ. If the resurrection is here virtually described as taking place ἐν Χριστῷ, the same is affirmed of the κοιμᾶσθαι. To be sure the author believes he can escape the force of this argument by observing that in 1 Cor. xv. 18 in οἱ κοιμηθέντες ἐν Χριστῷ the aorist tense is used, so that only the "dying" not the "being dead" is represented as taking place in Christ. But that is certainly a hair-splitting distinction and Deissner besides overlooks that in 1 Thess. iv. 16 the phrase νεκροὶ ἐν Χριστῷ does not allow of such a restriction to the moment of death. If then the fellowship with Christ covers the whole intermediate state, it becomes difficult to conceive of this as a state of unconsciousness and to differentiate it any longer from the state of fellowship looked forward as beginning with death in 2 Cor. v. and Phil. i.

It was perhaps not strictly germane to the author's purpose to give the Pauline conception of the Pneuma its larger eschatological setting. His theme brings it about that he could content himself with considering merely the functional operation of the Spirit in creating the prerequisite state of the resurrection. Still by losing sight of the larger aspect of the matter and not considering the Spirit as the element of the eschatological heavenly life in general and bringing into connection with this the special work of the Spirit concerning the raising of the body, the true perspective of the whole question is somewhat put out of focus and valuable light on it is shut off. The impression even is created, as if the resurrection of the body at the last day were not a specific act of the Pneuma, although this is not explicitly said in so many words. That the author does not quite steer clear of giving this impression is due to his legitimate desire to controvert the modern notion as if the resurrection-body could be in any sense the product

of an immanent development of the Pneuma dwelling in the believer. Over against this it is quite right to emphasize that the endowment with the new body is according to Paul an objective act, by which something is imparted *ab extra*, not something evolved from within. But in emphasizing this Deissner does not state clearly enough that to Paul this objective act is none the less an act which God supernaturally performs through His Spirit, so that there is a true connection and continuity between the immanent Spirit of the present Christian life and the objectively-operating Spirit of the resurrection-act.

At the conclusion of his treatise the author gives a survey of the views of the Stoic and the Epicurean philosophies on the subject of immortality and shows plainly that the nature of these views was not such as to make the assumption of any appreciable influence exerted by them on Paul at all plausible. The Stoics believed only in a temporary survival of the soul till the next world-conflagration, and that not consistently, since some believed in an earlier resurrection of the individual soul into the general pneuma. And the representatives of the Stoa who stood nearest to Paul in point of time, like Seneca, were at heart sceptical on the subject. In regard to Sap. Sol. and 4 Macc., where a greater formal agreement with Paul as to the persistence of conscious life after death exists, it is urged that even here on the point of the Pneuma-conception there are wide-reaching differences, the Spirit being not consistently conceived as "power" after the manner of Paul. In regard to the valuation of the body as an integral part of man there existed even a fundamental antithesis, since in these Hellenizing writings the body is felt to be a burden and a detraction to the state of future blessedness, whereas Paul considers the body absolutely essential to the consummate eschatological life.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

Der Begriff der Wahrheit in dem Evangelium und den Briefen des Johannes von Lic. F. BÜCHSEL. (Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie, XV, 3) 1913. Gütersloh. Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. Pp. 143.

This monograph enquires into the Johannine conception of "the truth", the prominent occurrence of which is common to both the Gospel and the Epistles. It has long been observed that the usage of this term has peculiar features which differentiate it from that of the Pauline Epistles, where it likewise, especially in the Pastorals, attains to a certain prominence. These peculiar features moreover stand in an obvious connection with the general physiognomy of the Johannine teaching as a whole. They have for their correlate the emphasis laid on knowledge, and most likely bear some relation to the antithesis between the higher and the lower sphere, God and the world, which to so large an extent colors the Gospel. An investigation into the idea of "truth" cannot fail, therefore, to have an important bearing upon the understanding of the Johannine teaching as a whole.

In the present discussion the author contents himself with ascertaining the facts of the usage without opening up the larger questions with which they are correlated. He approaches the subject from a historico-exegetical standpoint. The main interpretations thus far advocated pass in review. That of Holtzmann and Weiss, who with more or less consistency give to ἀλήθεια the specialized sense of "cognition of God" or "knowledge of God", that of Zahn and Wendt who think that, in dependence on the Old Testament idea of "Emeth", "veracity" should be regarded as the fundamental meaning, especially in Jno. i. 14, 17, the anti-speculative interpretation, which would give a practical import to the term making truth a matter of the heart rather than of the intellect, and in which such opposite spirits as Wellhausen and Schlatter coincide, the mystico-metaphysical view represented by Cremer and others, which places the center of the conception in the idea of "eternal reality and exclusive validity", and the comprehensive definition of Godet which attempts to combine the various meanings, are passed in review and successively criticized. The criticism revolves about the three questions, whether ἀλήθεια can be explained as meaning primarily "veracity", whether the conception has a speculative background, and whether its content is coëxtensive with the knowledge of God. As regards the first point Büchsel contends against Wendt and Zahn that the allusion to the Old Testament phrase *chesed we-emeth* in χάρις καὶ ἀλήθεια in Jno. i. 14, 17, even if it be intended, is not decisive for determining the sense of ἀλήθεια. Nor can the Old Testament phrase "to do truth" or the analogy of τὴν δικαιοσύνην ποιεῖν prove for Jno. iii. 21 that ποιεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν must mean "to practise truthfulness". The meaning of Rev. xxi. 27; xxii. 15 points in the opposite direction, insofar as here in the phrase ποιεῖν ψεύδος the word ψεύδος cannot have the subjective meaning of "untruthful" but has the objective meaning of "untrue". The main, and in our opinion decisive, consideration is that in i. 14, 17 the ἀλήθεια which forms according to the context the object of the revealing activity of Christ in the largest sense, can not be confined to such a detailed concrete point as the veracity of God: the setting of the word here emphatically requires a broader and more comprehensive idea. It might have been added that the alleged peculiar, ethical conception of "the truth" which Wendt and others find in iii. 21 can only with difficulty be developed out of the Old Testament idea of *emeth* which means "faithfulness", "truthfulness" in particular and not the "morally right" in general. As to the third point in question, the restriction of ἀλήθεια specifically to the knowledge of God, we feel that here also the author makes a good case against Holtzmann and Weiss. At the same time he rightly recognizes the element of truth in the criticized view, for while ἀλήθεια has at times other content than the knowledge of God, Büchsel admits that in point of fact the cognition of God stands in the center of the idea and determines its practical importance for John. We are not so sure that we can follow the writer in his criticism of the so-called metaphysical view, that

of Cremer, and of the allied Platonizing, Philonic interpretation of the term advocated by Holtzmann and others. The author duly distinguishes between ἀλήθεια as connoting *Wirklichkeit* and *Wahrheit* and does full justice to the idiomatic sense of ἀληθινός in connection with the former. But in his legitimate revulsion from the attempt to foist the Platonic dualism upon the Gospel, he goes in our opinion too far and fails to bring out the real connection between the idea of ἀλήθεια and the Johannine doctrine of the two spheres of being. Ἀληθινός is not, of course, equivalent to "heavenly", it means nothing but "veritable". It is, however, quite Johannine to say that this "veritableness" belongs in a prœminent sense to the realities of the world of heaven, the sphere of God. In vi. 31 ff. the idea of provenience from heaven is significantly associated with the ἀληθινός-character of the bread which Jesus is and gives. This is not Platonism, but it formally resembles it in that it assigns a supreme reality and perfection to the things of the invisible world. Whether the resemblance goes so far as to involve the correlated idea of the reproduction of these higher spiritual realities in the lower physical world is a difficult question. Holtzmann has asserted this. According to his view "the true light", "the true bread" designate the primordial embodiment of the idea of light and bread, of which all that passes under these names on earth is a mere copy. Even this would not be Platonism, nor would it necessarily prove a dependence of the Gospel on Philo or Plato, though Holtzmann thought it did. It may be hard to prove that, where the Gospel calls certain things ἀληθινός this idea of their recurrence on a lower plane is necessarily implied. But the main principle, that "veritableness" is predicated of the things of the higher world as such, does not depend on this. For the contrast between the substantial, abiding, perfect character of the higher world and the unsubstantial, ephemeral, imperfect character of the things below can be conceived without importing into it the Platonic thought that the things of sense are copies of the ideas. If ἀληθινός actually has this connotation, it becomes a further question whether the noun ἀλήθεια has not also acquired in John the corresponding concrete, collective sense of "those things that are veritable" in the sense of belonging to the higher world, and whether from this objective point of view the designation of Christ as "the truth" does not receive its simplest explanation. Büchsel does not seriously consider this possibility. Ἀλήθεια to him means truth in the sense of "cognition", "knowledge", i.e., truth as an ideal transcript of things, not the things themselves. Christ is "the truth" because He has and brings a perfect, complete knowledge of God. Even in regard to such a passage as Jno. i. 17 the contrast between the law given through Moses and the ἀλήθεια which came into being through Jesus Christ is construed in this way that Christ took the norm of "truth" and in his life gave reality to it. It will be observed that the writer here reaches the idea of "actuality", but he reaches it in an indirect way: it is not for him expressed in the word ἀλήθεια as such, but comes in

through the consideration that it is essential to the truth that it should be done, embodied in practice. It would seem so much more simple to reach this result directly by saying that ἀλήθεια here has not the meaning of "truth" but of "veritable things", and that the reality of the New Testament is contrasted with the commandment and prediction of the Old Testament. In iv. 23 Büchsel recognizes that the ἀληθινοὶ προσκυνῆταί are not "sincere, truthful worshippers" but "veritable worshippers", i.e., such as realize in themselves the idea of worship. Nevertheless he seeks to explain the phrase προσκυνεῖν ἐν ἀληθείᾳ which follows in verse 23 and verse 24 on the basis of ἀλήθεια as "true knowledge of God", and quotes and treats the phrase (pp. 46, 48, 54) as if it read ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. In xiv. 6 "I am the way, the truth and the life", the co-ordination of "truth" and life" with each other and the connection of these two with "the way (to heaven)" certainly suggests that Jesus is the truth in a more substantial personal sense than that He brings the truth, and that this truth which He is has special connection with the heavenly world. In all this there is nothing too metaphysical or speculative to be ascribed either to Jesus or to John. The author, who frankly recognizes that the teaching of the Fourth Gospel bears a pronounced theological character, and does not share the modern dread of the term "speculation" as applicable to this teaching, could scarcely from his own standpoint object to the idea as necessarily un-Johannine. Ἀληθινός in this technical sense certainly occurs in Heb. viii. 2; ix. 24 and there is a trace of it even in Lk. xvi. 11.

Of course, side by side with this special usage, if it be recognized, there remains room for the other according to which truth is the knowledge of God. And the prominence of the latter constitutes just as much a distinctive feature of the Johannine discourses as the occurrence of the former. It is interesting to observe how the author explains the emphasis placed on truth and knowledge from the peculiar fundamental character of the piety portrayed in the Johannine writings. The idea that to be put in possession of the truth about God, to know God, is in itself productive and constitutive of religion, rests on the absolutely God-centered and self-forgetting character of the religious consciousness in John. The mind is to such an extent focussed in God and absorbed by God as to cease altogether reflecting on itself and its own need. The majesty of God and of Christ overpowers it. There is an approach to the mystical type of religion in this. The idea that "knowing, through its pregnant semitic sense becomes equivalent in John to "loving", the author rejects. It will be observed that the above explanation relegates the soteriological element to a secondary place, for which reason we would hesitate to accept it as a central and complete solution of the problem. In general, where the writer leaves the path of simple exegesis and becomes more constructive and interpretative, his method of approaching and presenting things becomes somewhat involved and unnatural, reminding

strongly in places of the peculiarities of Schlatter. It should be added, however, that it also shares with the latter the merit of intense suggestiveness, even for one who is unable to understand it fully or adopt all its conclusions.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

The New Testament Documents. Their Origin and Early History. By GEORGE MILLIGAN, D.D., Professor of Divinity and Biblical Criticism in the University of Glasgow. With twelve facsimiles. Macmillan and Co., Limited, St. Martin's Street, London. 1913. Pp. xvii, 322.

In the Croall Lectures for 1911, which are printed in the volume now under review, Professor Milligan discusses in a popular way a number of subjects concerning which he is peculiarly well qualified to speak. His instructive and entertaining discussions of the language of the New Testament and of the literary character and early circulation of the New Testament books have been prepared for by years of painstaking investigation not only of the New Testament books themselves but particularly of the new materials for study which are being afforded by the non-literary papyri. But by Professor Milligan the new materials are employed with a moderation which is signally lacking in the works of such a scholar as Deissmann. In his enthusiasm for the papyri Deissmann is far too much inclined to lose sight of the Semitic element in the language of the New Testament, and to place the New Testament writings one-sidedly in the category of non-literary documents and private letters. In both particulars Professor Milligan registers a wholesome protest. The Semitic element receives due emphasis. And the Pauline epistles, according to Professor Milligan, are not to be compared one-sidedly with the careless letters of every-day life. "The letters of St. Paul may not be epistles, if by that we are to understand literary compositions written without any thought of a particular body of readers. At the same time, in view of the tone of authority adopted by their author, and the general principles with which they deal, they are equally far removed from the unstudied expression of personal feeling, which we associate with the idea of a true letter. And if we are to describe them as letters at all, it is well to define the term still further by the addition of some such distinguishing epithet as 'missionary' or 'pastoral'. It is not merely St. Paul the man, but St. Paul the spiritual teacher and guide who speaks in them throughout" (p. 95). Such a judicious use of the new materials serves only to render all the more evident their real value for the study of the New Testament.

With regard to authorship and date of the New Testament books Professor Milligan expresses himself in a number of instances only with caution. The Second Epistle of Peter he believes to be a pseudonymous work. Argument with regard to such questions and criticism of the author's views with regard to the New Testament canon would exceed the limits of the present review. The fourteen

notes at the end of the volume bring together in convenient form materials for study of various topics, and illuminating discussions. Particularly interesting is the note on dictation and shorthand in antiquity.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

The Apocalypse of Jesus. Being a step in the search for the historical Christ. By F. W. WORSLEY, M.A., B.D. (Durh.) University College, Durham, and Clare College, Cambridge. London, J. & J. Bennett Ltd. The Century Press. 7/6 net.

The Apocalypse of Jesus, as the title suggests, is a product of the Apocalyptic School of Biblical Criticism. Declaring himself in accord with the results of critical scholarship Worsley sets himself to the task of reading the life of Jesus in the light of the "established" facts of that scholarship. Worsley belongs to the extreme right wing of the Critical School and his work judged from that standpoint is, it must be allowed, largely constructive in character.

The author divides his material into two books. Book I, which he calls *The Facts*, treats of the following: Introductory, The Preconditions, The Kingdom of God, The Son of Man, The Apocalyptic Element in Q, The Eschatology of Jesus, The Parables. Book II, *Results*, contains five chapters treating respectively of The Historicity of Mark, The Messianic Beliefs of Jesus, The Self-Revelation of Jesus, The Reception of the Revelation, and Jesus or Christ. The division into *The Facts* and *Results* is, as a reading of the book shows, rather formal and arbitrary. Chap. I, Introductory, is not particularly well placed among *The Facts*, and *The Messianic Beliefs*, e. g., might almost as properly as *The Eschatology of Jesus* have been grouped under *The Facts*. The Historicity of Mk. is treated in Book II, but is not a result or deduction from facts previously established, nor is it so treated. The same is true to a larger or smaller extent of some of the other chapters of Book II.

In the Introductory Chapter Worsley voices a protest against the Ultra-Eschatological School of Schweitzer and the Liberal Protestantism of Wrede and others. He then goes on to define his own position. His argument is in brief that Jesus, employing the language and method of Apocalyptic Literature, came to correct the misrepresentation of the Law and the erroneous conceptions of Messiah and the Kingdom as expressed in that literature, and to bring to fulfilment in his life the higher hopes of all Israel. His life thus becomes "a new Apocalypse in action". While the Apocalyptic Literature was largely eschatological, Jesus' "New Apocalypse" is eschatological only to a very small extent (*cf.* et. p. 130). We are warned not to take Apocalyptic as synonymous with eschatological. In Chap. II, Worsley takes up the Preconditions necessary to the study of the question, viz., a working knowledge of N. T. Criticism and of contemporary Apocalyptic Literature. We are then made acquainted with the commonly accepted views as to the Markan Grundschrift and with some of the Apocalyptic conceptions current in the time of Jesus. In a characteristic statement (*cf.*

et. 199) Worsley claims that Jesus, during the days of his retirement in preparation for his ministry, was studying Apocalyptic Literature with the same enthusiasm as the Law and the Prophets—a contention hard to believe and equally hard to prove. This statement of Worsley's deserves to be noticed, since also elsewhere we meet with similarly characteristic utterances. E.g. p. 54 we read: "Those, who do not adopt the church's method here, will no doubt pass through similar spiritual experiences hereafter if they are to pass into the Kingdom." The main contention of the book is stated to be that "it was the Apocalyptic Literature which was responsible for much that He said or rather . . . for the way in which He said much that is recorded".

Worsley regards (Chap. III, The Kingdom of God) Matthew as "not consistent in his translation of the Aramaic phrase", *Malkuthâ dish-mayâ*. Wherever Matthew's Q has *τῶν οὐρανῶν* (*τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*), it has been "wilfully changed" from *τοῦ θεοῦ* "unless (p. 58) we are to make the further assumption, which is not warranted, that the recension used by St. Luke was one in which the change to *τοῦ θεοῦ* had been already made". Matthew labours under a misconception in that he takes the phrase in "a purely eschatological sense". Worsley claims that when Jesus "first came, teaching and preaching the Kingdom of God, his ideas on the subject were largely governed by the prevailing notions" of the people (which notions of course were erroneous), and that "Jesus at the outset did *not* know the relation in which He himself was to stand to the Kingdom". This latter statement is directed against Professor Orr, and finds its explanation in Worsley's development-idea which plays such an important role here and throughout the entire book and prejudices so much of the author's thought.

Commenting on the Lukan passage: *ἰδοὺ γὰρ, ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ ἐντὸς ὑμῶν ἐστίν* (p. 50) Worsley remarks, "It seems better to take *ἐντὸς ὑμῶν* with Weiss, Hahn, as 'in your midst', and a little later we find him contradicting himself in the following: "So here the intention evidently is to make clear to the Pharisees that the Kingdom is 'within them' in the sense that the word is sown in their hearts, etc."

In his discussion of the title, "The Son of Man", the author declares himself in sympathy with the views of Baldensperger and Charles. To determine whether Jesus ever used the title Worsley takes up the various passages where the title appears, showing rather convincingly that it is authentic. He also argues (against Schmidt and others) that the title cannot be rendered by "man". Matthew, Worsley contends, colored the use of the title with strong and pronounced eschatological ideas. Prior to Peter's confession it had no such force. It implied a "claim to special authority", "preëminent importance among men", "sympathy with the race", etc. After the confession the note of authority is overshadowed and superseded by the notion of suffering. It is a characteristic of the title that it remains applicable to the newer circumstances as they develop in the life of Jesus. In the coming-judgment passages there is a return to the meaning of authority in the title. Jesus chose the title since it was "surrounded by a halo of

mystery", and did not in any way suggest a distinctive claim to Messiahship. For Jesus Himself the title was Messianic from the beginning. In this chapter, also, the development-idea is constantly in the forefront. The development in Jesus' conception of the Kingdom brought with it a development in the conception of the title.

Worsley believes (Chap. V, *The Apocalyptic Element of Q*) with Resch that *Q* dealt in some degree with the Passion and recorded some post-resurrection sayings. He makes a study of *Q* particularly with a view to discover in how far it bears out the tendency on the part of Jesus to express His meaning in current Apocalyptic phraseology. Worsley quotes a large number of passages from Apoc. Lit. as parallels to *Q*. His general position is that Jesus' treatment of Apoc. Lit. is on a par with His treatment of the Old Testament. Throughout this chapter the author seems to be largely dependent for his parallels on Allen (commentary on Matthew), with whose views also in matters of Biblical Criticism his own are strikingly similar. Matthew here as in Chap. III, receives a good deal of rebuke and criticism. He is constantly reading an eschatological sense into *Q* and is credited with a large number of editorial additions. Had Matthew's Gospel afforded the *Grundchrift*, Schweitzer's view would have been held all along.

In "The Eschatology of Jesus" Worsley argues for the authenticity of the Eschatological discourse Mk. xiii, parallels. Mark, Matthew, and Luke all give evidence that three different sources existed which contained essentially the same eschatological teaching. As to the application of the parable of the fig tree the Synoptists have gained a wrong impression. Luke's phrase, "the Kingdom of God" is more authentic than "these things" of Matthew and Mark. Matthew was ignorant of Luke's phrase, or else he would have changed it into "the Kingdom of Heaven". According to Worsley reserve and "nothing-very-definite" characterizes Jesus' teachings on death, the intermediate state, and the Parousia. The fault lies with the reporters, who construed what Jesus said as being in accordance with current apocalyptic teaching, or embroidered or wilfully misrepresented Jesus' words. However, a considerable residuum remains to Worsley to enable him on the basis of this to declare himself in accord with the eschatology of Jesus as given in the Creeds.

In "The Parables" ("the parables display more than any thing else the apocalyptic character of Jesus' teaching") Worsley combats the views of Jülicher-Schmiedel on the one hand and those of Schweitzer on the other. In the parable of the sower Jesus has just abandoned the thought of an earthly kingdom. The logion "To you it is given to know the mystery of the Kingdom" Worsley argues against Jülicher is genuine and is applicable to several other parables, Jesus' teaching in the kingdom-parables being esoteric. Against Schweitzer, the parable is not eschatological. The "good ground" is "the major part of the field",—a doubtful interpretation. The "word" means more than the preaching of the kingdom; "it is the kingdom itself."! Mark's parable of the seed growing secretly is not borrowed by Matthew because of the

latter's eschatological tendency. Jesus is as guarded in his eschatological teaching in the parables as he is elsewhere. Worsley recognizes four groups of parables according to their general import. They almost always illustrate the nature and work of the kingdom. In the use of the parables we see a process analogous to that evidenced by the use of the title, *The Son of Man*.

The heading *The Historicity of Mark* (Chap. I of Bk. II, Results) should have read *The Historicity of St. Mark*. The author chooses to draw a distinction between Mark and St. Mark, assigning the *Grundschrift* to the latter, and it is of the *Grundschrift* that he treats in this chapter. Worsley's discussion of the historicity of St. Mark is largely determined by the "thoroughgoing" attacks of Wrede and Schweitzer. The absence of "Tendenz" in St. Mark, he argues, speaks rather for its historicity. Matthew is guilty of embroidering and coloring the facts, St. Mark is content to be a reporter. Worsley takes up in succession the different parts of St. Mark with a view to showing their historical trustworthiness. The healing of St. Peter's mother-in-law is an historical fact being vouched for by Peter himself. If this miracle is historical, other miracles are likely to be historical. St. Mark's chronology is reliable because the other two evangelists follow his outline. The effects of Jesus' teaching (Mk. iii) on his relatives and on the Pharisees bear the impress of verisimilitude. For Jesus not putting forth any Messianic claims thereby incurred the hatred of his relatives who in turn came to regard him as an imposter. For the Pharisees Jesus' whole method was far too reactionary. In this manner Worsley takes up the entire Gospel of St. Mark. One chief purpose Worsley keeps continually in view, viz., to show that the events reported set before us each time the requisite preconditions for the development of the situation. Worsley repeatedly insists that, though it may not be categorically stated or definitely traced by Mark, there is a development in the consciousness of Jesus. This is apparently meant against Schweitzer, though in the passage from Schweitzer referred to the contention made is that Mark knows nothing of any development in Jesus, which is of course a very different thing. On the whole, it must be admitted, Worsley makes out a strong case for the historicity of Mark. A gratuitous assumption it is to say that "nebulous conceptions" preceded "the awakening of His consciousness". Untenable the view p. 197 that "it is possible that John is the subject of *ἐξδεν* in Mk. i. 10, as Matthew suggests".

Worsley represents Jesus (Messianic Beliefs, Chap. ii) as beginning his ministry with the belief that an end of the present state of things is at hand. The expression is somewhat indefinite but as a later utterance shows (p. 244, "There can be no doubt that Jesus at one time expected the establishment of the kingdom in its fulness during his lifetime.") it evidently implies that Jesus at the outset entertained a mistaken view as to the kingdom. It has already been intimated that the development-idea is an all-controlling one in Worsley's version of the life of Jesus. In his study of the Messianic Beliefs this idea asserts

itself in all its vigor. Worsley finds it necessary to date much later large portions of Matthew, e.g., the Sermon on the Mount, because of their developed conceptions. As to the terms, "The Holy one of God" Mk. i. 24, "The Son of God" Mk. iii. 11, etc., Jesus cannot, very naturally, be sure of their meaning at the time they were uttered. On the other hand as indicative of *growth* in Jesus' God-consciousness we find adduced the following: "He spake with authority and not as the scribes", and "I say unto you". Worsley takes up the entire Markan record to point out the successive stages in the development of the Messianic consciousness of Jesus. The Baptism convinces Jesus of his messiahship. The assumption of the title, The Son of Man ("The title was begotten of his half-developed consciousness") is with the purpose of compromise, since his ideas are in a state of conflict between the militant Messiah of the Psalms of Solomon and the Son of Man of Enoch. The determining factor in the whole process of development of Jesus' messianic beliefs is the opposition of the religious rulers. In Mk. i-ii we see Jesus conscious of holding a unique position, in Mk. iii closely identifying himself with God the Father and God the Holy Ghost, in Mk. iv realizing that the aims and the essence of the kingdom are purely spiritual and in consequence his views as to his own part assuming a more definite shape. The incident of the healing of the Syrophenician woman indicates that Jesus does not yet conceive of the Gentiles as entering into the kingdom save through the portals of Judaism. The central point in the process of development of the messianic beliefs is the confession of Peter. Jesus here has arrived at a full consciousness as to his person and office. The future of the kingdom is a vast spiritual reality and for the accomplishment of this his death and resurrection are essential, etc. Worsley asserts that the principal development in the messianic beliefs is to be found in the eschatological teaching of the last few days, but can hardly be said to succeed in indicating a progress in that development after the incident at Caesarea Philippi.

Worsley opens his chapter on The Self-revelation of Jesus with the significant sentence, "If Jesus was not conscious until the events at Caesarea Philippi of the great sacrificial part that he was called upon to play, it is obvious that he could not have revealed as much to the disciples or to anybody else." The same thought occurs in a clearer form, p. 261: "Up to the moment of St. Peter's confession there is no conscious self-revelation of Jesus at all." The truth of the introductory sentence, provided its premise is granted, is of course self-evident. But it is hardly necessary to say that it cannot be regarded as scientific to approach the study of the self-revelation with the foregone conclusion as is the above one. It will then as a matter of course follow that the assumption of the title, "The Son of Man", cannot mean "a revealing of a claim as yet to Messiahship" but must be "simply the assertion of a personal mission among men". In the Parable of the Sower and the parables that immediately follow we will then not find any "definite statement of messiahship", "because He himself is not certain". Of

the Sign of Jonah the three days and nights which Jesus was to spend in the tomb may then very naturally be "due to the Editor of the Gospel, as such a thought never occurred to Jesus at this period."! From the moment of Peter's confession, as the introductory statement anticipated, Jesus' real self-revelation begins. The whole outlook as to the revelation to the world has here undergone a complete change. The newer aspect "is wonderfully shown in the eschatological passage". The above is the conclusion reached from St. Mark, and Q is substantially in accord with it. The importance of John's Gospel is that it gives us the self-revelation which was vouchsafed by Jesus to the disciples on the eve of his death.

In the Synoptists there is according to Worsley (Chap. IV, The Reception of the Revelation), no attempt discernible to portray the results produced in the minds of men by the teaching of Jesus. Though the disciples started out with the conviction that Jesus was Messiah, "this does not seem to have been the case with regard to the people in general". This contention of Worsley's is based on the following doubtful assumptions: first, that in all that the Baptist said there was "only so much as might lead them to suppose that a greater prophet was to come"; second, that Jesus made no definite statement concerning his messiahship to the people. Worsley is hereby obliged to question the genuineness of certain messianic utterances of Jesus as e.g. in the episode of the Samaritan woman. And the Baptist's words, John iii. 28, "I am not the Christ, but am sent before him" are declared to be "not a public announcement, for those who thus questioned were but a handful". As touching the disciples they were as hidebound by tradition as were the people and not ready to listen to any teaching that Jesus gave them and to accept his own explanation of it. When Jesus did not carry out the sort of campaign as tradition had mapped out, their enthusiasm received a check. In Peter's cry "Lord to whom shall we go" Worsley finds a note akin to desperation. In ἀληθῶς θεοῦ υἱὸς εἶ Worsley attaches too much importance to the anarthrous υἱὸς regarding it to be a holding back of the full declaration and as eloquent of the mixed feelings of the perplexed men.

The closing chapter, Jesus or Christ, takes up the question of the "historical" Jesus, the Virgin-birth, the resurrection, and the ascension. Theories as those of Drews are deservedly dismissed without serious discussion. On insufficient evidence, viz., silence as to the Virgin-birth on the part of Peter in his preaching to Cornelius and of Paul at Pisidian Antioch, Worsley contends that "the Apostles at this time were ignorant of the supernatural birth and supposed that Jesus was the son of Joseph". It was very likely not until after the resurrection that they came to know the truth. On the other hand Paul's christology, Worsley believes, is incompatible with ignorance as to the Virgin-birth. The various theories of the resurrection Worsley shows to be unsatisfactory. The great objection to them is the fact of the empty tomb. The train of the disciples' thought during the great forty days, the events of Pentecost, the rise of, or reason for the doctrine of exaltation, the

spread of the infant church in the face of opposition, etc.,—these are all facts that cannot be explained by any other cause than the resurrection and ascension.

Corrigenda occur p. 47 ἐφθάσειν, p. 49 παρουσιά, p. 50 ἔρουνσιν, ἰδου, p. 52 μείζων, kindom, τῇν, p. 53 δὲ τις, l. 25 may (delendum), p. 55 τοι-
 άτων, τῇν, p. 56 ἐκείνου, δεῖν, λυεῖν, p. 64 Die (should be De), Eerdmanns
 (et p. 65), p. 70 jüdische Apocaliptik, p. 89 וְלִמְשָׁעִים, p. 94 הַגְּבוּרָה,
 p. 95 גְּבוּרָתִי, p. 105 ζωῆς μου, πάτερα, p. 112 synoptischen (l. 6), p. 116
 ἄλας, ἵνα, ἀπ' αὐτήν, p. 117 μακαρίος, ״שֶׁאֵל (bis), p. 118 χορτασθῶσόνται,
 p. 119 (last line) 43 (should be 44), p. 120 Father of God, ζωῆς
 μου, p. 124 (l. 13) recession, p. 125 reminder, p. 132 utter (should
 be uttered), p. 156 (l. 5) seem, p. 182 altjudische, 194 δαιμονίον, p. 237
 (l. 1) abrogating, 248 (l. 28) reference, p. 256 (line 5 from below) And,
 p. 258 (l. 20) he, p. 270 (l. 10) no, p. 275 ״ב, p. 302 זֶה, p. 308 זֶה p. 312
 Geschichte, p. 320 B. W. Warfield (B. B. W.), p. 324 (l. 13) writes,
 p. 327 (l. 1) pace, p. 340 principle (l. 19 was, p. 362 Warfield,
 B. W. (B. B.).

Knox College, Galesburg, Ill.

RALPH JANSSEN.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

Theologischer Jahresbericht. Dreissigster Band 1910 . . . herausgege-
 ben von PROF. DR. G. KRUEGER und PROF. DR. M. SCHIAN in Giessen.
 Des ganzen Bandes IV. Abteilung. (Zweite Lieferung). *Kirch-
 engeschichte.* Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger; New York, G.
 E. Stechert & Co. 1913. Pp. 321-592. Price 11 m.

The first part of this division of the *Jahresbericht* was noted in the immediately preceding number of this magazine. It was there stated also that the editors expected to publish the second and last part within a short time. This they have not been able to do on account of not receiving the manuscript for the literature of the eighteenth century, so rather than wait longer they have now published a second part, and promise the third and last before long. The volume before us, for it is quite large enough to be dignified by the name, contains the literature of the periods falling between 1648 and 1800, and between 1900 and 1910, with continuous paging, so that the chronological sequence has been sacrificed.

With regard to the contents, we need only note that the editors are Professors Zscharnack and Schian, and that they have performed their work with the excellence characteristic of the *Jahresbericht*. Not so much can be said of the responsible proof-readers, for the English names and titles are frequently misspelled. In glancing through the pages we could not but notice the comparative lack of interest in the history of Theology in the modern churches. Practical and experiential Christianity receives much attention; so does the Roman Catholic Church; and it is doubtless indicative of the growth of the free

churches on the continent, that both France and Germany are looking into the origin and history in English speaking lands of the Methodists and the Baptists.

Princeton.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

Bible Reading in the Early Church. By ADOLF HARNACK, Professor of Church History in the University of Berlin. Translated by the REV. J. R. WILKINSON, M.A., late scholar of Worcester College, Oxford; and Rector of Winford. New York: Geo. P. Putnam's Sons. 1912. Pp. x, 159. \$1.50. (The Crown Theological Library.)

The thesis that Professor Harnack undertakes to prove is that during the first four centuries no attempt was made, or even contemplated, to restrict the reading of the Bible by all classes of the people. On the contrary, the Scriptures were everywhere regarded as a message from God, which every man should read and study for himself. In this examination the writer has in mind two classes of opponents; first, the Roman Catholics who maintain that the Bible has been committed to the Church, i.e. ultimately to the Pope, and is to be given or withheld from the laity as she sees fit; and second, modern scholars who would make of early Christianity a mystery religion of a kind with the other cults of the Graeco-Roman world. Without going into details, it is enough to say that Professor Harnack has proved his point up to the hilt. Leaning upon Walch and aided by his own wide knowledge of the Fathers he reviews the literature of the first four centuries in such a way as to leave no doubt as to the undisputed access of Christian and heathen, layman and cleric, to the Scriptures in these centuries. And this in turn he quite correctly points out, as Bible reading was at the very centre of the life of the Christian life, is fatal to all theories which would make of early Christianity a thing subservient to a church organization, or a mystery religion.

There are just two criticisms we would like to make, one of which affects Professor Harnack's general position, and the other the work of the translator. Of course if, as Professor Harnack so conclusively shows, the reading of the Bible was felt to be outside the control of the church, the obvious conclusion is that the Bible itself was felt to be superior to the church. That we think is the correct view. The church of the second century did not make the Bible, either Old or New Testament, but felt itself bound and conditioned by books over which it had no control. But although this shines all through Professor Harnack's thesis, it is not, as every one knows, his own view. The Old Testament, he holds, did indeed occupy such a unique position, being received by the church from the Jews as the very word of God; but there was no such feeling toward the writings which later came to be known as the New Testament, until the second century, when under stress of circumstances so-called apostolic writings were raised for the first time to a position of equality beside those of the Old Testament. Here is a great inconsistency. How is it conceivable that a church which felt itself bound not to interfere with the inspired writings, dared to assert that certain books which had long

been considered not to be part of the word of God in reality were so or were made so. That this inconsistency is to be referred to the early church and not to Professor Harnack is of course possible. History is not always logical. But after his strong presentation of the view that the early church regarded herself as the servant and not the mistress of the Scriptures, we have a right to ask of Professor Harnack just as strong or stronger historical evidence, and a philosophical explanation, of this very illogical behaviour on the part of the early church; and until this is forthcoming we shall continue to think that he, and not the early Christians, is guilty of inconsistency. In this connection too we may note that he is still entangled in, and embarrassed by, the opinion that the statement of the Muratori Fragment to the effect that the Shepherd of Hermas ought to be read, refers not to the Shepherd alone but to a whole class of literature. For this there is of course not a scintilla of evidence; and the problem of the Shepherd's place in the early church, and incidentally the relation of this classic passage of the Muratori Fragment to the history of the Canon, will never be rightly understood until the words are taken to mean exactly what they say, and this then be taken as a starting point from which to reconstruct a situation which called for such a statement.

As to the translation, Mr. Wilkinson has reproduced very successfully both the sense and the spirit of the original; but we would suggest for the future, that books intended for sale in America would find a readier acceptance if translations of Greek and Latin quotations were inserted in the text and the original put in the foot-notes. In this volume there are many passages and several of considerable length, without an accompanying translation, and this fact militates against the usefulness of the book more than any but an American can appreciate.

Princeton.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

Protestantism and Progress. A Historical Study of the Relation of Protestantism to the Modern World. By ERNST TROELTSCH, Dr. Theol., Phil., Jur., Professor of Theology in the University of Heidelberg. Translated by W. MONTGOMERY, B.D. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1912. Pp. xii, 210. \$1.50.

Professor Troeltsch's work, the latest fruit of the Calvin celebration, has been known to scholars on both sides of the Atlantic for some time and is now offered to a wider public in English form. That it will be widely read and enjoyed there is no doubt. The author has read widely and thought carefully on the problems of religion and the modern world, and few men command greater respect. The problem he handles in the volume before us is the relation of the modern world, to early protestantism. By the modern world he means Europe and America and by protestantism the revolt against Church civilization under Luther, Calvin, the Anabaptists and others in the sixteenth century. In brief his thesis is that early Lutheranism and Calvinism are to be reckoned to the preceding age of ecclesiasticism,

i.e., the Middle Ages, rather than to the Modern world. Of course both of these and especially Calvinism contributed something to our present culture, but the other-worldliness, the submission to authority, the desire to establish national and exclusive Churches, which were the characteristics of early Protestantism, show greater kinship to the preceding than to the present period, whose characteristics are this-worldliness, independence of authority, relativity and anti-supernaturalism.

A detailed statement or examination of Professor Troeltsch's position would be here out of place. We desire simply to make a few remarks on some matters which to our mind have not been given their proper relative value. Professor Loofs has objected already to Troeltsch's picture of the modern world that it is to be seen only out of a university window, and to us the criticism appears applicable to what he says of the Reformation and Illumination as well. To Professor Troeltsch the modern world is a unity which can be characterized by a few broad generalizations, the Reformation on the contrary a much divided thing. Neither the one nor the other is true. Because we are removed from it by a few centuries we can look back upon the sixteenth century and calmly disentangle the forces which were then entangled. A future historian will do the same for our own period. Calvin it is true, as Troeltsch recognizes, brought comparative order out of the chaos; but even Calvinism was not a unit, and as for the others, there can be no sharp line of demarcation drawn between the names of Luther, Carlstadt, Zwingli, Hubmaier and even Münster. Nor can we think Troeltsch correct in elevating to a place of first importance the intolerance and what he calls the asceticism of the early protestants. That men only slowly freed themselves from the idea of the necessity of the union of Church and State, and that a habit of mind which reflected the ideals of the period of Church domination long remained, especially in the Lutheran lands, is not only true but natural and necessary. But to say that these things are at the centre of Protestantism is to mis-read history. The proof of this is to be found in the consciousness of the Reformers themselves who knew the past and felt that they were fundamentally breaking with it; also in the fact that the several protestant churches existed under so many forms of civil and ecclesiastical government. The center of Protestantism lay in the affirmation of the right and the duty of the individual to approach God directly and to learn individually of him in the Scriptures. What was not in harmony with this fundamental declaration of independence was soon sloughed off.

The only way in which Protestantism can be linked to the preceding Romanism is by contrasting both with anti-supernaturalism; and this is of course just what Professor Troeltsch does, at the same time explaining the present world as anti-supernatural, and so anti-Roman and anti-Protestant. Whether this characterization is applicable to Germany or not we will let others determine. Professor Loofs denies that it is. But in speaking of the English-speaking world in this

manner Professor Troeltsch is certainly misinformed, and part of his mistake comes we think from a one-sided view of Illuminism, which he regards as largely responsible for our present civilization. The name Illuminism is generally reserved for that humanistic movement in the eighteenth century which was accompanied on its religious side by rationalism in Germany and deism in England and by similar phenomena elsewhere; but it must not be forgotten that it had as its counterpart, or more exactly, its complement, the great religious movement which we call by various names, Pietism, Methodism, Evāngelicalism, The Great Awakening. In aim and spirit Illuminism and Pietism were inseparable; both strove for a subjective assurance of truth and both were intensely practical. Both over-shot the mark and had to be freed from excrescences but both together have largely determined our modern culture. Another thing that should be remembered in considering Pietism is that it was necessarily tied to the essential doctrines of the Reformation. If humanistic Illuminism was a recrudescence of the Renaissance, Pietism was the re-affirmation under different circumstances of early Protestantism. Again, it is a matter of no small importance to note how these two which were so interwoven and over-lapping succeeded each other in different countries. In Germany, Pietism and the Church quarreled before rationalistic Illuminism appeared to conquer easily a foe thus engaged in fratricidal strife; and religion in Germany has lived more or less under the rationalism of that period from that day to this. In England on the contrary deism had been answered before Wesley and Whitefield began their work; and England and English speaking countries have been living under the influence of the evangelical revival ever since. This is a fact that Professor Troeltsch does not seem to realize. We have our anti-supernaturalists of course, and they make considerable noise; but any picture of the modern English and American world that does not recognize the success of separatism and voluntarism in the Churches with all that they mean, or note the activity in foreign missions and the success of protestant supernaturalism there, or fails to weigh the fact that the demand for Bibles is as steady as that for sugar and calico, cannot do justice to the truth.

Princeton.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

The Rise of the Mediaeval Church and Its Influence on the Civilization of Western Europe from the First to the Thirteenth Century.

By ALEXANDER CLARENCE FLICK, Ph.D., Litt.D., Professor of European History in Syracuse University. New York: G. A. Putnam's Sons. 1909. 8vo; pp. xiii, 623.

Even the somewhat cumbrous title of this manual fails to indicate with sufficient accuracy the unusually narrow limits of the account here given of the Mediaeval Church. As a professor of European history dealing with students whose interest in the subject is not professional but purely "cultural", the author, long convinced that "not a single Church history suitable for regular college work, or for popular reading is available", has undertaken to meet this need in his

own classes by the preparation of this "simple account of the evolution of the old Church minus all theological and dogmatic discussions". "The purpose has been to show the origin of the Christian Church, its development in organization, the forces which produced the Papacy, and the marvellous formative influence of the Roman Church upon the civilization of Western Europe."

In view of this statement of the scope of the work we are not surprised by the absence of much of the material usually contained even in compendiums on this period of the Church's history. On the other hand, if the volume is to be weighed in the light of its value as a cultural discipline in a college curriculum, it becomes difficult to understand the complete omission, in some cases, and the slighting in others, of matters that would commonly be supposed to serve such a purpose, as, for instance, Christian art and architecture, the more important ecclesiastical literature, and, above all, the distinctive features of the moral and religious life of the several ages apart from that aspect of the subject to which the author may be said to do ample justice—institutional monasticism. Nor is the determination to exclude "all theological and dogmatic discussions" rigidly adhered to,—a fault from the writer's standpoint that enhances the value of his book. For as he himself admits, in a summary statement of the elements that make for success in the studying or teaching of Church history, "emphasis ought to be laid on ideas back of events rather than on the events themselves". At any rate we could ill afford to lose, from this account of the rise of the Mediaeval Church the sections and chapters that sum up the formative ideas of the New Testament, the issues at stake in the council of Nicæa, and the doctrinal controversies that made their contribution to the separation of the Eastern and Western Churches.

In some of the chapters the author indulges in what many will regard as an excessively analytic method of treating concrete historical realities. Thus in two succeeding chapters on "the rise of the Papacy", he assumes the existence of the problem to be explained and then gives two series of arguments, the first containing twelve points and the second fifteen to show how the final stage in the development was attained. This impairs the literary quality of the work and likewise, to some extent, its scientific value. The representation becomes static rather than dynamic. We get no satisfactory picture of historical forces in the process of acting and reacting upon one another.

Nevertheless the book is one of great merit, especially for those making their first acquaintance with the subject. For them even the undue amount of analysis to which we have just referred will by no means lack a certain pedagogical advantage; the outstanding facts can readily be gotten hold of and kept as a possession of the memory. Moreover, the manual is one of the best guides into the vast literature belonging to this field. Besides the very excellent general bibliography on Church history, there are elaborate lists of sources, primary and secondary, appended to every chapter, special attention being given

to the needs of those who can use only English books of reference. The footnotes, too, give evidence of the thoroughness and the scholarly ability with which this manual has been prepared. The index is all that could be desired.

We shall be glad to welcome the companion volumes which the author promises—one on the Reformation and another on the Modern Church—and also the proposed source-book on Church history to supplement the texts.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

A History of Creeds and Confessions of Faith in Christendom and Beyond. With Historical Tables. By WILLIAM A. CURTIS, B.D., D.Litt. (Edin.), Professor of Systematic Theology in the University of Aberdeen. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1911. Demy 8vo; pp. xix, 502. \$4.00 net.

These "first-fruits", gratefully offered by the author to the memory of the late Prof. Robert Flint, and to the Faculties of Divinity in the Universities of Edinburgh and Aberdeen, his teachers and colleagues, are a fine sample, and as we shall hope a sure pledge for the continuation by him, of work in historical theology.

Condensed and summary as is the treatment in every part, the style is never dry or dull, but always vigorous, giving in admirable combination the technical details of the history and the author's valuations of the finished credal formulas. The judgments expressed are those of a mind full of reverence for the best achievements of the past, hospitable to the truth whether new or old, skilled in critical analysis, and reasonably fair in its expression of results. True, the reader has occasion to regret the extreme brevity of some of the chapters, but when he regards the unusual breadth of the work he cannot but feel that the proportion is admirably maintained. The second chapter (consisting of twenty-three pages on "Creeds and Confessions outside Hebrew and Christian Religion" is the most fragmentary and least satisfactory part of the volume. It is one of a number of elements that may stimulate the interest of the general reader but will offer little of value to the student of historic religious thought. More widely useful will be the exhibition of the creeds of such ecclesiastical free lances as Tolstoi, such sects as the "First Church of Christ, Scientist", and such organizations as the Salvation Army. But the main value of the book lies in its being a comprehensive and yet concise book of reference on the creeds and confessions of Christendom.

Four Historical Tables, in the form of Appendices, illustrate the rise of the ancient creeds, the evolution of the Apostles' Creed, the Confessional Divisions of the Church, and the history of confessions of faith in modern Christendom.

The author's spirit and point of view are most fully revealed in the concluding chapters in which he indulges in a general retrospect of the history in its broader features, offers some reflections on the dogmatic movement as a whole, argues in favor of the need of

retaining creeds and of revising those of the past, and discusses the question of the ethics of creed-subscription.

Among ecclesiastical confessions the Westminster Shorter Catechism and the Brief Statement of the Reformed Faith, of our own Church, please Dr. Curtis best. Concerning the latter he says (p. 290): "More than any other Confession, perhaps, it speaks in modern language, such as the pulpit may utter frankly and without alteration or paraphrase. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that every Protestant Church might cheerfully and heartily accept it for use both at home and in the mission field." But the ideal creed, to the author's way of thinking, is one couched in Biblical terms and offered by our Lord Himself: "Thou art the Christ, Son of the Living God."

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Life of Sir Henry Vane the Younger, Statesman and Mystic (1613-1662). By JOHN WILLCOCK, M.A., D.D., F.R. Hist. Soc. Published by the Saint Catherine Press, London. 1913. Crown 8vo; pp. xxiii, 405.

Dr. Willcock has already given us three biographies dealing with the central years of the seventeenth century. One of these is devoted to the romantic figure of the author of *The Exquisite Jewel*,—Sir Thomas Urquhart of Cromartie (1611-61). The two others trace the careers of those sharply contrasting figures, the eighth and ninth Earls of Argyll—*The Great Marquess: Life and Times of Archibald, 8th Earl and 1st (and only) Marquess of Argyll (1607-61)*, and *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times: Being Life and Times of Archibald, 9th Earl of Argyll (1629-85)*. In the present volume he turns to the English side of the same great struggle for civil and religious liberty which was described on its Scotch side in *The Great Marquess*, and groups an account of its progress on English ground around the figure of Sir Henry Vane the Younger. Argyll was certainly the most commanding figure in the Scotch history of the times; and Dr. Willcock would place Vane by his side as occupying something like the same position of relative eminence in the English history of the day. There can be no good biography when there is no sympathy with the character and achievements of the person whose history is depicted; and we count it only gain for the general value of this volume that Dr. Willcock looks upon Vane with an admiring eye. "The purest patriot that England has ever seen" he calls him (p. 344) with genuine enthusiasm, if possibly with some exaggeration. To him more than to any other, he thinks, we are indebted for that vindication of our liberties which was the crowning service to us of the epoch of strife through which Vane lived. He does not hesitate to assign to him preëminence among all the statesmen of his time. "Three great names," he remarks, "are associated by us with the English Commonwealth which rose on the ruins of the Monarchy in the middle of the seventeenth century: Cromwell supreme in the field of war, Blake on the sea, and Vane in the cabinet" (p. 1). "Nothing, to a

modern man is more astonishing in Vane's career," he explains more fully (p. 347), "than the advanced views which he held regarding so many political matters. His advocacy of toleration, of religious equality, of the sovereign power of Parliament, of reform in the House of Commons, and of a written constitution, shows him to have been far in advance of his time. In some respects, indeed, he is in advance of our time. And the mere fact of his being able to rise so completely above the level of his age explains how it was that he so often stood alone and was so often regarded with hostile feelings."

It is as the enlightened advocate, not so much of religious toleration as of the equality of all religions before the law, that Vane especially commands Dr. Willcock's admiration. It is in effect in this aspect of his character that Dr. Willcock essays particularly to depict him. In the effort to throw into a vivid light how much Vane towered in this above his contemporaries, perhaps now and then something less than justice is done to them. "The principle of toleration," we read (p. 17), "was firmly rooted in Vane's nature, and it would be hard to say whether Geneva or Rome, Canterbury, or Edinburgh, or Boston, in those days hated it most." That a practical unanimity of opinion obtained in the middle of the seventeenth century, that a religious function belonged to the civil magistrate; and that it was his duty, as the Westminster Confession expressed it, "to take order that unity and peace be preserved in the church, that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed, all corruptions and abuses in worship and discipline prevented or reformed, and all the ordinances of God duly settled, administered, and observed", is of course true. But we can hardly on the basis of this common consent that it belonged to the magistrate to foster the true religion and to suppress heresy, wipe out the differences with respect to toleration which existed between Rome, say, with its "anarchical methods of propagating religion"—by means of force and fraud and massacres and burnings (pp. 33-34)—and Protestantism; or even between Canterbury with its Laudian doctrine of "thorough", and Edinburgh, operating under its "Solemn League and Covenant". If Argyll may be taken as a representative of Covenanted Edinburgh,—and surely no better representative could be wished—we have Dr. Willcock's own testimony that he was no persecutor (*The Great Marquess*, pp. 193-4, 198). The "comprehensive ecclesiastical establishment", which Argyll expounded in his great speech at Westminster on the 25th of June, 1646, while it sought "a reasonable measure of uniformity in religion", could not (as Dr. Willcock points out himself) "press heavily upon devout, well-disposed persons who had conscientious scruples",—and indeed, clearly (as Dr. Willcock also tells us), "expressed the same idea" in another way, which Cromwell gave famous utterance to in his letter to the Speaker of Parliament after the battle of Naseby. And that Argyll was in his broad views of the establishment occupying the same ground with his other brethren in

the Covenant is notorious. Precisely the same views for example had been declared by George Gillespie in his sermon before the House of Lords in 1645, and other equally authoritative announcements of them might easily be adduced. No doubt all these men were advocates of an "established church", and Vane had progressed beyond that standpoint. He was convinced, as they were not, that the magistrate as such had no function in the sphere of religion; and in this he rose superior to them, and manifested an insight into the essential fitness of things to which they had not yet attained. We may contrast with the article on the "Civil Magistrate" in the Westminster Confession from which we have just quoted the exposition of "the Rule of Magistracy" given by Vane in his *Retired Man's Meditations* published in 1655 (p. 388) and observe with admiration the height above all theories of "establishment" to which Vane had soared. "We are to understand by this terme," he says, "the proper sphere, bounds, and limits of that office, which is not to intrude itself into the office and proper concerns of Christ's inward government and rule in the conscience, but is to content itself with the outward man, and to intermeddle with the concerns thereof in reference to the converse which man ought to have with man, upon the grounds of natural justice and right, in 'things appertaining to this life', wherein the Magistrate or higher power is not only the proper Judge, but hath the right of coercion thereunto, if not obeyed, and the more illuminated the Magistrate's conscience and judgment is, as to natural justice and right, by the knowledge of God and communications of light from Christ . . . the better qualified is he to execute his office, and the more accountable he is to God and man in default thereof" (p. 229). But because the true relation of the civil magistracy to the church was as yet so little understood, is no reason why we should lump all the advocates of the "establishment" of religion in an indistinguishable mass of intolerant persecutors. In point of fact Vane would have had little quarrel with the Scots with their accomplished independence of the Church in *spiritualia*: what vexed his righteous soul most was the ingrained Erastianism of the English Parliament, on which, more than any other one thing, was wrecked the scheme of a uniform religious establishment in the two kingdoms.

And this leads us to speak a word on Vane's relation to the Solemn League and Covenant. We are loath to believe that the real state of the case is fairly represented when we are told that "Vane succeeded in inserting clauses in it" (p. 122) by means of which—that it was "through Vane's diplomacy that—the terms" (p. 145) in which its obligations were expressed were weakened beyond the purpose of the contracting Scots. Baillie leaves us in no doubt that the declaration in its final form was understood by the Scots to express their full mind. And certainly the terms in which the obligations were expressed in the final form seem to be precise enough to bind most consciences (*cf.* this REVIEW vi [April 1908], pp. 198 ff.). Vane himself moreover in 1662 declared, at his trial and on the scaffold, his

loyalty to the Covenant and his reverence for it, only explaining that he did not consider that it should be rigidly imposed. "I will not deny," he says in his "Reasons for an Arrest of Judgment", "that as to the manner of prosecution of the Covenant to other ends than itself warrants, and with a rigid, oppressive spirit, to bring all dissenting minds and tender consciences under one uniformity of church discipline and government, it was utterly against my judgment. For I always esteemed it more agreeable to the Word of God that the ends and work declared in the Covenant should be promoted in a spirit of love and forbearance to differing judgments and consciences, that thereby we might be approving ourselves 'in doing that to others which we desire they would do to us'; and so, though upon different principles, be found joint and faithful advancers of the reformation contained in the Covenant, both public and personal" (p. 129). On the scaffold he speaks with evidently true feeling of the Marquess of Argyll as "that noble person whose memory I honour" and describes how he "was with myself at the beginning and making of the Solemn League and Covenant, the matter of which", he continues, "and the holy ends therein contained I fully assent unto, and have been as desirous to observe; but the rigid way of prosecuting it, and the oppressive uniformity that hath been endeavored by it, I never approved. This were sufficient to vindicate me from the false aspersions and calumnies which have been laid upon me, of Jesuitism and Popery, and almost what not, to make my name of ill savour with good men" (p. 130). These do not seem natural words on the lips of one who had sought so to frame the wording of the Covenant as to make it palter in a double sense; and we would fain believe, if it be possible to do so, that Vane was incapable of arguing as, for example, Browne argued, when rebuking the Assembly of Divines for its attitude regarding the *jus divinum*, that as there is no positive rule of church government in the Word, the Covenant leaves absolute freedom to all on this point. We prefer to think, if it be possible to do so, that Vane's meaning is not very far from that of Argyll; or of George Gillespie when Gillespie declares that he would condemn "any rigorous or violent course against such as being sound in the faith and holy in life, and not of a turbulent, factious carriage, do differ in smaller matters from the common rule"—and apostrophises thus: "Let that day be darkness, let not God regard it from above, neither let the light shine upon it, in which it shall be said that the children of God in Britain are enemies and persecutors of each other." No doubt Vane would interpret the "smaller matters" more broadly than Gillespie and seek a wider toleration but we should not forget that the toleration of the Scots was wide enough to include Vane's party. "We may be very confident," declared the Scottish Commissioners in 1646 of the Pilgrim Fathers, "that the godly people who did transplant themselves out of this island (the fame of whose piety and zeal shall never suffer detraction or the smallest diminution from our thoughts or words) might have lived in the Church of Scotland en-

joying the pure ordinances of God, with peace in their consciences and comfort to their souls." The chief enemy of Vane in his pleadings for toleration was not the Scots with their Solemn League and Covenant, within which toleration would have been readily granted for all the practical of Vane's friends, but the chief enemy of the Scots with their Solemn League and Covenant,—the Erastian Parliament, who would itself govern everything, even the inmost *spiritualia*, and would allow no freedom outside the reach of its prescriptions.

The main lack which the reader feels in the volume is an adequate account of Vane's theological opinions. "Dreamy Mysticism" is what he is credited with; "strange dreams and fantastical interpretation of Scripture and sheer unintelligibility" we are told "often overcloud his religious writings." A contemporary critic is quoted to the effect that he "hath not contented himself in the shallows, but hath waded into the deeps of divinity, possibly so far sometimes as that he cannot feel the ground of Scripture". Some description is given of his chief religious writings: and (with the help of T. H. Green) a brief *précis* of his teaching is offered. A good deal more than this would have been welcomed by theological readers who have not access to Vane's books.

Dr. Willcock is more interested in the man, however, than in his religious opinions, and brings him before us with especial zest as the Apostle of liberty, civil and religious. He is full of admiration for his insight and foresight and credits him, as we have seen, with being in advance not only of his time but even of our time in the clearness of his convictions and the boldness of his suggestions. No doubt it is generally true that most of the political advance which has been slowly worked out in Britain for the last two hundred and fifty years has merely given effect to what was already present in promise in the Puritan Revolution: and Vane as the bold spirit who was ever in the lead in the Puritan Revolution naturally embodies in his own person the *clairvoyant* element inherent in it. Some of his suggestions have not even yet worked themselves into fact: some of them—as for example government by a single-chamber—we may hope never will, though certainly a close approximation to it is already in being. But the praise which Dr. Willcock pours out upon him seems fairly justified in general. The biography he has given us of him is most illuminating. The field it covered was not unoccupied: other biographies of Vane are in existence. There was room, however, for a new one, and Dr. Willcock has written this new one with adequate knowledge, keen sympathy and just characterization. The positive new contributions to our knowledge of Vane which he makes he does not claim to be large. He thinks he has given a fuller account of Vane's relations with Cromwell, and of his political career from Cromwell's death to the restoration of Charles II, than has hitherto been accessible. And he presents the material for a judgment upon the connection of Vane which has recently been alleged with the plot in which Sir Richard Willis was the chief spirit and which had for its object the seizure—perhaps the murder—of Charles II and his brother, the Duke of

York, expressing his hope, at the same time, that Vane may be ultimately cleared of complicity in this discreditable proceeding. But the chief claim of the volume upon attention is its lucid and well-ordered narrative of the whole story of Vane's career. As is usual in Dr. Willcock's books the volume is well illustrated. It is also provided with a useful index.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

What is the Truth about Jesus Christ? Problems of Christology discussed in six Haskell Lectures at Oberlin, Ohio. By FRIEDRICH LOOFS, Ph.D., Th.D., Professor of Church History in the University of Halle-Wittenberg, Germany. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. 12mo; pp. vii, 241.

There are few men better equipped than Friedrich Loofs to give an illuminating survey of recent christological discussion. He is handicapped, of course, by his own dogmatic point of view. His dogmatic point of view is that of right-wing Ritschlianism. As a right-wing Ritschlian, Jesus is to him the unique Revealer of God and Mediator of Redemption. From this standpoint he looks out upon all recent discussion, and by its standard he estimates the value of its contribution to thought. Whatever is less than this, and, equally, whatever is more than this, he condemns; and he so conducts the survey of the progress of discussion as to lead up with apparent naturalness to the conclusion that it is thus and not otherwise that we must think of Christ. It is only at the end of the volume, therefore, that we learn Loofs' own Christological opinions; and they are given to us there less as the constitutive elements of his own Christology than as the residuum of the Christological discussion of recent years. "For us," says he (p. 236), "the three following thoughts, held out by these views, are the most valuable: first, that the historical person of Christ is looked upon as a human personality; secondly, that this personality, through an indwelling of God or his Spirit, which was unique both before and after, up to the end of all time, became the Son of God who reveals the Father and becomes also the beginner of a new mankind; and, thirdly, that in the future state of perfection a similar indwelling of God has to be realized, though in a copied and therefore secondary form, in all people whom Christ has redeemed." Here are just the familiar forms of right-wing Ritschlianism: Jesus Christ is only a man; but in this man God dwells uniquely and by this unique indwelling of God, He is made the Revelation of God and the Mediator of redemption; and the redeemed are to be brought in their measure into a relation to God similar to that in which He stood. When Loofs, then, speaks of Jesus being something more than man—as he sometimes does in the course of his lectures,—it is this that he means: not that Jesus is in

Himself more than a man, but that God dwells in Him more fully than He dwells in other men. "The conviction that God dwelt so perfectly in Jesus through his Spirit, as had never been the case before and never will be till the end of all time," he says, "does justice to what we know historically about Jesus, and may, at the same time, be regarded as satisfactorily expressing the unique position of Jesus which is a certainty to faith" (p. 238-9). We know "historically" that Jesus is a man. We are sure with "the certainty of faith" that Jesus has in Him something more than we can find in other men. When we speak of Jesus as the man in whom God uniquely dwelt we are doing justice to both facts. "It also," he even adds, "justifies our finding God in Christ when we pray to him" (p. 239). That is to say, although He is only a man in whom God dwells in a measure superior to that in which He dwells in other men, we are justified, because we can thus find God "in Him", in praying to Him. What it means for God to dwell in Christ; and what it means to say it is by His Spirit that He dwells in Christ; and indeed what it means to speak at all of God's "Spirit" remains meanwhile uncertain (p. 239). "My last refuge, therefore is," he says, "the term which Paul sharply emphasizes in the epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians, *the mystery of Christ*" (p. 209). "We can never penetrate so deep as to learn how God made Him what He was" (p. 241). This is Loofs' Christological standpoint.

From this standpoint Loofs is sure that Jesus, the man Jesus, existed. And therefore he opens his course of lectures with a refutation of the modern radicalism—the most important representation of which he finds (p. 6) in William Benjamin Smith—that denies the existence of the man Jesus. It is the extra-canonical testimony and the witness of Paul to which he gives his chief attention. He concedes—we think improperly—"that the historicity of Christ cannot be conclusively proved by the non-Christian sources"; though he contends that they give weighty evidence for it, such as to render it very difficult to deny His existence (pp. 30-31). The stress of the argument is therefore thrown upon the shoulders of Paul; and, of course, Paul can bear it.

From the same standpoint Loofs is equally sure that the life of Jesus was not a natural human life, and he devotes three of his six lectures (the second, third and fourth) to making this clear against the current "Liberal" contentions. The "Liberal" thinkers, he shows, starting with the presupposition that Jesus' life must needs have been a purely human life have found it impossible to sustain themselves on that ground. They come in the end inevitably to one or the other of these two conclusions—either that "we know next to nothing about Jesus", or that "Jesus was a religious enthusiast". And neither conclusion is tenable in the face of what we most surely know about Jesus, namely that "there was a growing community shortly after the death of Jesus which highly revered Jesus, and which must, therefore, have had a lively interest in his words and deeds", and that the most surely genuine words of Jesus that have come down to us are certainly not the words of a fanatic. Then taking up the "Liberal"

assumption that Jesus exhibited nothing above the measure of a man in life on its merits, Loofs shows that Jesus certainly was conscious of something that was more than human within Him; that His immediate followers recognized something that was more than human in Him; and that this faith of the earliest community has been verified by the experience of multitudes since. "History", he says impressively, "does not know of any community in those primitive times that saw in Jesus merely the teacher and the exemplar of Christian faith. To the earliest Christians too, Jesus was an object of their belief. Paul also assumed that all Christians prayed to Christ. He characterized the Christians as people *who call upon the name of Jesus Christ*" (p. 148). Still more impressively, he says: "Science has to respect realities. And it is a reality that the faith in Jesus the Saviour has been a power in history, and still is a power in the world up to the present day. Historical science cannot do justice to the sources with its assumption that the life of Jesus was a purely human life. It cannot draw a credible picture of Jesus. But the faith of all time carries a picture in its heart which has its prototype in the Jesus of the Gospels and in his own self-consciousness" (p. 160).

But from his standpoint Loofs is also bound to declare that the conviction of His church that Jesus Christ is really (*realiter*) God as well as man is also untenable. He argues against this conviction in his fifth lecture,—on three grounds: first, "rational logic" condemns it; secondly, it is not in accord with New Testament views; and thirdly, it is a product of Greek philosophy. Under the first of these heads he urges that the incarnation of only a single person of the Trinity is unthinkable, that it is meaningless to say God could become flesh, that incarnation of a person of the Trinity breaks up the Trinity—if there be such a thing as a Trinity. Under the second head he pleads that the Scriptures know nothing of a Son of God before the incarnation; that they know nothing of the Trinity; that they give to Jesus a human, not divine personality; that they attribute to Him a human development; and that they present Him as in organic connection with the human race. Under the third head he endeavors to trace the origin in the church of the doctrines of the Trinity and the Two-Natures of Christ as the product of philosophical thought impressing Greek conceptions upon the simple Christian facts.

Having thus disposed of all possible rival views, Loofs has little difficulty, in his last lecture, by means of a rapid survey of the efforts of recent theorizers in this field to present a valid conception of Christ—from the Kenotists, of whom he speaks with deserved contempt to their opposites, the Dörnerites—in arriving at last at the enunciation of his own right-wing Ritschlianism as the pure product of the age-long thinking of the church concerning the nature of its Lord. He is not a God who has been made into a man and He is not a man who has been made into a God; He is a man in whom God so dwells that in Him we see the unique revelation of God and through Him we are redeemed to God. It is to Loofs' credit that he does not seem fully

satisfied with this formula, as we certainly are not; he seems to hold to it only as a kind of safe middle-way, walking in which he may avoid the crass humanizing of Christ and the crass deifying of Him which he conceives is done respectively by the "Liberals" and the "Orthodox". Perhaps we may admit that it is as near the truth as one can come who has lost the guidance of the authoritative Scriptures and is thrown back for the conception he will form of Christ upon general considerations, interpreted under the guidance of modern chariness of the supernatural.

There are many points which are incidentally discussed in the course of Loofs' argument to some of which we would like to advert.

There is, for example, the picture of the state of present-day German thought in the field of Christology which he gives, in allusions throughout the lectures indeed, but chiefly in the last lecture. He tells us that the doctrine of the Two Natures has perished out of German academical circles (p. 202); Philippi (†1882) was the last recognized theologian who taught it. He tells us again that the Kenotic speculation, if it has not yet quite died out, has nevertheless "been pushed pretty far back" (p. 223). He expresses wonder that it has been taken up by English writers just as it is dying out in Germany; "in Sweden too", he slyly remarks, "it was confidently defended as late as 1903 by Oskar Bensow",—as, we may add, it was in Germany too as late as 1902 by Alexander von Oettingen. Other mediating views, whether, like those of Johannes Kunze and Erich Schäfer, echoes of Kenoticism, or, like those of Martin Kähler and Reinhold Seeberg, echoes of Dörnerism, he evidently thinks have no general significance. All "learned" Germany is given over, in a word, to humanitarianism and divides only on the question whether the man Jesus shall be thought of as a special organ of God (the "Mediatorial Christology", in the nomenclature of Otto Kirn), or merely as a God-seeking man (Kirn's "Prophetic Christology"). Loofs' own view is the former; but he does not glose the wide extension of the latter, to which Jesus Christ is but the first Christian. It will be well for us to bear in mind that thus "learned" Germany has pretty much as a body fallen away from the Divine Christ.

It is interesting to observe the decision with which Loofs wishes to separate himself from the extreme schools of "Liberalism", as in their Christology, so also in their methods of criticism. He recognizes that their aim is to prove the life of Jesus to be a merely natural human life (p. 3), and he fully recognizes that this aim is not only wrong in itself but has been sought by most reprehensible critical methods. He thus sweeps the extreme radical criticism out of the way at one blow, as thoroughly prejudiced and untrustworthy: "judging by what I understand by historical method", he remarks, "such criticism is historically unjustifiable because it violates the sources instead of doing justice to them" (p. 112). It is particularly interesting to observe the judgment he passes on the currently employed canons of historical criticism, as they are enunciated say, by Heitmüller or somewhat more extremely by P. W. Schmiedel. "Critics", says he (pp. 114 sq.), "have

tried to introduce rules for picking out the genuine words [of Jesus]. As a basis, says Heitmüller, we have to take all the materials that are not in accordance with the belief, theology, worship, and customs of the ancient Christian community, or, at any rate, do not completely agree with it. We may absolutely trust all this and everything that is organically united therewith. On the other hand, we must pass the verdict 'not genuine' whenever a story or a word agrees too obviously with the thoughts and customs and the dogmatic and eschatological wants of the later community. This sounds very circumspect, and certainly contains correct ideas. . . . Yet we cannot make use of this canon as a general rule. For, in the first place, if we consider with how much freedom tradition treated the words of Jesus (as we can see on many occasions) we shall not at all expect a word of Jesus in the Gospels which does not agree with the belief of the reporter. If we interpret any word in this way we have to fear that we misinterpret it. And, secondly, it would be contrary to all sound knowledge if we suspected those words of Jesus which agree most obviously with the belief of the ancient Christians simply for this reason. For there was no greater authority for these Christians than Jesus. We are also in practice brought to evident absurdities if we apply this rule. . . ." Of course this deliverance is not free from the "halbheit" which is inherent in Loofs' whole attitude—as it is in that of the entire school to which he belongs. But on account of this very "halbheit" of his attitude, his adverse judgment on the validity of the critical canon upon which, in point of fact, the entire case of the reconstruction of the evangelical narrative in the naturalistic interest hangs, is valuable (*cf.* THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, April, 1913; pp. 254 *sq.*).

But perhaps the most interesting element in these lectures is the intimation given, in suggestions here and there, of the basis on which Loofs founds his historical judgments on the one hand and his dogmatic conclusions on the other. There are involved here a doctrine of the nature of historical science, and a doctrine of the validity of judgments of faith, both of which attract attention and perhaps also criticism.

Loofs commits himself to a purely naturalistic conception of History. "History", says he ((pp. 81 *sq.*) "has to reckon with the analogy from other experience. . . . Everything that is impossible according to all our experience is to be put aside as being unhistorical. For historical research has to make clear in its genetic connection what happened in the past; and, as measure for what is possible, it has to employ our experience. . . . Where we cannot find any cause which, according to our experience, is possible, then every conscientious historian is prevented from speaking of a historical fact. Hence, when historians are forced by credible reports to recognize a fact as having really occurred, they must assume causes lying within the sphere of our experience." This is the precise position relatively to "history" which our naturalists occupy relatively to "science". "Nature", for example,

says Huxley (*Hume*, p. 129), "means neither more nor less than that which is; the sum of phenomena presented to our experience; the totality of events past, present and to come. Every event must be taken to be part of nature, until proof to the contrary is supplied. And such proof is, from the nature of the case, impossible." "In truth," he adds, applying his doctrine, "If a dead man did come to life, the fact would be evidence not that any law of nature had been violated, but that these laws, even when they express the results of a very long and uniform experience, are necessarily based on incomplete knowledge, and are to be held only on grounds of more or less justifiable expectation." We do not know what may happen to-morrow but we know that whatever happens—either to-day or to-morrow—is "natural", and we must simply assume for it and search out its appropriate natural cause. So, Loofs intimates, we do not know except by testimony what happened yesterday; but as historians, we must assume that all that happened yesterday happened in accordance with "nature" as known to our experience, and we must seek a cause for it "lying within the sphere of our experience". This is a purely naturalistic conception of "history", and will permit "history" to record as fact only the "natural".

This naturalistic conception of history Loofs of course applies to the history of Christ. "From this," he writes (p. 83), "it follows that historical science, when investigating the life of Jesus, must take into consideration the supposition that it was a purely human life and that nothing happened in it which falls outside the sphere of human experience. Giving up this supposition would mean admitting that the life of Jesus, or this or that event in his life, is incommensurable for historical science." "Historical science, therefore, is not only allowed, but also obliged, to explain the conviction of the resurrection of Jesus from causes lying within the sphere of natural human experience" (p. 84). "As long as a historian does not declare his science incompetent, he must look for a natural explanation of the faith of the disciples. No description of the life of Jesus that recognizes supernatural factors is purely historical" (p. 84). If this means anything, it means that from the point of view of "historical science", Jesus *must* be explained, in all the elements of his manifestation, as a purely natural phenomenon, transcending in nothing the experience of ordinary men. Loofs does not in the least, however, believe that Jesus can be so explained. But instead of inferring from this that his definition of historical science is wrong and correcting it accordingly, he simply proclaims Jesus as a "supernatural" phenomenon. The "unhistorical" can, it seems, have been actual, because we elect to define the "historical" as the "natural", and to remove out of the province of historical science all that is above nature. Thus "the science of history" is set upon a task which is *ab initio* proclaimed impossible: it *must* explain all that has occurred on natural grounds; but all that has occurred is, in point of fact, not explicable on natural grounds. The fundamental assumption on which "the science of history" proceeds is therefore false, and history is necessarily in conflict with faith.

To avoid this conflict, Loofs demands that in a case like that of Jesus historical science, instead of pressing its claims, must just abrogate its function. That Jesus as He was manifested in the actual life He lived lies outside the sphere of history, Loofs is therefore explicit in affirming. Before Him "historical science" must declare itself incompetent. If we undertake to write a life of Jesus, we are "forced to suppose that his life was a purely human one". Since His life, however, in point of fact was not a purely human one, all that "historical science" can do with respect to Him is to stand aside (p. 88). It may give from its sources evidence to this or that of the doings and sayings of Jesus, but it is beyond its power to give us an account of Jesus. When it attempts to give an account of Jesus it finds itself, with its instrument of research, viz., the analogy of our own experience, before an impossible task: the Jesus of the sources is not a purely natural Jesus. There is nothing for historical science to do, therefore, but to draw back from the problem of Jesus and to hand it over to the judgment of faith. The one thing that must not be done is to mix the two matters. "An author treating his subject in some chapters as a historian would do, but elsewhere emancipating himself from the analogy of human experience, will produce a mixture of history and assertions of faith. And in my opinion this combination of heterogeneous modes of consideration is to be welcomed neither by a believing Christian nor by a scholarly historian" (pp. 84-5). It is then not on the ground of historical science but solely on the ground of the assertions of faith that we know that there is something divine about Jesus. This is not to be taken as meaning, however, we are assured, that we can affirm on the ground of faith that which historical science declares not to have been actual: though how "historical science" as defined can refrain from declaring all that transcends the natural not actual it is hard to see. What it means, we are told, is only that we may, or must, affirm on the ground of faith what historical science is incompetent to declare on the ground of experience to be actual. "Historical science can as little conceive Jesus correctly as natural science can appreciate God correctly. Its method cannot reach up to Him" (p. 100). Historical science stands before Jesus therefore helpless and we must call in the judgments of faith or remain forever incapable of understanding Jesus. We have no other instrument.

Nevertheless we do not thus escape after all wholly from history. The judgment of faith as to Jesus, we are told, is given to us partly in the records of the New Testament: for the records of the New Testament are testimonies of the faith of primitive Christian times. Their records, however, combine historical facts about Jesus and beliefs of the community which He founded concerning Him. They already mix, therefore, historical knowledge and the assertions of faith. We cannot, of course, accept that mixture out of hand as the truth. Historical knowledge and the assertions of faith must indeed be combined in our conclusions as to what Jesus really was and is: but this combination must be of our own—not of another's—convictions of

faith with historical truths if it is to be valid (p. 205). "Historical research shows us a number of traits in the historical Jesus which it cannot combine into a homogeneous picture on the basis of its pre-suppositions." "Historical science, which is forced to recognize the analogy of human experience, is therefore, in the case of Jesus, placed before a dilemma. It must either reduce the notices about the self-consciousness of Jesus to such an extent that they fit into the frame of a purely human life; or it must declare itself incompetent to speak the last word on this question; that is, it must be satisfied with a frank acknowledgement of the existence of these heterogeneous elements which it cannot combine, and must then leave it to the other, not purely historical, observation to unite the heterogeneous elements into one uniform whole" (p. 207). It is faith and faith only which can effect this combination. The experiences of faith which are "the common property of riper Christians of all ages" become thus the key to the interpretation of Jesus. These experiences certainly include the ineradicable conviction that in Jesus Christ we have a unique revelation of God: and with it a revelation of what we may through His revelation of God to us, become. "Faith will, therefore, have to oppose the science of history, if the latter, unwilling to recognize that Jesus stands beyond the reach of its standards, thinks it has to eliminate those traits in the picture of Jesus which surpass the ordinary bounds of human life. Faith will have to claim—and it has a right to do so—that historical science shall acknowledge that it cannot say the last word about Jesus. Faith and the seemingly contradictory traits in the picture of Jesus which historical science can show—those truly human and those surpassing human bonds—these two support one another" (p. 218). Here is the triumph of faith over "historical science" manifested.

In reviewing this statement of principles we cannot fail to marvel at the sharp discrimination between the science of history and the assertions of faith which it insists upon. There is no reason whatever for defining history at the outset naturalistically and therefore committing it to the discovery of a purely natural Jesus. It is surely the function of history to discern and portray what actually was, not to describe the past in terms of natural law. There is no more reason for describing the judgments of faith in so exclusively a subjective fashion, lest we sublimate them into mere fancies. We should be the last to deny that Christian experience has its convincing testimony to bring to the deity of the Lord. But we think it important to make it clear from the outset that Christian experience is an experience of realities. I may well doubt whether I am not trusting to a fevered dream when a wild-eyed starving man tells me of the feasts that have been spread for him and which he is daily enjoying; but when, amid a starving population, one who is obviously sleek and well-fed tells of the provision made for our needs by good people to whom he would direct us, the benefits he has already received become the best evidence of the truth of his story. The effects of Christ in the world and in the individual, in the regulation

of lives and society, are valid proofs of His claims and power. No one would neglect them. But there is no need—or propriety—in setting them in opposition to the “historical evidence” of His claims and power, as the sole proof of their truth. In point of fact they are themselves just historical evidences, along with the other forms of historical evidence, and lead us not merely to a conviction of faith, but to a historical judgment. That is no true “historical science” which in forming its historical judgments fails to take account of the effects of historical events or personalities. And if these effects are of a supernatural order it belongs to historical science to assume for them a supernatural cause emerging in history, on pain of ceasing to be historical *science*. For science means causal thinking, and causal thinking means the discovery and validation of *adequate* causes. The Divine Christ is not merely a fact of faith, but a fact of history; and it is not history but a *a priori* reconstruction of history in the interest of an erroneous world-view which would eliminate Him from history and relegate Him to the realm of faith alone. That Loofs reacts from this extreme view is to his credit: that he reacts only partially is only a part of that fatal “halbheit” which vitiates all the reasonings of the whole school to which he belongs and of which he is one of the chief ornaments. The “assertions of faith” are not to be set over against the findings of “historical science” to correct them; they are to be made part of the evidence on which “historical science” depends for its findings and are to coöperate with whatever other evidence “historical science” has at its disposal in rendering beyond all question the historical fact of the Divine Christ, who is given to us on the ground of a great variety of historical evidence, only one item of which is found in our own experiences of His reality and power.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

The Rule of Faith, being the Baird Lecture for 1905. By the Rev. W. P. PATERSON, D.D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh. London and New York: Hodder and Stoughton. 1912. Crown 8vo; pp. x, 439.

The range of Dr. Paterson's discussion in his Baird lectures, now published in this attractive volume, will scarcely be suggested to the average reader by the title he has given them,—*The Rule of Faith*. He considers himself entitled to subsume the whole under this title, however, because of a certain ambiguity attaching to it, due to its divergent use in Patristic and in Protestant Theology. In the early ages of the church “the Rule of Faith” (or “the Rule of Truth”) was the designation given to the common fundamental faith of the Church, as drawn out from Scripture and expressed in a succinct formula, say for example, the Baptismal Creed. By their harmony with this standard of teaching the orthodoxy of all theological constructions was estimated. In the Post-Reformation controversies, on the other hand, “the Rule of Faith” is the designation given to the proximate authoritative source of Christian knowledge, from the

teaching of which alone what is genuinely Christian doctrine is to be ascertained. In the former usage the substance of Christian doctrine, in the latter the seat of Christian doctrine is called "the Rule of Faith"; and by this circumstance Dr. Paterson considers he is given a certain justification in employing the term as the general title of a series of lectures in which both the seat and the substance of doctrine are discussed. There is, however, a deeper justification of Dr. Paterson's procedure here than can be provided by the mere ambiguity of a term. As a result of his discussion of the seat of Christian doctrine, Dr. Paterson arrives at the conclusion that the seat of Christian doctrine lies really in the substance of Christian doctrine; so that the discussion of the seat of doctrine necessarily involves in it the discussion of the substance of doctrine, and any discussion of the Rule of Faith in the former sense must include both topics. The bald announcement of this conclusion has undoubtedly a paradoxical sound. That is, however, Dr. Paterson's concern, not ours; and it must be conceded to him that if he does actually find the seat of Christian doctrine in the substance of Christian doctrine, then he must discuss under the head of "the Rule of Faith" not merely the seat but the substance of Christian doctrine, and he is from his own point of view justified in dividing his lectures on "the Rule of Faith" into these two main topics, and, indeed, in giving the larger share of the discussion to the topic of the substance of Christian doctrine. This is in point of fact what he does. So that what we find in the volume before us is a parallel discussion of first, the seat of doctrine (pp. 31-173), and secondly, the substance of doctrine (pp. 177-396); to which there is added a series of illustrative appendices (pp. 397-428), and an Index (pp. 429-439).

Whatever we may think of the cardinal decision by which the question of the seat of Christian doctrine is transferred to the question of the substance of Christian doctrine (and we have no wish to conceal the fact that we do not think well of it), the reader of the volume profits by the inclusion in it of the rich discussions upon the substance of Christian doctrine which Dr. Paterson gives us. Decidedly it is here that Dr. Paterson is at his best. His method is historico-critical. He passes in review, in turn, the Orthodox—that is to say, the Patristic—Interpretation of Christianity, the Genius of Roman Catholicism, the Gospel of Protestantism, the Distinctive Testimony of the Reformed Churches, the Rationalistic Theology, the Theology of Schleiermacher, and the Ritschlian Revision, endeavoring on each occasion to fix the conception of Christianity presented and to estimate it as an attempt to set forth Christianity in its substance. The order pursued is in each case to begin with a careful exposition of the view under scrutiny, then in a few sentences to point out in general its excellences, and antithetically its shortcomings, and only after this to enter into detailed criticisms. It is doubtless an old-fashioned method of conducting a discussion, and a certain air of formality hangs around it; but it contributes a singular tone of judicial balance to the discussion, which combines with Dr. Paterson's scrupulous care

as an expositor and the very unusual insight which he displays in his criticisms to render the whole a very attractive piece of exposition. The effect is heightened by the plain, clear, penetrating style in which the whole is written, and the independence and sturdy common-sense of the point of view which suggests that rather of the experienced man of affairs than of the pedantic scholar poring over his texts.

No doubt part differs from part both in lucidity and in satisfactoriness, and curiously enough the power of the discussion appears to increase steadily as it progresses. On the whole the least satisfactory section is that on the Patristic Theology where the great doctrines of the Trinity and the Person of Christ come under consideration. On both doctrines Dr. Paterson seems to waver somewhat and to be not altogether free from confusion of mind: he even goes so far as to suggest in the one case whether the question of tritheism might not be hopefully reopened, while in the other he seems to be almost inclined, though without full satisfaction, to seek refuge in the Kenotic theory, pronouncing it (in its moderate form) "the only possible interpretation of the Person of Christ", *provided*,—provided, that is, that we believe both in the preëxistence of the Son of God and the true humanity of Jesus. In sharp contrast with this fumbling touch on matters of the highest concernment, the sections on the Rationalistic Theology, the Theology of Schleiermacher, and the Ritschlian Revision leave little to be desired. The exposition here is sympathetic and adequate and the criticism fundamental and full of weight. A passage like the following (p. 363), goes indeed to the root of matters; and the reader may be pardoned if he wonders before he finishes the work, whether Dr. Paterson has kept these wise words in mind for his own guidance. "But a religious theory which, by whatever path, brings us back to the imperfect self as the ground of our confidence violates what may well be felt to be an axiom of the Christian religion. Our deepest spiritual need is to look away from what has been divinely and graciously wrought in ourselves to a ground of confidence which is wholly of God, and perfectly worthy of God; and it is a mark of theological decadence to disturb religious assurance by transferring the gaze to the humiliated and imprisoned Christ that is discernible in the experiences even of the most Christ-like of those who have entered on the new life." In general one gets the impression that Dr. Paterson's touch is steadiest and his modeling firmest when he is dealing with recent thought, especially if it is of German origin, and particularly if it lies in the region of soteriology rather than in that of theology proper.

It perhaps ought not to be a matter of surprise therefore that we find the section on the "Testimony of the Reformed Churches" unwontedly good. It breaks down, indeed, only when it faces the doctrine of preterition (pp. 311 ff.), and it breaks down there apparently only because it fails to realize with sufficient poignancy what sin is and its deserts, and reasons as if the salvation of all were a question of merely the power of God: God has power enough to

save all; if, then, He does not, there must be some flaw in His love. The obstacle of justice is not realized. Dr. Paterson can see but two ways out: either, on the one hand, in an Arminian or semi-Arminian modification (which obviously he shrinks from as fundamentally wrong), or else in a doctrine of universal salvation (which, apparently, with the late Dr. Hastie, he inclines to). The difficulty is, however, purely artificial, and is wholly due to the practical elimination of the element of justice from the conception of the Divine character. It is not difficult to understand why a just God does not save all sinners; the difficulty is to understand how a just God saves any sinners. It is precisely this difficulty which Christianity meets, and if neither the difficulty is felt nor the manner in which Christianity meets it appreciated,—then Christianity is not understood, and we have substituted for it in our thought of it something which is essentially different.

Dr. Paterson, it must be borne in mind, has introduced this discussion of the substance of Christianity as part of a discussion of the seat of Christianity. He has reached the conclusion that the seat of Christianity is found in the substance of Christianity, and so passes into the discussion of the latter topic. We seem to be entitled to obtain from him in these circumstances, a clear exposition of that substance of Christianity which is to stand as its norm. We do not feel that we receive it. A very illuminating discussion of the several main views of the nature of Christianity which have ruled in the Church is given us, and from that discussion we may infer what Dr. Paterson thinks Christianity to be. The impression we gain thus of his own conception of Christianity is in general reassuring: but we should hardly be justified in drawing out from this criticism of others a positive statement of what should be held to be so of the essence of Christianity that it should stand as its substantial norm, to which in all its details Christianity must conform on pain of being no longer Christianity. The short opening chapter of this section of the book, entitled, "The Nature of the Christian Religion", deals only in certain wide notions, which Dr. Paterson no doubt gathers up into a formal definition of Christianity (p. 199 note), but which he certainly would not himself, if we are to judge by the drift of the whole discussion, consider to embody the substance of Christianity in sufficient detail to enable it to stand as the norm of what Christianity is. On his own showing Christianity necessarily contains much more than is here set down to its credit. Neither do we get any clear light from the short concluding chapter. There no doubt we are told in general what Christianity is like, and some of the things which have been attached to it without being of it, and are assured again that there is "a groundwork of the Christian religion" which is present in all its divergent forms. But there again no serious attempt is made to extract this "groundwork" and set it plainly before us, that we may see precisely what Christianity in its essence is, persistent in all its genuine forms, the presence of which is Christianity,

and the absence of which is the absence of Christianity. On the face of it, Dr. Paterson seems to have left his task incomplete. His main undertaking was to present us with the Christian rule of faith. He intimates that this rule of faith lies ultimately in the substance of the Christian faith. And then he leaves this substance of the Christian faith only vaguely indicated, with shadowy boundaries on this side and that.

It seems to be time that we should revert, therefore, to the main question. The main question which Dr. Paterson invites us to consider is the question of the Christian "Rule of Faith". This he himself explains (p. 4) to mean, "in brief", the question of "what is the proximate source from which we collect the special Christian knowledge which is held to be derived from God as its primary source, and how is this source known to be trustworthy". Primarily, therefore, the question before us is, what is the source of our knowledge of Christian truth. Now, Dr. Paterson tells us, many answers have been given to this question in the Christian Church. The Roman Catholics have their answer. It runs in brief: the Word of God, as contained in Scripture plus tradition, as interpreted by the Church, speaking through its infallible organ, the Pope. The Protestants have their answer. In direct opposition to the Roman Catholic (and on the other hand to the Mystical) view, it runs: the Word of God as contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. The Mystics have their answer. They appeal to the Word of God, spoken directly to the soul of each man. The Rationalists have their answers. They appeal to the primal endowment of man with reason as the adequate source of knowledge of divine things. Professor Patterson passes all these answers in review, and then for the sake of completeness adds two additional chapters, in the one of which he investigates the attempt to find in spontaneous religious feeling the norm of all religious truth, and in the other, the attempt to find the norm of Christian truth not in the Scriptures as a whole, but in some particular portion of the Scriptural content. With this last view in general, which Professor Paterson calls "Biblical Eclecticism", he expresses his own sympathy. The Rule of Faith is therefore to be found, according to Professor Paterson, not in the Church nor in the Reason, not in the Inner Word, nor in the Feelings, but in the Scriptures: but not in the Scriptures as a whole but in a certain portion of the Scriptural contents isolated by him as "the substance of Christianity". Thus he draws us away from the Scriptures as such and invites us to attend, as "the Seat of Christianity", rather to the "substance of Christianity" as transmitted to us in the Scriptures.

The justification which Dr. Paterson offers for deserting the Protestant doctrine of the Rule of Faith is, brusquely put, that the Scriptures, in their full extent, are not a trustworthy source of Christian truth. They contain a human element of ignorance and error; and they teach differently in different portions so that no single system of either doctrine or morals can be extracted from

them. It is then simply impossible to make them in their entirety the authoritative rule of faith: no man can possibly believe all they teach. The way for rejecting the authority of Scripture in its entirety as the source of truth is prepared by the contention that in point of fact Scripture never was in its entirety the rule of faith to anyone. The Reformers themselves practically used as the rule of faith not the whole Bible but a selected portion of the Bible, a Bible within the Bible: and we are entitled to do no less. We shall not stay to refute either of these very refutable propositions. It is enough for us to note that on their support what Dr. Paterson proposes for us to do is to find the source of our knowledge of what Christianity is, not in the Scriptures as such but rather in a certain body of contents which has been transmitted to us by Scripture. He seems to be under the impression that he does not thus desert the Protestant doctrine of the rule of faith, but only modifies it: not all Scripture but some Scripture is, he intimates, his formula. This is, however, plainly an illusion. He no longer appeals to Scripture at all as authority. What he appeals to is a certain sum of truths selected out of Scripture on the authority of something extraneous to Scripture. The most that can be said for Scripture is that it is the vehicle in which—along with much else—the items of Christian knowledge which in their sum constitute Christianity are conveyed to us. What assures us that these are genuine items of Christian knowledge is not that they are found in Scripture, but that they are gathered out of the heap of things found in Scripture by quite another magnet.

The magnet by which these items of Christian knowledge are gathered out of the dust heap of Scripture is sometimes described as spiritual tact (pp. 98, 170). This is explained to mean that the divine message that is in Scripture is "self-authenticating to those who meet it with a trustful mind and an obedient will" (pp. 76-7). When the need of a deeper ground of confidence is felt, it is found in "the testimony of the Holy Spirit" (pp. 70, 164, 165). And when something more objective is desiderated, a pragmatic test is suggested (p. 169). Perhaps no fuller statement is given than that embodied in the eloquent closing words of the volume, where we are told that Christianity has an absolute persuasion of its central doctrinal content, "which forms the soul and power of the Christian religion". The grounds of this full persuasion are suggested in the following series of sentences: "It passes down from generation to generation under the protection of experience and of God. It is accredited afresh from age to age by the fact that it is an engine for doing spiritual work of the most valuable kind, and that those who make use of it find that it makes good its promises. It is also authenticated by a conviction of its truth wrought in the hearts of those who live by it, which shows such strength, tenacity and energizing activity that they confidently interpret it as a gift of God through the testimony of the Holy Ghost" (p. 395). If we may venture to subject words which are so suffused with lofty feeling to a logical analysis, we may per-

haps be permitted to distinguish here three lines of evidence which, according to Professor Paterson, converge to give the Christian confidence in the central doctrinal content of Christianity. There is first the evidence from experience: the Christian has made trial of these truths and found in them salvation, and he perceives himself to be but one of a long series of men and women extending through the ages who have had the same blessed experience. The central truths of Christianity authenticate themselves and have always authenticated themselves by their blessed effects in human hearts. There is secondly the evidence of the observation of the effects of Christianity in the world,—the pragmatic proof: Christianity has transformed the world and continues to transform it wherever it is embraced—it obviously “works”. From a hint let drop (on p. 387), we may presume that Dr. Paterson has in mind here only the effects wrought *in the world*, in the amelioration of social conditions; and is not speaking “from an eschatological point of view”. And then, lastly, there is the “testimony of the Holy Spirit”, that is to say, as apparently expounded here (it is differently expounded elsewhere), a conviction of the truth of the central doctrinal content of Christianity arising in the soul, of such “strength, tenacity and energising activity” as suggests powerfully that it is God-given. On these three grounds, then, Christians are convinced that Christianity is true, in its central content. And in this central content they have in their hands a Rule of Faith. Whatever enters into this “central content”, that is Christianity. Whatever lies outside this “central content”, may or may not be true, may or may not be valuable; it is not of the essence of faith, and no one need be asked to believe it that he may be a Christian.

Surely no one will doubt that Christianity continuously authenticates itself by its blessed effects. And surely no one will doubt that we know that that is true Christianity which thus continuously authenticates itself by its effects. We may conceivably learn what is true Christianity therefore by analysis of that Christianity which “works”. Whatever is necessarily involved in the effects may be confidently assumed in the cause. Give me but the one assured fact, indeed, that I am saved through faith in Jesus Christ and make the content of this fact all that it really is in him who is really saved through faith in Jesus Christ, and I will draw out from this one fact by inference after inference—like the waves spreading out in ever increasing circles around a stone cast into the water—the entire body of the Calvinistic divinity. But that of course is only because unless the entire body of Calvinistic divinity were true I could not be saved through faith in Jesus Christ. Salvation by faith in Jesus Christ authenticates therefore the entire body of Calvinistic divinity. It surely will not do to tell me that my experience of salvation through faith in Jesus Christ authenticates nothing except my salvation through faith in Jesus Christ. I could not experience this salvation were not every thing true which is necessarily presupposed by it. But neither will it do to tell me that I can know the truth of these things only by inference back from this experience.

It might be truer to say that I will never have this experience until I know the truth of all these things at least implicitly. So long as I am not convinced of the truth of these things I shall never make experiment of salvation through faith in Jesus Christ. Shall I not ask, Who is He, Lord, that I may believe on Him? Shall I not argue, How shall they call on Him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in Him whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach except they be sent? Must I not have the knowledge before I exercise the faith, through which I gain the experience I am to analyse? And where am I to get this knowledge? This is the problem of the Rule of Faith. It is the question of the source of the knowledge acting on which I may be saved. It is all very well to tell a man that he may know his pump is a good one if it brings the water, and that he may learn therefore what kind of a pump is a good one by the simple experiment of trying all pumps and seeing which of them bring the water. That a pump brings the water is quite evidently proof enough that it is a good pump. But where will he find pumps that will bring water to him, unless the principles of suction on which alone pumps that will bring water must be constructed, are understood beforehand? The question is, on what rules shall pumps be constructed that they may bring water? And the question is on what rule shall the "Christianity" be constructed that will save? We can derive the one no more than the other from "experience". Theory precedes practice.

Professor Paterson has, in a word, lost sight of his problem in the course of his argumentation. His task is not to prove the truth of the Christian religion. His task is to point out whence we obtain knowledge of what the Christian religion consists of. That the Christian religion "works" is a very important fact: but the Christian religion must exist before it "works". It was brought into the world before it "worked", and it has "worked" on those who have never seen it "work" before, and who could not have learned its nature first from its "working". We may indeed be told, Try it and you will find that it will "work". Try what? Must we not be told what it is we are to try? And why should we try it on the mere chance of its "working?" Obviously we need an authoritative source of information as to what Christianity is, and the problem of that source is the problem of the Rule of Faith.

What Dr. Paterson has done is to shift the source of information from an objective to a subjective basis. For the "Schriftprinzip" of Protestantism he has substituted a "Geistprinzip"; and what he tells us in effect is merely that we may be sure that true Christianity is what we find effective Christianity to be: beyond that circle of truths which we find effective we need not bother ourselves. But thus we are cast upon a wide and uncertain sea and that utterly without chart, loadstar, or rudder. We must settle for ourselves what it is we would have done. We must settle for ourselves that this is effectively done. We must settle for ourselves what it is that

has done it. We must, in a word, invent our own Christianity. Professor Paterson merely takes his place in the great company of modern subjective writers in this matter. And so far as we have been able to see, despite the superior sanity of his judgment in passing on the several doctrines and the varying constructions which come before him, he has nothing to offer us in the way of a Rule of Faith superior to what other subjective writers have previously offered us. There is much in his book that is useful and admirably said; but it leaves us wholly without an objectively valid Rule of Faith. It is a great thing to know that there is a Christianity which propagates itself down the ages and "does its work", blessing the lives of men, filling them with deathless hope, assuring them of the favor of God. But when we ask what this Christianity producing all these great effects is,—what are its precise contents, what is its extent, what enters into it giving it its full power and ensuring its stability,—Professor Paterson can help us very little. He can only say: I can point you to some things which certainly stand at its center. But where can we learn it in its whole extent? This is the problem of the Rule of Faith, and it is an important problem; and Professor Paterson has no guidance to give us as to its solution.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

The Glory After the Passion. A study of the events in the life of our Lord from His Descent into Hell to His Enthronement in Heaven. By the REV. JAMES S. STONE, D.D., Rector of St. James's Church, Chicago. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1913. Pp. 393.

This is the third volume of the series projected by the author. The first, *The Prayer Before The Passion*, was reviewed in these pages in October 1911. The second was entitled, *The Passion of Christ*. It is understood that the author is engaged at present on *The Preparation For The Passion*, in which he will deal with the question of the Pre-incarnate State of Our Lord, His Birth and His Earthly Ministry. The volume before us, like those preceding it, is written continuously, without the usual divisions into chapters, but, in the course of it, he covers the doctrine of Immortality, The Descent into Hell, The Resurrection, The Forty Days, The Ascension, The Session at the Right Hand of God, The Heavenly Priesthood and The Intercession. Another volume will deal with The Return of our Lord in Glory, The Resurrection of the Dead, The Judgment and the events which are to follow.

Dr. Stone is fully aware of the difficulty of his present task arising out of the tendencies of thought in our day (p. 375 ff). Modern conditions do not afford time for reflection. Churches are not without displays of energy but music and ritual are substitutes for devotion while philanthropy, building and mending civic and social conditions pass now for religion. The spirit of the age calls for action, not thought; for physical enterprise not for spiritual culture. "It is not the hardness of the doctrines that stands in the way but the trouble

it takes to think of them." Accordingly, it has become common that the events which befell our Lord after His Crucifixion are passed over as of no such consequence as His earthly life and those things which He did for the good of man while in the flesh. Yet the Gospel of the Apostles and Evangelists was based, not on the Sermon on the Mount nor upon any ethical teaching but on the fact that Jesus of Nazareth had risen from the dead. The Resurrection is the fundamental principle of Christianity. "Without this fact, there is no such religion as Christianity. The name loses its life and stands for nothing" (p. 383). In this analysis of present-day thought, Dr. Stone will be followed closely by everyone who interprets aright the Gospel and it is a hopeful sign that one so well prepared in mind and in heart has undertaken the task.

The volume opens with a clear recognition of the widely-spread disbelief in a life or consciousness after death (p. 7), involving the primary questions of the Future Life and of the nature of the Ego. The author shows that faith in a life after death has been universal among the nations and he well says that this faith, if worsted in argument, falls back on intuition and that that intuition remains firm and impregnable (p. 13). The mere fact of the other world, however, is not in itself sufficient and men inevitably will speculate upon its nature and upon the state of the dead, the primary distinction recognized being that given by the moral sense, namely as between the good and the evil. This, of course, suggests to the average man the need of preparation for that future state. Greater interest has been felt in the regions of torment than in the conception of Heaven. Dante's *Inferno*, for example, "is made as definite as an Ordnance map" (p. 23). Yet, despite this well-nigh universal belief, it was not easy in the days of our Lord, nor is it now, to secure the acceptance of the events which happened immediately after the Crucifixion, the difficulty arising not so much from the question as to their possibility as from the want of sufficient evidence. For this reason, Dr. Stone thinks there is needed some bias or tendency towards these truths and he deems Mysticism as helpful, when viewed as "an intuition, an instinctive, immediate apprehension" that "does not run contrary to reason and the senses" (p. 27). Mysticism, thus defined, seems to be put here instead of that spiritual apprehension of heavenly things, wrought in believers by the power of the Holy Spirit, triumphing over temperament, guiding our natural apprehensions and producing conviction in the minds of the most prosaic of men. Elsewhere, however, Dr. Stone distinctively recognizes the work of the Holy Spirit.

What impresses us as the unique feature of Dr. Stone's present volume is summed up in the opening sentence of his discussion of the Glory of our Lord:

In the Descent into Hell appears the beginning of that triumph of Jesus Christ which should increase, event after event and age after age, until the consummation, when the kingdoms of this world shall have become the Kingdom of our Lord and of His Christ (p. 33).

The author's purpose to exalt our Lord and to manifest His glory runs throughout the volume and none will admit this more readily than those who cannot accept all of his interpretations. The issue, of course, is joined in this opening sentence. Dr. Stone quotes the Westminster Catechism to show that our Lord continued under the power of death, but he overlooks the fact that the Westminster doctrine, which is the common evangelical doctrine, is that the Descensus was a part, the last stage, of the Humiliation of our Lord and not the first stage of His Glory. This primary difference colors the whole discussion. If the Descensus be the beginning of the Glory, it must be blessed, beautiful, glorious even as were the Resurrection and the Ascension and everything that suggests pain and shame and darkness must be put away as far as possible. This appears in nearly all of the striking passages in which Dr. Stone unfolds his interpretation. The following are examples:

In the Borderland of Hades, towards that Paradise into which Christ promised admittance to the penitent thief, may have been the hosts of saints of earlier dispensations waiting till the Christ should come to give them clearer light and greater happiness, waiting as "prisoners of hope" even as others less advanced in holiness than they, may have been retained in deeper gloom as "prisoners of fear". Some, too, may have been in that Underworld, who, like the multitudes swept away by the Flood, in this life, may not have heard or have apprehended the warnings addressed to them, in other words, may never have had a chance. These many sorts and conditions of men, uncondemned to eternal woe and yet incapable of heavenly joy, had no chance of release except through the victory of Christ.—That fringe or outskirts in Hades adjoining Paradise, in which the righteous waited for the coming of Christ before going into Heaven is called *Limbus Patrum*—The Borderland of the Fathers . . . Not into the Gehenna of condemned and lost souls did our blessed Lord descend, but into this realm of spirits waiting for redemption (p. 59-61).

Step by step, Dr. Stone unfolds this view and reverently points out the glory which he thinks it gives to our Lord. His view is what is known generally as the Patristic. Familiar as it is to students of Christian doctrine, it will be difficult to find anywhere a statement surpassing this one for the combination of reverence, self-restraint and tolerance. The effect upon the casual reader is likely to be that, after this, there is nothing more to be said and that the volume brings to the modern Church a great discovery. This makes it the more needful to consider the facts adduced by Dr. Stone and some others which he does not mention that thereby we may understand, as far as possible, the significance of that mysterious period in the history of our Lord.

Dr. Stone is careful to distinguish the doctrine of the Limbus, as he holds it from that of Purgatory or a Second Probation or a Universal Restitution. His moderation has excited severe criticism from high-Anglican reviewers in this country and in England. He frankly states that his view is "not an article of faith" (p. 61) and that no authority "binds the individual to accept any interpretation of a fact which the Church has not thought possible of a definition" (p. 95).

His conclusions, therefore, are all stated cautiously, as the expression of a hope rather than of an assured conviction, as what may be rather than as what is. He even entitles the climax of his discussion "a short journey into the wilderness of conjecture" (p. 96). There is, of course, good reason for this caution. While it is claimed that the early Church held this view of the Descensus, it is admitted by Dr. Stone that the article in the Apostle's Creed is a late addition used first in the Church of Aquileia and dating from about the fifth century. It appears further that, where the phrase occurs, there is no mention of the burial of Christ, as if the one phrase in some sense took the place of the other. Later creeds refrain from a definition of the Descensus. The question ought to be held as at best one for private judgment, although many of the writers quoted by Dr. Stone are not so cautious as he. Dean Alford, for example, is so fixed in his opinion that he lays it down as an ultimatum that, on any other interpretation, "exegesis has no longer any fixed rule, and Scripture may be made to prove anything".

Dr. Stone quotes freely from the formidable list of authorities supporting his view. To these may be added the late Dr. Briggs, whose conclusions in their final form are given in the volume published recently, *The Fundamental Christian Faith*. He endorses the view held by Dr. Stone as "the only sound interpretation" (p. 129) but he gives none of the reasons on which he bases this statement. Dr. Stone is only fair in quoting from those who repeat his theory, such as Dr. Isaac Barrow, Bishop Burnet, Rev. Wm. Perkins. He quotes also from Calvin, as if approvingly. His mention of Calvin raises the question of that Reformer's views, but, for the present, it must suffice to say that, in the very chapter quoted by Dr. Stone, Calvin calls the doctrine of the Limbus "a fable. To conclude from it that the souls of the dead are in prison is childish." (Institutes ii, p. 59.) Among modern scholars, Bishop Westcott is quoted in his statement that the Patristic interpretation rests on "too precarious a foundation to claim general acceptance" (p. 57). The limits of space doubtless prevented Dr. Stone from outlining the reasonings of such authors as Bishop Pearson of the older school, Bishop Moule, Dr. Charles Hodge, Dr. A. A. Hodge and Principal Salmond among modern scholars. That the issue may be clearly seen, we quote from Bishop Pearson, as thorough an Anglican in his day, as Dr. Stone is in ours. His massive work, *An Exposition of the Creed*, although published in 1659 has not yet been superseded and in the language of that day sets forth what we conceive to be the evangelical belief of our day:

Wherefore, being it is most infallibly certain that the death of Christ was as powerful and effectual for the redemption of the saints before Him, as for those which followed Him. . . . I cannot admit this as the end of Christ's Descent into Hell, to convey the souls of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and those which were with them from thence, nor can I think there was any reference to such an action in the word "Thou shalt not leave my soul in Hell." (Ed. London 1824, p. 406-407.)

The soul of Christ, really separated from His body by death,

did truly pass unto the places below, where the souls of men departed were and I conceive the end for which He did so, was that He might undergo the condition of a dead man as well as of a living. . . . His body was laid in a grave, as ordinarily the bodies of dead men are; His soul was conveyed into such receptacles as the souls of other persons use to be. . . . By the Descent of Christ into Hell, all those which believe in Him are secured from descending thither; He went into these regions of darkness, that our souls might never come into those torments which are there. By His Descent, He freed us from our fears, as by His Ascension, He secured us of our hopes" (*ibid.*, pp. 412-413).

The question at issue is, of course, primarily as to the teaching of Scripture. Dr. Stone recognizes this by quoting a number of passages but his discussion of them is very brief. He quotes freely from the Patristic literature, from the apocryphal gospels, from the mystery plays and other writings, all of which are interesting but not decisive. The general question of the Descensus has been for so long before the Church and the lines of discussion are so well marked that any one who is reasonably familiar with the subject should be able to indicate sufficiently the points needing to be observed in arriving at a conclusion.

The Scriptural foundation for the Patristic view is a composite of a number of passages, which, woven together, seem to read thus: Our Lord at His death descended into the abyss (Rom. x. 7) but God did not leave his soul in Hades neither did His flesh see corruption (Ps. xvi. 10, Acts ii. 27, 31): He suffered for sins that He might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit; by which also He went and preached unto the spirits in prison; which sometimes were disobedient (1 Peter iii. 18, 20): The Gospel was preached to them that are dead that they might be judged according to men in the flesh but live according to God in the spirit (1 Peter iv. 6). Read thus, the teaching seems very clear and the dogmatic tone from which Dr. Stone is so free, seems to have ample warrant. When we analyze the passages, the case is different. Among them, the Petrine passages are central and the fact that in one, the sermon at Pentecost, Peter is the speaker and Luke the reporter, while in the other two Peter himself is the writer, ought not to lessen our recognition of the common origin of the three. His teaching seems to be that Ps. xvi. 10 was fulfilled, not in David, but in Christ, whose Resurrection was spoken of there in that His soul was not left in Hell neither did His flesh see corruption. The triumphant word "This Jesus hath God raised up" was the keynote of Peter's sermon, after which three thousand souls were added to the number of the disciples. Not a word is said in this Pentecostal sermon about Christ's preaching either to the living or to the dead, the emphasis being entirely upon His Resurrection. As to where our Lord was during those days and as to what He did, we do not know, because Scripture is silent. Dr. Morris well says that the Westminster divines, by the phrase 'under the power of death for a time' (L, C qu 51), "happily interpreted the ancient and perplexing expression,

He descended into Hell. Where the spirit of the Lord was during that period, or how He was occupied has never been revealed. . . . All that we truly know is that both body and spirit remained in the condition into which the tragic death had introduced them, and in that sense remained under the power of death until the glad moment of the Resurrection arrived." (*Theology of the Westminster Standards*, pp. 346, 347.) Dr. Swete, whose sympathies are apparently with the Patristic view goes no further than to call it "an apostolic belief which affirms that the Incarnate Son consecrated by His presence the condition of departed souls". (*Apostles Creed* p. 62). On this, of course, there is no controversy.

Thirty years elapsed after the sermon at Pentecost and then this same Apostle wrote his First Epistle to the Diaspora in which he speaks of our Lord preaching to spirits, who were then in prison and of the Gospel having been preached to them that are now dead but he makes no mention of the Descensus. In view of the fact that the circumstances in which each utterance was made are so different and of the long space of time which elapsed between them, dare we read them as one or even as connected together? Further even the two passages in the First Epistle are not connected sufficiently together to warrant the belief that they treat of the same subject. In the one, the preaching is that of our Lord, in the other our Lord is not named as the preacher. It is significant that Bishop Bilson, quoted by Dr. Stone, held that neither passage in the Epistle was pertinent to the Descensus (p. 57), and further that Dr. Chas. Hodge in his two discussions of the subject does not even mention 1 Peter iv. 6. (*Systematic Theology* II, p. 618, III, p. 736.)

Dr. Swete (*op. cit.* p. 58) is candid enough to say "Nor is there any considerable evidence that either of these passages influence the thought of the second century . . . on the whole, it is scarcely possible to account for the early legends of the Descensus by supposing them to be based upon reminiscences of St. Peter's words". The more closely this composite is examined, the less warrant appears for reading these passages as if they were one or even as if they dealt with the same subject. The doctrine of the Limbus seems to rest upon inferences only and these inferences have their real origin in a Rabbinical or Patristic belief outside of the Scripture itself.

This will appear readily upon an examination of the passages in the First Epistle of Peter. The Epistle itself was written somewhere between A.D. 59-68, probably about 64, during the Neronian persecutions. It was addressed to Christians throughout the Empire who had now come to expect the worst. They were facing death for Christ's sake. The allusions to martyrdom are unmistakeable, the warnings against their enemies are emphatic and the call to Christian endurance is sounded again and again. In a practical epistle, addressed to living men and women to meet a present want in their lives, it is needful to show very strong reasons why the Apostle

should suddenly turn from his subject to discuss the state of disembodied souls and their relation to the Gospel of Christ. It is not enough that many scholarly men are inclined to believe that these two passages admit of the Patristic interpretation or even that they positively teach it. It is required by every rule of interpretation that this strange departure from the subject in hand be accounted for. This has not been done. The verses are taken as standing alone and apart from their context, a mistake which modern scholarship has often pointed out in other connections.

Further, the interpretation of 1 Peter iii. 19 that our Lord after His death exercised a ministry of grace in Hades by preaching to disembodied spirits which were imprisoned there because of their disobedience can be made to cover the doctrine of the Limbus only on conditions which seem to be impossible. One is that the patriarchs who were in the Limbus were "the spirits in prison which sometime were disobedient". Another is that the preceding verse, closing with the word "quickened by the Spirit", can be made to apply to the state of our Lord after His Death rather than to His state after His Resurrection. Still another condition is that, granting that "the spirits in prison" referred to the "disobedient" men of Noah's time who refused to listen to His preaching, they can be classified, in the language of Dr. Stone, as "uncondemned to eternal woe and yet incapable of heavenly joy" (p. 60). It would also be necessary to show wherein these men of Noah's time were worthy of a special visitation and wherein they had less "chance" (p. 60) than multitudes of others. For these reasons, the interpretation held in one form or another by Augustine, Aquinas, Bede, Beza, Turretin and among recent writers by Hofmann, Schweitzer and Salmond seems almost forced upon us. In the language of Principal Salmond: "It refers the scene of the preaching to earth instead of Hades, and the time of the preaching to Noah's day instead of the period between Christ's Death and the Resurrection. It takes the preacher to have been Christ Himself in His pre-incarnate activity, and the preaching to have been in the form of the divine warnings of the time, the spectacle of the building of the Ark, and the various tokens of God's long-suffering." Thus understood, the words mean: "Reflect, how then, too, our Lord acted in this gracious way, how He went and preached to the guilty generation of the Flood, making known to those grossest of wrong doers, by the spectacle of the ark a-building, the word of His servant Noah, and the varied warnings of the time, His will to save them." (*Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, p. 472.)

Further still, the "dead" to whom the Gospel was "preached" in iv. 6 are, under the Patristic view, assumed to be the "dead" of the verse preceding, the inference being that men condemned for their sins were afforded by the Hades ministry of our Lord an opportunity to repent and be saved. Yet nothing is said in this chapter of the Descensus or of the preaching of our Lord and the dead of verse 5 are those who shall be found dead at the last day and shall then appear before God, while the dead of verse 6 are those who suffered

death for their witness to Christ. The verb rendered "judged" has a definite judicial significance. It is, as Dr. West points out, the sentence of death pronounced by a human court, consequent on a criminal accusation. It indicates, therefore, those who had suffered death for their profession of the Gospel, especially those who went to martyrdom for Jesus' sake in the Neronian persecutions. (*Princeton Review*, 1878, p. 470.) Their's was a death as to the body, while they lived according to God in their spirits, a life which no human court could take away. Their fate was notice to the Christians of Peter's time as to what they might expect. The disciple is not above his Master and he ought not to expect to be above his fellow-disciples. Steadfastness in the faith brings the "judgment" of men and often death as its earthly reward. The Apostle would prepare his readers for what awaited them.

This outline is perhaps sufficient to indicate that, despite the formidable authorities behind it, grave difficulties attend the Patristic interpretation. Clearly, it is not as some have claimed the only possible view. Granting that, because of the eminence of the scholars who have espoused it, it is a possible view, it is needful to inquire whether it be the most probable view and the probabilities in the case are to be based not only on the interpretation of the individual passages but also on the Analogy of Faith. That is, even if one incline to the Patristic view of these passages, he has to meet the questions arising out of the general teaching of Scripture with which the Patristic view is in conflict. The question then is, Shall we overturn the general teaching of Scripture for the sake of a dubious interpretation of certain passages or shall we seek an interpretation of these passages which harmonizes with this general teaching? There is little doubt as to the answer which the great body of Christian believers will give to this alternative. The Analogy of Faith is against the Patristic view of the Descensus in at least three particulars:

(a) Those believers who died before Christ came, such as the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, are represented in Scripture as, not in a Limbus but in Paradise, in Heaven, in Glory, that is, in the presence of God. Nowhere else is it even suggested that they are "in prison". The Westminster Shorter Catechism, with other Reformed symbols, makes no distinction between believers before and believers after the coming of Christ as to their blessedness, but says: The souls of believers are at their death made perfect in holiness and do immediately pass into glory, and their bodies, being still united to Christ, do rest in their graves till the Resurrection (qu. 37). More fully, the Larger Catechism, from which Dr. Stone quotes, says "The communion and glory with Christ, which the members of the Invisible Church enjoy immediately after death, is in that their souls are then made perfect in holiness, and received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God in light and glory; waiting for the full redemption of their bodies, etc." (q. 86). As to the distinctions between Paradise, Abraham's Bosom, Heaven and the Highest Heavens, the Westminster Confession states the faith of

evangelical Christians that, besides the two places for souls separated from their bodies, Heaven for the righteous and Hell for the wicked, "the Scripture acknowledgeth none" (xxx. 1).

(b) The Gospel is represented in Scripture as exercising its salutary influences upon man from the beginning of time. The first Gospel promise was to the first man; Abel, the first martyr, "by faith" offered a more excellent sacrifice than Cain; Enoch walked with God and was not, having been translated that he should not see death; Abraham believed God and "rejoiced to see my day" said our Lord; Moses "wrote of Me" said our Lord and he esteemed "the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures in Egypt"; the Israelites drank of that rock that followed them and "that rock was Christ"; David "spake before of the Resurrection of Christ"; Isaiah's prophecies read like history; the Apostle Peter tells us in this very Epistle that the prophets searched diligently as to what or what manner of time the Spirit of Christ which was in them did signify, when it testified before-hand the sufferings of Christ and the glory that should follow (i. 10-11). Old Testament saints by faith looked forward to Him to whom by faith we look back. The Glory of Christ was revealed, not in a Descensus to release spirits held in prison because He had not come before, but in that far reach of His salvation, back to the very beginning of time, so that they who foresaw and believed on Him entered into the same blessedness with those of our day who are "asleep in Jesus". The communion of saints in the Glory above is unmarred by distinctions as to the dispensations under which they lived.

(c) The responsibility of those who die out of Christ for their eternal destiny is clearly recognized throughout Scripture. Of those who lived under the Old Testament dispensation, our Lord spoke when, in the parable of Dives and Lazarus, He represents Abraham as saying: If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead (Lk. xvi. 31). The Apostle Paul, presenting the case of Jew and Gentile says that the law was given that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God (Rom. iii. 19). There is no warrant for the theory that it was needful for our Lord to preach to the dead in order to make good the lack of mercy in the lives of men at any period of the world's history, or to afford them the "chance" which was denied them on earth. This theory reaches far beyond the use made of it by Dr. Stone. Dr. Briggs (*op. cit.* p. 130) says: "If the Gospel was preached to them (the wicked antediluvians) certainly to others less wicked than they and also certainly not in vain." Dr. Briggs, however, does not, in this last volume, enlarge upon his distinctive doctrine of the Middle State. Dr. Stone expressly repudiates the doctrines of a Second Probation and Universal Restitution, but he will not deny that his interpretation does duty for both of these. These theories are very attractive to men who would excuse themselves before God or complain that He has not dealt justly with them. Men, whether under the light of revelation or not, are not

unfortunates, badly treated by a cruel or neglectful God, but sinners who shall give account for the deeds done in the body. This solemn truth, so often overlooked to-day, lies at the base of the Gospel call to repentance and salvation by faith in Christ.

For these reasons, the interpretation of the Descensus given by Dr. Stone, cannot, we think, be approved.

It is greatly to be regretted that the limits of space forbid us to enlarge upon the later portions of Dr. Stone's volume. They will commend themselves to devout believers. We must be content with one quotation which illustrates his penetration and his reverent understanding in the things of Christ:

We may think therefore of our great High Priest, in the glory of the Eternal Presence, the ever-living Witness as well as the Author of Salvation. By His presence there, He pleads for those who have come unto God through Him. It is not necessary that He should utter words or perform rites as do earthly ministrants: He Himself is both Intercessor and Intercession. And this not in one act, but by a continuous and unceasing service. He ever liveth. That sinners cannot be saved without His death, is generally admitted; but it is equally true, that believers cannot be kept safe without His life following that death. It was not enough that He should fight the battle of the Cross, and leave us to avail ourselves of its victory; or, by His wonderful example and faithfulness unto the end, lay a foundation for us to build upon: and then ascend into the heavens to enjoy His glory. Man needs His continual help: not only pardon for sin, but protection against the temptations and adversities of this world. Less than this will not save unto the uttermost, i.e., wholly and completely, to the extinction of every element or trait that alienates us from God" (pp. 360, 361).

It is earnestly to be hoped that the purpose of Dr. Stone to arrest the attention of the present-day Church to the great facts following upon the death of our Lord will be crowned with success and that a new devotion to Him will be vouchsafed us all. We will await the promised volumes of Dr. Stone with much interest.

Chicago.

W. S. PLUMER BRYAN.

Socialism: Its Strength, Weakness, Problems and Future. By ALFRED RAYMOND JOHNS. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. 8vo; pp. 75. 50 cents net.

The title of this booklet indicates its scope, but gives no indication of its excellence. Brief though it is, it would be difficult to conceive of a clearer, fairer, more striking and more comprehensive presentation. Mr. Johns writes sympathetically. He predicts for Socialism a great and growing influence. He outlines that influence correctly, as we think, and most instructively. It is, therefore, significant when he concludes from a study of its propaganda that "Socialism can never be realized in all its fullness; and that it is visionary, impractical, impossible." We would go further. Socialism impresses us, as essentially irreligious, as essentially unjust, as essentially absurd. It is irreligious, because it would put the state in the place of God and would have the

government override providence. It is unjust, because its aim is to treat all as nearly alike as possible; and because there is no injustice so great as that of treating unequals as if they were equal. It is absurd, because "it is an attempt to make the world better without making men better". We cannot, therefore, agree with Mr. Stelzle when he says "that a man has a perfect right to be a Socialist, if he is convinced that Socialism is morally and economically sound". No one has a right to be convinced that a system is morally and economically sound which is essentially irreligious, unjust and absurd.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

Life's Unexpected Issues and Other Papers on Character and Conduct.

By WILLIAM L. WATKINSON, D.D., LL.D., author of "The Fatal Barter", "The Bane and the Antidote", "The Blind Spot", etc.
New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1912. 12mo; pp. 212.
\$1.00 net.

A volume of sermons by this celebrated preacher always makes delightful and profitable reading. These seventeen discourses are thoroughly characteristic of his homiletic art. They reveal an unusual intellectual versatility and breadth, combined with tender spiritual fervor and exquisite graces of style. The venerable editor and preacher gleaned from many fields of literature and makes the scientific study of nature yield a wealth of strikingly apt illustrations. He has an uncommon power of drawing novel and instructive lessons from familiar texts.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The James Sprunt Lectures delivered at Union Theological Seminary in Virginia. *The Sermon: Its Construction and Delivery.* By DAVID JAMES BURRELL, D.D., LL.D., Pastor Marble Collegiate Church, New York. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1913. 8vo; cloth, pp. 329. \$1.50 net.

"This book is made up, for the most part", says the Preface, "of material used in Princeton Theological Seminary, where the author recently supplied a four years' vacancy in the chair of Homiletics. The lectures . . . were afterwards revised and committed to writing for use in other seminaries and ministerial associations. They have been still further revised and reduced to their present form to meet the requirements of the James Sprunt Lectureship in the Union Theological Seminary of Richmond, Va."

The introductory chapter is an incisive discussion of the definition of the sermon, "an address to a congregation on the subject of religion from the standpoint of the Scriptures, with the purpose of persuading men". The seven main divisions of the work are devoted to the con-

sideration of the following subjects: Texts and Topics; The Outline of the Sermon (with an excellent treatment of textual and expository outlines, and a well illustrated discussion of topical outlines with special reference to ethical, doctrinal, historical, biographical, and evangelistic sermons); The Body of the Sermon (presented under the three heads, the exordium, the argument, and the peroration); The Forensic or Finished Discourse (style, illustration, humor in the pulpit); The Delivery of the Sermon; Getting Attention; Pulpit Power (its secret; Christ our model).

In this manual on preaching, as in his own sermons, Dr. Burrell treats everything in a fresh, vital, practical way. The fundamental principles of effective sermonizing are clearly stated, admirably illustrated, and convincingly applied to the many details of the preacher's art. The suggestions and counsels given at the conclusion of most of the chapters are invariably judicious and helpful, while the many quotations from other homiletic works will serve to stimulate the reader to consult the best literature on special phases of the subject.

The chapters on illustration and delivery are especially suggestive, and valuable, but the whole book will well repay the preacher and the theological student for the careful perusal of its pages. An acknowledged master of the pulpit here gives us the wisdom of a lifetime of devoted and most successful service in the ministry of the Word.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Efficient Religion. By GEORGE ARTHUR ANDREWS, author of "What is Essential". New York: George H. Doran Company. 1912. 12mo; pp. 178. \$1.00 net

Accepting the utilitarian temper of our age as one of its most important characteristics, the author undertakes to answer the question, "What is the use of the religion of Jesus? What is it good for? What can it do?" The writer makes no attempt at an exhaustive exhibition of the evidence, but rather, assuming its adequacy, suggests a basis in reason for our practical acceptance of the claims of the Gospel. The argument, stated summarily, is that a Christian is a man who has a "profitable faith", "practicable love", "prevailing prayer", "loving forgiveness", "abundant health", "sufficient consolation", "sustaining strength", "satisfying joy", "attainable peace", and "achieving power". The spirit of the discussions may be fairly inferred from the statement that the religion of Jesus must be rescued "from the realm of intellectual thought" and brought "into the realm of efficient action". In the sequel we find the author tarrying about as long in the former as in the latter sphere, for he must needs offer us his own "concepts" and "speculations" as to the truths he wishes us to adopt as principles of conduct. But in spite of this treacherous antithesis between thought and life, he presents a great deal of truth that every Christian can verify in his own experience.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Ministry of the Word. By the REV. W. C. E. NEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of St. Paul's Cathedral. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1913. 12mo; pp. vi, 135. 90 cents net.

The title of this volume is rather too general to suit the specific aim of the author, which is to show "that words spoken from the pulpit are first and foremost a message from God; and that therefore the spiritual storing of the heart and mind is the main and most pressing requisite for the preacher". The whole subject is viewed from the spiritual side, and the stress is laid upon the personal qualifications of the minister for his high calling and upon the means to be used in securing these. The author speaks out of a strong conviction, in which many, if not most, of his readers will agree with him, that "preaching at the present moment seems to be suffering from a contemptuous disparagement in those who hear, and from a misunderstanding on the part of those who speak", and that the remedy for both evils can be found only in a return to a more biblical conception of the work of the ministry.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Modern Christianity Or The Plain Gospel Modernly Expounded. By JOHN P. PETERS, Ph.D., Sc.D., D.D. Rector of St. Michael's Church, New York, and Canon Residentiary of the Cathedral of St. John the Divine New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1909. 12mo; pp. viii, 323.

Modern Christianity, if one were to judge from this volume of sermons, is a rather vague affair, and, so far as it is here clearly interpreted, a much poorer and far less attractive boon than that which the New Testament offers us. Dr. Peters divides his discourses into two parts—nineteen on "Doctrines of the Church" and eight on "The Social Teaching of our Lord Jesus Christ", a division of material that hardly permits the doing of justice to either part. As a matter of fact Christianity in these pages offers us little more than an ideal, good and true enough for many practical purposes, but needing for its realization somewhat more of divine grace than is here proclaimed. We admire the fearlessness and the directness with which these parish sermons enforce the ethical teachings of the Gospel, but we sadly miss the sweetest and most comforting notes that even the modern sinner must hear if the salvation of Christ is to be good news.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Expository Preaching: Plans and Methods. By REV. F. B. MEYER, B.A. New York: George H. Doran Company. 1910. 12mo; pp. vi, 141. \$1.00 net.

Mr. Meyer makes a noble and forceful plea for a larger use of the expository method of preaching and gives many helpful directions for the attainment of success in this department of the minister's work. Each of the six chapters is followed by an expository sermon of the author's in which he illustrates the leading points emphasized in the

discussions. The book merits the attention of all who are interested, and yet more the attention of those who are not but ought to be interested, in this method of preaching.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Cole Lectures for 1912 delivered before Vanderbilt University. *What Does Christianity Mean?* By WILLIAM HERBERT PERRY FAUNCE, President of Brown University. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1912. 12mo; pp. 245.

The first of these six lectures, on "The Essence of Christianity", lays the foundation for the rest. President Faunce defines Christianity, first negatively and then positively. It is not ritual; it is not a series of propositions; it is not history; it is not a series of good deeds to be done or bad deeds to be avoided; it is purpose; more specifically, it is "the revelation through Jesus of Nazareth of the eternal unchanging purpose of God, and the developing of that same purpose in the lives and institutions of men." In this statement all the other ideas of the lectures—as we may summarize them by the use of the title-words—are implicated: "the meaning of God", "the basis and test of character", "the principle of fellowship", "the aim of education", "the goal of our efforts".

Dr. Faunce writes with great clearness and power, and his book is an able attempt, by one manifestly reared upon the basis of evangelical truth, to mediate between the traditional and the now widely prevalent anti-supernaturalistic conception of Christianity.

The author has some misgivings, indeed, as to the issue of his endeavor to fashion a unifying view of the conflicting ideas. He fears that he can succeed only by sacrificing what some consider vital. "We must leave many cars standing on side-tracks if we are to keep the main line open for through trains. Some men will doubtless mourn that their private car was left on a siding." Our grief, rather, is that this main line is not satisfactory either in the glimpses it gives us of the King's realm as we sit by the window or in the guarantees it furnishes that we shall, even at the terminal, see the sort of King we had hoped for. "Justification by faith is simply"—the italics are the author's—"classification by fundamental intention and tendency." . . . "It is the clear apprehension and affirmation, that he who steadily intends righteousness is righteous, and should be classed with righteous men." But what, after all, is the standard of righteousness and what has "Jesus of Nazareth" to do with our "steadily intending" righteousness? Far more satisfactory to us is Luther's doctrine of justification by faith, which Dr. Faunce himself, by a happy inconsistency, commends to us as the "bulwark of moral reform, the hope of every soul on life's moral battlefield".

Quite unworthy of the book as a whole is the erroneous assertion (p. 214), "No Hebrew prophet, and only one New Testament apostle, makes any reference to the Garden of Eden".

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Renascence of Faith. By the Reverend RICHARD ROBERTS. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 318. \$1.50 net.

This volume may be defined as a plea for the recovery of a sound spiritual idealism. The present forgetfulness of God, selfishness, shallowness of thought, and "dismemberment of life", are traced to "the evil seed of materialism"; and the "tyranny of things", the impotence of science to give relief, the insolvency of organized religion, the evil results of imperfect methods of religious instruction, are shown to be demanding a remedy which can be found only in a renascence of faith.

Such a renascence the author ventures to predict. The prophecy is based upon the general theory that, in spite of occasional declensions and depressions, the movement of the race is upward, and upon the special considerations of the present spirit of unrest, the feeling of brotherhood, the efforts for international peace, and the vogue of Rudolf Eucken. While some may desire more sure grounds for prediction, and may differ from certain theological implications, no one can fail to appreciate the cleverness, charm and seriousness of the writer, nor to share with him the hope that an increasingly spiritual view of Christianity may result in a wider evangelism, an awakened social conscience, in a broad missionary vision, and a larger liberty of belief. Many readers will be awakened to a truer conception of the critical character of modern moral, social and religious conditions.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Second Book of the Kings. The Smaller Cambridge Bible for Schools. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. Cloth. 16mo; pp. 184. Map. 30 cents net.

The Second Book of Samuel. The Revised Version, edited for the use of schools. Cambridge University Press. Imported by G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York. Cloth. 16mo; pp. 101. Map. 50 cents net.

These two small commentaries contain explanatory notes which are brief but helpful. It may be questioned whether, in volumes intended for the youngest students, it is wise to introduce such alleged results of biblical criticism as are suggested in the introductory chapters. However the larger portion of the work will be of unquestioned value to all readers of these Old Testament narratives.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Gospels. By the REV. LEIGHTON PULLAN, Fellow and Tutor of S. John Baptists' College Oxford. London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co. Cloth. Crown 8vo; pp. 323. 5 shillings.

This volume forms a part of "The Oxford Library of Practical Theology", edited by the Rev. W. C. E. Newbolt, M.A., and the Rev. Darwell Stone, D.D., and designed to supply to devout laymen sound and readable instruction on the subjects included under the common title "The Christian Religion". This purpose has been kept in view by

the author of these studies in the field of New Testament criticism. While suggesting the main problems presented by modern scholarship, the discussion is free from unnecessary technicalities, and deals with questions which bear most vitally on the Person and teaching of Christ.

In discussing the "Canon of the Gospels" the writer concludes that the church was convinced, by A.D. 150 at latest, that all four were authentic, and that their record was true. As to the "Criticism of the Gospels" he shows how much less serious are the difficulties presented by "enlightened orthodoxy" than those of "liberal Protestantism" or "Judeo-German rationalism".

Dealing with the "Synoptic Problem" the popular modern critical theory of the composite origin of these gospels is accepted, but stated in no dogmatic spirit; as to the documents used exact knowledge is declared to be impossible. Matthew and Luke are said to be based upon Mark and on the document commonly denoted by the symbol Q. This document was known to Mark but little used by him. Luke, in addition to Mark and Q employed another important source denoted by the symbol S. The discussion is not convincing, but will reveal to the layman the more usual and conservative of modern critical processes, and serves to emphasize, aside from the theories and conjectures involved, certain unquestioned features and characteristics of the Gospels. Yet it again and again seems that apparent but not real differences are so construed as to be contradictions, and that the real problems could be solved by methods less intricate and conjectural.

As to the fourth Gospel the author ably defends the view that it was written by John, at Ephesus, and that the Christ of John was no creation of fancy nor a "Christ of experience", but the veritable Christ of history.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Most Beautiful Book Ever Written. By D. A. HAYES, Professor of New Testament Interpretation in the Graduate School of Theology, Garrett Biblical Institute. New York: Eaton & Mains. Cloth. 12mo; pp. viii, 183. 75 cents net.

As a title for this book, the author has adopted the phrase by which Renan described the third Gospel. In fact, the author and character of "*The Gospel according to Luke*" are the themes under discussion. Controversial points are avoided, but by means of historic statements, traditions and conjecture, all that is possible has been done to make real and vivid the life and character of "the beloved physician". While the Person and work of Christ are not made to stand out as impressively as may be possible in such a study, the peculiar features of the Gospel narrative are set forth clearly and suggestively, and are shown to have been determined by the characteristics of the beautiful soul by which the "Book Beautiful" was composed.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Miscellanies. By AUGUSTUS HOPKINS STRONG, D.D., LL.D., Ex-President of Rochester Theological Seminary. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 493, 504. \$1.00 per volume.

These two beautiful volumes form a collection of essays, sermons and addresses which embody much of the ripest thought and scholarship of the distinguished author. The first volume contains addresses and essays which are chiefly historical; the second volume is mainly theological. The former deals in part with the history and character of the Baptist denomination; but all the contents of the two volumes are of interest to anyone who is concerned with the faith and progress of the Christian Church. These essays, published in this attractive form, are a crown to the long years of fruitful service in the sphere of literary and theological production in which the author has been so conspicuous.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Report of Proceedings. The Second Quadrennial Council of the Federal Council of The Churches of Christ in America. New York: 215 Fifth Ave. Paper. 8vo; pp. 140.

Christian Unity at Work. Cloth. 8vo; pp. 291. \$1.00 net.

These two volumes contain a full account of the second meeting of the Federal Council held in Chicago, December 4-9, 1912. The first, in pamphlet form, gives the minutes of the Council, the reports of committees, the lists of delegates. The second, a well-printed and edited volume, presents the substance of all the addresses delivered at the various sessions of the Council. These are grouped under the three heads: "Christian Unity in Conference", "Christian Unity in the Work of the Church", "Christian Unity and the Social Order".

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Vicar's Excursion. By DU BOIS H. LOUX. New York: The Worker's Press. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 159.

This is a pathetic fragment of autobiography. The writer is a graduate of Wooster University and of McCormick Theological Seminary. He served as pastor of the Campbell Park Church, and of Crerar Chapel, Chicago. He assisted Dr. Jefferson in New York, and was minister of the Old Centre Church of Meriden, Conn. Excepting his experience in New York, he feels he has been cruelly abused because of his peculiar loyalty to Christ, that he has "been hounded out of one position and thwarted in his efforts to obtain another". He is convinced that the church misrepresents the social principles of Christ, but he is resolved to prove himself true to his Christian stewardship in spite of the martyrdom he is suffering at the hands of a "commercialized" "ecclesiasticism". Those unacquainted with all the facts will read this arraignment of the church with no doubt as to the sincerity and devotion of the author, but not without some question as to the wisdom and charity of his judgments.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Religious Unrest and Its Remedy. By JAMES A. ANDERSON, D.D., LL.D.
New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth. 16mo; pp. 128.
75 cents net.

The causes of present theological unrest are found in modern freedom of thought and eagerness for investigation, in the discoveries of science, in the acceptance of the theory of evolution and the results of Biblical criticism. The remedy suggested is in the acceptance of the fact of Jesus Christ. More than is necessary may be conceded as to the possible defects of Scripture, but the historicity of the Gospels is defended, and the claims of Christ are vindicated on the grounds of his power in human history, and in the lives of individual men, by the testimony of Christian experience and the admissions of unbelievers. The discussion ends with an appeal to a complete abandonment of self to the transforming power of Christ.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Endeavors After the Spirit of Religion. By ARTHUR G. BEACH. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 124.
\$1.00 net.

According to the author all religions are merely human in their origin, and it is therefore the privilege, if not the duty of every man, to create for himself a religion which accords with his own tastes. One is warned to expect little help from what was believed in the days of Augustine or of Bunyan, but encouraged to consider what is believed to-day. To aid in this construction of a personal religion the author makes certain kindly suggestions relative to the elements he has discovered as common to all religions. He intimates the kind of a God we should make for ourselves, and expresses himself as confident that we shall yet be able to shape our modern conception of God into one which shall satisfy the heart as well as the head. Even though Jesus lived long ago he is conceded to have been of some aid to religion, specifically in giving an example of confident and buoyant faith. However, in spite of such elements, these essays are less interesting than might be supposed.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Methods of The Master. By GEORGE CLARKE PECK, D.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 207.
\$1.00 net.

These essays are admirable in their style and valuable in their substance. In terse, striking sentences, bright with illustrations, the author shows how conclusively our Lord dealt with problems which are modern because they are timeless. Among these great problems are those of "Finding God", "Doubt", "Sin", "Salvation", "Poverty", "Divorce", "The Sabbath", "Sickness", "Conflicting Duties", "Sorrow", "The Future", "Jesus Christ". The very titles of these chapters are as attractive as they are familiar; but the treatment of each theme is original, suggestive, stimulating.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Concerning Them That Are Asleep. By DANIEL HOFFMAN MARTIN.
Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Boards. 12mo; pp. 74.
50 cents.

This beautiful little volume sets forth the teaching of Scripture relative to "the blessed dead". The chapters answer the following questions, or suggest light on these problems: Does death end all? Is death to be dreaded? With what manner of body do they come? Shall we recognize our friends in the future? What is the meaning of sorrow? The truths set forth will bring comfort to many hearts.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Church Triumphant. By the REV. LUCIEN ADELBERT DAVISON.
Milwaukee: The Young Churchman Co. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 115.
\$1.00 net.

It is refreshing to read the confident statements of the author relative to the infallible authority of the Scriptures, and interesting to note his assured conviction of the premillennial return of Christ. It is to be feared, however, that this volume will strengthen the popular misconception that such views of the Bible and of prophecy are to be identified with allegorical interpretations and careless exegesis. The writer has two main propositions, neither of which are necessarily related to the doctrine of the coming of Christ, although they have been advocated by many of the less scholarly writers upon that theme: (a) That the seven days of creation are prophetic of seven subsequent historic eras, and (b) that the seven "Churches of Asia" symbolize seven successive periods of church history. Most of the interpretations of Scripture found in this book are fanciful; the pages have curious tinges of a blended high-church Episcopalianism, and a traditional Plymouth-Bretherenism; nevertheless many will enjoy the confident assurance of the personal, glorious, return of the Lord, and all should agree in the practical conclusion that the pressing, immediate duty of the church is the evangelization of the world.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

One Hundred Brief Bible Studies. By J. B. SHEARER, D.D., LL.D.,
Professor of Biblical Instruction, Davidson College, N. C. Richmond, Virginia: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. Cloth.
12mo; pp. 229.

These discussions are so brief as to be almost fragmentary. They are, however, not without value, especially to college students for whom they were intended, and they are certainly not without interest as they were completed on the eightieth birthday of one whose long life has been devoted to the teaching and defense of the Bible as the infallible and inspired Word of God.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Religious Education in the Home. By JOHN D. FOLSON. New York: Eaton and Mains. Cloth. 16mo; pp. 190. 75 cents net.

The writer presents in a brief form some of the general principles

relating to the religious training of children in the home. He aims to help parents, pastors and teachers. He discusses "Possibilities", "Environment", "Suggestion", "Imitation", "Instruction", "Training", "Home Government", "The Holy Spirit", "Personality", "Stages of Growth". No one can read these pages without being impressed anew with the difficulty, the sacredness and the importance of the task to which attention is herein so thoughtfully and sympathetically directed.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Gates of Dawn. By W. L. WATKINSON, D.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth. Crown 8vo; pp. 387. \$1.25 net.

This is a volume of devotional readings. These are intended to cover an entire year. A morning lesson from the Bible is suggested for each day of the year, followed by one special Scriptural thought, and then a "meditation" by Dr. Watkinson, whose quaint style and peculiar illustrative ability are here seen in their most attractive qualities. The daily readings are concluded with a short series of prayers by Rev. Laughlan MacLean Watt, M.A., B.D.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Book of Common Prayer. By SAMUEL HART, D.D., LL.D. Seawanee, Tennessee: The University Press. 12mo; cloth, pp. 299.

The purpose of this volume is to guide candidates for Holy Orders in the Episcopal Church in their study of the History and Contents of the Book of Common Prayer as it has been set forth for use in the American Protestant Episcopal Church.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Making of Tomorrow. By SHAILER MATTHEWS, Dean of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. New York: Eaton and Mains. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 193. \$1.00 net.

These forty fragmentary essays, dealing with various political and social problems, appeared originally as editorials, and are now grouped under four general captions: "The Common Lot", "The Church and Society", "The Stirrings of a Nation's Conscience" and "The Extension of Democracy".

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Inside Views of Mission Life. By ANNIE L. A. BAIRD. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Boards. 12mo; pp. 138. 35 cents.

The writer is a missionary of the Presbyterian Church at Pyeng Yang, Korea, and does not need to draw upon her imagination, but can depend upon observation and memory as she sketches in fascinating vividness, "Missionary Temptations", "Trials", "Tasks", "Community Life", "Joys". The little book is not designed to be merely interesting, but instructive; and it should be specially commended to young missionary candidates.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Bible. By I. M. HALDEMAN, D.D. New York: Charles C. Cook. Paper. 12mo; pp. 66. 15 cents.

This article is taken from the book by Dr. Haldeman entitled "*Christ, Christianity and the Bible*". It is intended to prove that the Bible is "not such a book as a man would write if he could, nor such a book as a man could write if he would". Its teachings as to man and sin, its fulfilled prophecies, its unity of organism and theme, its literary style and moral influence show it to be the veritable "Word of God".

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

A Muslim Sir Galahad. By HENRY OTIS DWIGHT, LL.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 188. \$1.00 net.

This is "a present-day story of Islam in Turkey". It narrates the true but romantic experiences of a young Kurd, whose pure heart longed for a truer knowledge of God than his Mohammedan guides could give, and who found peace and strength through Christ. It suggests the great difficulties but also the vast possibilities of Christian Missions in the Moslem world.

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CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Signs of the Times. By WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN. An address delivered before several colleges.

The Call of Jesus to Joy. By WILLIAM ELLIOT GRIFFIS, D.D. A sermon on the "Gospel of Gladness".

The Misfortune of a World Without Pain. By NEWELL DWIGHT HILLIS, D.D., LL.D. Studies in the problem of suffering.

The Conservation of Womanhood and Childhood. By THEODORE ROOSEVELT. An address delivered before the Civic Forum and the Child's Welfare League.

The Latent Energies in Life. By CHARLES REYNOLDS BROWN, D.D. An essay on unrealized possibilities.

These five minute volumes form part of the Leather-Bound Pocket Series published by Funk & Wagnalls Company, New York and London. Each volume is bound in flexible leather and sold for 80 cents, postpaid.

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PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Journal of Theology, Chicago, July: EUGENE W. LYMAN, What is Theology? The Essential Nature of the Theologian's Task; PAUL WENDLAND, Hellenistic Ideas of Salvation in the Light of Ancient Anthropology; JOHANNES WEISS, Significance of Paul for Modern Christians; JAMES MOFFATT, Ninety Years After: A Survey of Bretschneider's "Probabilia" in the Light of Subsequent Johannine Criticism; GEORGE R. DODSON, Aristotle as a Corrective in Present Theological Thought; J. W. BASHFORD, Adaptation of Modern Christianity

to the People of the Orient; EDGAR J. GOODSPEED, *The Freer Gospels*; EDGAR J. GOODSPEED, *Professor Harnack and the Paris Manuscript of Justin*.

Bibliotheca Sacra, Oberlin, July: W. J. MCGLOTHLIN, *The Minister and the Truth*; HERBERT W. MAGOUN, *A Layman's View of the Critical Theory*; CHARLES W. SUPER, *Two Distinguished Frenchmen in England*; J. B. LAWRENCE, *"The Theology of Prometheus Bound"*; HENRY H. BEACH, *Physiological Psychology*; HENRY C. MABIE, *The Atonement and Conscience*; JACOB THE SON OF AARON, *The Book of Enlightenment*; WILLIAM M. LANGDON, *Some Merits of the American Standard Bible*; HAROLD M. WIENER, *Studies in the Septuagintal Texts of Leviticus*.

Church Quarterly Review, London, July: *Montenegro and the Eastern Question*; T. HANNAN, *Popular Education in Britain, France and Germany*; W. H. FRERE, *Some Vicissitudes of English Parochial History*; H. D. OAKLEY, *Time and Eternal Life*; A. C. HEADLAM, *Degrees in Divinity*; H. T. K. ROBINSON, *Pensions for the Clergy: An Estimate of Cost*; B. J. KIDD, *Papalism or Federalism*; H. KINGSMILL MOORE, *The Sunday School in the Twentieth Century*.

Constructive Quarterly, New York, September: ARCHBISHOP PLATON, *Admitting All Impossibilities, Nevertheless Unity is Possible*; MGR. BONOMELLI, *An Appeal for Unity from Italy*; F. D. KERSHNER, *Restoration Plea of Disciples of Christ*; GEORGE P. MAINS, *Comprehension not Compromise*; THOMAS J. GARLAND, *An American Contribution to Unity*; PETER T. FORSYTH, *Congregationalism and Liberty*; FRANCIS J. HALL, *The Anglican Position Constructively Stated*; ROBERT E. SPEER, *Foreign Missions a Constructive Interpretation of Christian Principles*; A. G. FRASER, *Missionary Education in India*; EXCELLENZ VON BEZZEL, *The Church and The State*; MAX TURMANN, *Moral and Religious Restoration of a Tenement House Quarter in Paris*; GEORGE B. EAGER, *Christ's Teaching about Marriage*; JACQUES ZEILLER, *Frederic Ozanam, Founder of the Conferences of St. Vincent de Paul*.

East & West, London, July: *Mohammedanism in Malaya*; ALEX YAKOLEV, *Missionary Work in Siberia*; W. E. S. HOLLAND, *Missionary Conferences*; MRS. CREIGHTON, *The Continuation Committee of the Edinburgh Conference*; S. K. RUDRA, *Religious Changes in India during the British Period*; J. P. HAYTHORNWAITE, *India's Demand for Mass-education and her Quest for the "Ideal University"*; H. WYATT, *Missionaries and the European Community in India*.

Expositor, London, August: JOHN SKINNER, *The Samaritan Pentateuch*; G. BUCHANAN GRAY, *Forms of Hebrew Poetry. Parallelism and Rhythm in Lamentations*; F. R. TENNANT, *Services of Philosophy to Theology*; D. S. MARGOLIOUTH, *The Zadokites*; W. MONTGOMERY, *Albert Schweitzer*; A. E. GARVIE, *Psychology and Exegesis*; ERSKINE HILL, *History and Mysticism. The Same*, September; MAURICE JONES, *Date of Epistle to the Galatians*; W. B. STEVENSON, *Interpretation of Isaiah 41. 8-20 and 51. 1-8*; G. BUCHANAN GRAY, *Forms of Hebrew Poetry. Elements of Hebrew Rhythm*; C. McEVoy, *New Testament Language of Endearment to the Lord Jesus Christ*; F. R. TENNANT, *Philosophy of Religion as an Autonomous Subject*; JOHN SKINNER, *Divine Names in Genesis*.

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, July: GEORGE H. PARKER, Brief Survey of Field of Organic Evolution; HOWARD N. BROWN, Finalism and Freedom; L. P. JACKS, Quest for Absolute Certainty; BENJAMIN W. BACON, Two Forgotten Creeds; C. DELISLE BURNS, Mysticism of a Modernist; STEWART MEANS, Future of Religion; AMBROSE W. VERNON, Christianity and Ministerial Ordination.

Hibbert Journal, Boston, July: RABINDRANATH TAGORE, Problem of Evil; A. C. McGIFFERT, Christianity in the Light of Its History; PRESERVED SMITH, New Light on Relations of Peter and Paul; T. C. SNOW, Imagination in Utopia; A. SMYTHE PALMER, Fall of Lucifer; JAMES DRUMMOND, Occasion and Object of Epistle to Romans; F. P. BADHAM AND F. C. CONYBEARE, Fragments of an Ancient (? Egyptian) Gospel used by the Cathars of Albi; R. B. TOWNSHEND, Antiochus Epiphanes, The Brilliant Madman; THOMAS C. HALL, Significance of Coercion; H. D. RAWNSLEY, The Child and the Cinematograph Show; J. N. LARNED, Evil. A Discussion for the Times; ARTHUR DALE, A Plea for the Unemployables.

Hindustan Review, Allahabad, July: B. N. DAR, Indian Progress and Anglo-Indian Bureaucracy; M. P. DEWEBB, Better Money for India; S. N. SINGH, Passing of Indo-Chinese Opium Trade; P. C. GHOSH, India as Known to Ancient Europe; The Balkan War and Indian Mussalmans; N. S. AIYAR, Status or Contract in Regard to the Practice of Religion.

International Journal of Ethics, Philadelphia, July: WILLIAM J. COLLINS, Place of Volition in Education; C. D. BROAD, Lord Hugh Cecil's "Conservatism"; ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY, Practical Tendencies of Bergsonism; HELEN BOSANQUET, English Divorce Law and the Report of the Royal Commission; J. DASHIELL STOOPS, Ethics of Industry.

Interpreter, London, July: WALTER LOCK, God is Love; OWEN C. WHITEHOUSE, Historic Background of Book of Baruch; A. H. MCNEILE, Law, Sin, and Sacrifice in the Old Testament; A. C. BOUQUET, Parables of Our Lord: Sources and Parallels; W. L. MACKENNA, History of an Irish Jesuit; J. E. SYMES, Epistle of St. James; N. E. EGERTON SWANN, Supernatural Religion and Social Conditions; H. NORTHCOTE, Love the Interpreter of Belief.

Irish Theological Quarterly, Dublin, July: HUGH POPE, A Neglected Factor in the Study of the Synoptic Problem; JAMES MCCAFFREY, Catholic School System of the United States; BRUNO WALKLEY, Testimony of St. Irenaeus in Favour of the Roman Primacy; THOMAS GOGARTY, Dawn of the Reformation; M. J. O'DONNELL, Seal of Confession.

Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia, July: NORMAN BENTWICH, From Philo to Plotinus; V. APTOWITZER, Formularies of Decrees and Documents from a Gaonic Court; ISRAEL DAVIDSON, Poetic Fragments of the Genizah. IV; W. ST. CLAIR TISDALL, Aryan Words in the Old Testament.

Jewish Review, London, July: BEN YISRAEL, An Open Letter to Mr. Zangwill; A. CALEFF, Jews of Bulgaria; LEONARD G. MONTEFIORE, Jewish Question in Prussia and in Berlin; H. GOLLANCZ, Thoughts

upon the International Congress of Historians; BERTRAM B. BENAS, A Jewish University in Jerusalem; J. SNOWMAN, Jewish Eugenics.

Journal of Religious Psychology, Worcester, July: CLARK WISSLER, Doctrine of Evolution and Anthropology; WILSON D. WALLIS, Religion and Magic; ALBERT N. GILBERTSON, The Pitfall; ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN, Antagonism of City and Country.

London Quarterly Review, London, July: GEORGE JACKSON, Reformation Doctrine of the Bible; SAINT N. SINGH, Japan's Status Among the Nations; W. F. LOFTHOUSE, Parzifal and Parsifal; ANNE E. KEELING, New History of the Vaudois; HENRY W. CLARK, Christian Idea of Revelation; CHARLES BONE, Chinese Fiction, Ancient and Modern; J. PARTON MILUM, Fallacy of Eugenics.

Lutheran Church Review, Philadelphia, July: W. JENTSCH, The Church of England at the Time of Shakespeare; W. JENTSCH, Shakespeare's Baptism and Boyhood; PAUL FEINE, Positive Theological Research in Systematic Theology in Germany; J. E. WHITTEKER, The Minister's Sphere; PAUL H. C. SCHMIEDER, Church Orders of the Sixteenth Century; THEODORE E. SCHMAUK, Can Christianity Unite on the Disciples' Basis?; THEODORE E. SCHMAUK, Philosophy of the Disciples' Proposal for Christian Unity; J. C. MATTES, Use of the Lord's Prayer in the Consecration of the Sacrament at the Altar; T. KNAPPE, Permanent Menace of Rome; JOHN W. RICHARDS, Valerius Herberger: a Sermon; EDWARD T. HORN, Outcasts in India; J. M. HANTZ, The Apostolic Age and Writings Considered with Reference to Gospel of Mark.

Lutheran Quarterly, Gettysburg, July: WILLIAM B. PATTERSON, Significance of the Social Movement in the Church; J. M. REIMEN-SNYDER, The Character of Preaching; J. S. SIMON, The Righteousness of God; LUCY F. BITTENDER, German-American Literature; GEORGE H. SCHODDE, The Parables and Their Interpretation; CHARLES W. SUPER, Martin Luther in the Twentieth Century; WALTER KRUMWEIDE, The Book of Job; A Critical Study; AUGUST SPIECKMANN, Attitude of the Lutheran Church in America toward Modern Thought; WAYNE O. KANTNER, Confessional History of the General Synod.

Methodist Review, New York September-October: W. A. QUAYLE, Nec Timeo; S. PARKES CADMAN, George Eliot; HERBERT WELCH, Great Words of the Age; H. W. CONN, Eugenics vs. Social Heredity; HARRY F. WARD, Songs of Discontent; A. B. LEONARD, Value of Prophecy and Miracle; SAMUEL PLANTZ, Our need of the Productive Scholar; PAUL WEYAND, Beecher and Cleveland: A Sermon that Made a President.

Methodist Review Quarterly, Nashville, July: G. W. DYER, The Christian Home in Peril; D. M. KEY, Religious Experiences of R. L. Stevenson; R. E. ZEIGLER, P. T. Forsyth and his Theology; ALFRED BURBANK, Personal Observations in the Philippines; S. W. GILL, The Y. M. C. A. and the World's Problems; T. H. TIMMONS, My Capture and My Experience as a Prisoner of War; W. D. WEATHERFORD, The Amazing Progress of the Negro Race; J. W. BOSWELL, The Religious Status of Little Children; H. N. SNYDER, The College under Fire; C. W. MATHISON, Parasitism; ERNEST RICHARDS, St.

Clair and Major Pendennis; O. E. BROWN, *The Challenge of the New China*.

Missionary Review of the World, New York, September: MASUMI HINO, Ought Japan to Become a Christian Nation?; WILLIAM E. GRIFFIS, Bishop Channing M. Williams of Japan—Christian Pioneer, Spartan; KOZAKI KIRMICHI, The Kumamoto Band in Retrospect; MASIH PARSHAD, How I Became a Christian; MRS. T. C. ROUNDS, Louis Meyer—A Christian Prince in Israel; ROBERT H. GLOVER, The Real Heart of the Missionary Problem.

Monist, Chicago, July: RICHARD GARBE, Christian Elements in the Mähābhārata, Excepting the Bhagavadgītā; PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN, Robert Hooke as a Precursor of Newton; HENRI POINCARÉ, The New Mechanics; WILHELM O. FOCKE, History of Plant Hybrids; PAUL CARUS, Principle of Relativity as a Phase of Development of Science; J. W. POWELL, Books of Primeval History.

Moslem World, London, July: W. ST. CLAIR TISDALL, Shi'Ah Additions to the Koran; PROFESSOR MONTET, Saint Worship in North Africa; F. E. SCHÄFER, The Rosary in Islam; N. L. ROCKEY, Progress of Islam in Oudh; G. MONDAIN, Islam in Madagascar; S. M. ZWEMER, The Clock, the Calendar and the Koran; MISSES THOMPSON AND FRANCKE, The Zar in Egypt; S. VAN R. TROWBRIDGE, Mohammed's Views of Religious War.

Philosophical Review, Lancaster, September: J. W. SCOTT, Idealism as Tautology or Paradox; OSCAR EWALD, German Philosophy in 1912; THEODORE DE LAGUNA, Nature of Primary Qualities; CHARLES E. CORY, Bergson's Intellect and Matter; J. F. DASHIELL, 'Values' and the Nature of Science.

Reformed Church Review, Lancaster, July: A. S. WEBER, Contemporary Religious Thought; C. ERNEST WAGNER, An Essay of Provincialism; EDWIN M. HARTMAN, Some Practical Applications of Modern Psychology; EDWARD EVERETT HALE, JR., Politics out of Office; HIRAM KING, Identity of Christ; LEE M. ERDMAN, Sources of Gospel of Luke with Especial Reference to the Gospel of Mark; A. V. HIESTER, Contemporary Socialism.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, July: E. B. POLLARD, Luther Rice and His Place in American Baptist History; GIOVANNI LUZZI, Modernism; W. E. HENRY, Christ's Resurrection and the Father; ARTHUR YAGER, Should a Preacher Participate in the Political Life of his Country? If so, Why and How?; E. R. PENDLETON, The Kind of Ministry Needed To-Day; S. ANGUS, Hebrew, Greek and Roman. II; A. J. DICKINSON, Genesis of Epistle to Romans.

Yale Review, New Haven, July: A. PIATT ANDREW, The Crux of the Currency Question; HENRY H. CURRAN, What the Ten Year Sergeant of Police Tells; RALPH A. CRAM, Style in American Architecture; ANSON P. STOKES, JR., Historic Universities in a Democracy; DUNCAN PHILLIPS, Giorgione: The First Modern Master; CHARLTON M. LEWIS, William Vaughn Moody; AVARD L. BISHOP, High Cost of Living; CHARLES SCHUCERT, Climates of the Past; A. J. DUBOIS, The Religion of a Civil Engineer; LEE W. DODD, The Well Made Play.

La Ciencia Tomista, Madrid, Julio-agosto: A. COLUNGA, El don de

profecia; JUSTO CUERVO, Carranza y el Doctor Navarro; JOSE D. GAFO, Las Cortes y la Constitucion de Cádiz (con); VICENTE BELTRÁN, El Diccionario de la Teologia Católica de Vacant-Mangenot.

Lehre und Wehre, St. Louis, August: Etwas über die Gleichnisse unsers Herrn, sonderlich über ihren dreisachen Zweck; Das ersten Auftreten der römischen Kirche in Nordamerika und die Religionsfreiheit; Die trunkene Wissenschaft; was sie will, und warum wir wenig Respekt vor ihr haben.

Recherches de Science Religieuse, Paris, Juillet-Octobre: CAMILLE LAGIER, Le Pharaon du disque solaire of la révolution religieuse de Tell-Amarna; JOSEPH BRUCKER, Saint Cyran d'après ses lettres inédites; XAVIER ROIRON, Les plus anciens Prologues épistolaires chrétiens-Les Prologues ignatiens et les Prologues johanniques.

Revue Bénédicteine, Paris, Juillet: A Wilmart La Lettre de Potamius à Saint Athanase; G. MORIN, Un Nouvel opuscule de S. Pacien? Le *Liber ad Justinum* faussement attribué à Victorin; D. DEBRUYNE, L'Itala de Saint Augustin; J. CHAPMAN, On the "Decretum Gelasianum de libris recipiendis et non recipiendis"; G. MORIN, Les *Statua Ecclesiae antiqua* sont ils de Césaire d'Arles?; D. DEBRUYNE, Un vieux libraire romain: Gaudiosus; B. DEFRENNE, Les *Diaria* et les *Acta* du Concile de Trente.

Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie, Lausanne, Juillet: CHARLES WERNER, Le Problème de la destinée humaine dans la philonophie de l'action; GORGES BERGUER ET PIERRE BOVET, A propos d'un mystère; EUGÈNE DE FAYE, Les études gnostiques (1870-1912); ANDRÉ AESCHIMANN, Les traditions mosaïques.

Revue de Théologie et des Questions Religieuses, Montauban, Mai: HENRI BOIS, Adèle Kamm et Marie Flournoy; HENRI CHAVANNES, Balaam, sa psychologie, la formation de sa légende et les enseignements que l'histoire nous donne; CH. BRUSTON, Les derniers épîtres de saint Paul pendant et après sa captivité; C. VAN GELDEREN, A propos de la plus ancienne inscription cananéenne connue; La date du second voyage de Paul à Jérusalem.

Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, Paris Juillet: M.-D. ROLAND-GOSSELIN, L'intuition bergsonienne et l'intelligence; A. DIÈS, Le Socrate de Platon; A. LEMONNYER, Le culte de dieux étrangers en Israël; M. JUGIE, Sévérien de Gabala et la casualité sacramentelle; M. GILLET ET TH. BESIADÉ, Bulletin de Philosophie: Morale et Philosophie social; A. LEMONNYER, ET E.-B. ALLO, Bulletin de Science des Religions; M. JACQUIN, Bulletin d'histoire des institutions ecclésiastiques.

Theologische Studiën, Utrecht, Aflev. IV: TH. L. W. VAN RAVESTEYN, Jeremia's eerste prediking; K. SONIES, Het Hebreuwsche metrum; J. TH. UBBINK, Waarom de vier vrouwen in Evang. Matth. I?; J. DE ZWAAN, Philippenzen 3:20 en de *Kouή*.

Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, Innsbruck, III: JOHANN B. NISIUS, Zur Kontroverse über die Dauer der öffentlichen Wirksamkeit Jesu; FRANZ MÜLLER, Ist der Erlass Pius X über die erste hl. Kommunion der Kinder ein blosses Kirchengesetz; WILHELM KRATZ, Das vierte Gelübde in der Gesellschaft Jesu; ANTON PRESEREN, Die Beziehungen der Sonntagsfeier zum 3 Gebot des Dekalogs.

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